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The 
tot 


The 
pos 
oft 
filr 


Ori( 

beg 

the 

sior 

oth( 

first 

sior 

or 


The 
shal 
TINI 
whi( 

Map 
diffc 
entii 
begi 
righl 
requ 
metl 


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26X 

SOX 

V^ 

• 

12X 

16X 

20X 

24X 

28X 

32X 

aire 
details 
ues  du 
t  modifier 
ger  une 
I  filmage 


6es 


re 


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empreinte. 

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de  Tangle  sup6rieur  gauche,  de  gauche  d  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  ndcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mdthode. 


f  errata 
d  to 

It 

le  pelure, 

pon  d 


12  3 


1 


n 


32X 


6 


THE   WILL 


ITS  STRUCTURE  AND  AIODE  OF  ACTION. 


BY 


/ 


'^ 


JAMEvS  EDWIN  CREIGHTOX,  A.B. 


I'UINTED  nv 

ANDRrS   it    CitlRCH, 

ITIIACA,    IS9S. 


PREFACE. 


Tliis  essay  was  written  during  tlie  suininer  of  1891,  wliile 
I  was  a  student  in  the  Tniversity  of  Berlin,  and  ])resented 
to  the  Faculty  of  Cornell  University  as  a  thesis  for  the  doc- 
torate in  the  sprin<r  of  1S92.  At  that  time  I  hoped  to  be 
able  to  return  to  the  subject  and  make  what  I  had  done  the 
basis  for  a  more  extensive  investigation.  The  press  of  other 
engagements  and  duties  has,  however,  prevented  me  from 
carrying  out  this  plan,  and  the  essay  is  now  published  in  the 
form  in  which  it  was  first  written.  I  have  added  one  or  two 
foot-notes  while  reading  the  proofs,  but  made  no  other  altera- 
tions, though  if  I  were  writing  today  I  should  doubtless  lay 
different  emphasis  upcn  certain  points. 

My  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  Will  was  due  mainly  to 
the  psychological  writings  of  Wundt,  James,  and  Miinster- 
berg,  and  my  treatment  owes  much  to  each  of  these  writers. 
My  other  obligations  I  have  tried  to  acknowledge  in  full 
throughout  the  essay  itself. 

J.  K.  C. 


I 


TABLK  OF  COXTKNTS. 


I 


Chaptkr      I.  Thk.  Conckpt  ok  Wii.i., 

Chapter    II.  Thk  Dkvki.oi'.mkxt  ok  Wii.i,, 

Chapter  III.  Ax  Axalysis  ok  Wiij.ixg,     . 

Chaptkr   IV.  Thk  Rkkatiox  ok  Mixd  and  Body, 

Chapter     V.  The  Freedom  ok  the  Wii,l, 


7 
i8 

28 

46 

63 


I 


CHAI'THR   I. 


■i: 


Tin:  c<>\ci;i'T  oi-  WFi.i,. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  iniportanci'   to  atti-mpt,  first  of  all,  to 
define  the  conceptions  which   are   to  form  the  subject  of  our 
study.     What  do  the   terms  *  Will'   and  '  Willin.ij  '   si.irnjfy  ? 
The  extension  of  these  terms  have  varied  widely,  as  is  well 
known,  with  diiTerent  authors.      With  many  writers  '  Will  '  is 
only  used  to  denote  a  conscious  choice   between   alternative 
directions  of  activity,  and  is  i)redicated  only  of  such  individ- 
uals as  are  capable  of  rei)resentinj^>^  to  themselves  such  possi- 
bilities.'    Other  i)hilo.so))hers  widen  the  conception  bv  omit- 
tin<^  from  it  the  element  of  consciousness,  and  ihat  of  repre- 
sentation of  alternatives,  and  thus  extend  the  notion  of  will,  so 
as  to  make  it  synonymous  with  force  or  enerj^'-v  in  <^eneral.      In 
this  broader  sense  of  tlu-  w(jr(l.  Will  is  i)redicable  not  onlv  of 
persons,  but  also  of  all  phenomena  of  the  Tniverse,  and  of  the 
Universe  itself  as  a  whole.'     between  these  extreme  limits, 
we  find  various  definitions  and   uses  of  the  term,  as   one   or 
other  of  the  elements  constitutin,^;  the  concept  has  been  em- 
phasized or  removed.^ 

As  for  the  last  mentioned  theory,  that  of  vSchopenhauer 
and  his  school,  we  can  only  protest  a^aiust  such  a  confusion 
of  ideas  under  one  term.  We  know  '  Will '  only  throu(,rh 
our  own  immediate  experience,  and  as  an  element  of  our  con- 
scious life  ;  and,  as  thus  known,  consciousness,  not  less  than 
force,  is  always  an  element  of  the  empirically  given  fact.  To 
quote  from  Sigwart  :  "  From  this  point  of  view  an  uncon- 
scious Will  is  a  contradiclio  in  adjecto.     It  may  be  believed 


'  Martitieau.  A  Study  of  Rrliffioii,  I.  j),  19S  ;  II.  p.  iSS.     Si^wart,  A'/fin^ 
Schriftcn,  Vol.  II,  p.  iiS  fl. 

=  vScliopenhauer,  l^ie  IVelt  als  IVillc.     Wcrkc,  H,  pp.  1 1 3  ff. 

'  For  various  uses,  see  Marlineau,  Study  of  Religion,  II.,  p.  18S. 


1 


•  rikt  Will. 

that  uiicotiscious  activitits  take  place-,  and  have  the  same  re- 
sults as  those  which  we  call  will  ;  we  may  perhaps  even  be 
justified  in  eallint;  these  activities  Will  in  a  wider  sense,  but 
only  because  we  have  first  leariud  to  know  a  conscious  Will ; 
and  it  will  always  be  safer  to  choose  for  the  broader  concept 
another  term.  "  ' 

( )n  the  other  hand,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  notion  of  will 
as  a  separate  I'aciUty  has  tended  to  unduly  limit  the  notion. 
The  old  l*sycholo<;-y  rejj^arded  the  activities  of  the  self  as 
manifested  through  a  number  of  '  I'aculties'  such  as  Think- 
inj^',  I'erceivin^,  Willing,  etc.  It  was  toooften  for<.j'otten  that 
these  faculties  were  not  each  sin'  ileum's,  and  that  they  indi- 
cated nothiu,i,r  in  themselves  apart  from  the  nature  of  the  con- 
scious ])rocesses.  Apart  from  the  definite  content  of  con- 
sciousness, the  uni\'ersal  form  of  activity  is  only  an  abstraction 
whicli  leads  us  astray  and  defies  treatment.  As  a  result  of  the 
same  separation,  too,  a  larj^e  part  of  our  ment:d  life  was  con- 
ceived as  j^oinjj^  on  without  any  relation  to  the  Will.  It  was  sup- 
posed that  ordinarily  the  Associative  process,  with  its  own  pe- 
culiar laws,  sufficed  to  explain  mental  occurrences.  I>ut  at  cer- 
tain points,  more  or  less  fre(pient  in  the  life  of  the  individual, 
the  Will  as  a  kind  of  miraculous  function,  as  a  power  of  an  al- 
<i;ether  new  and  unique  nature,  was  sui)posed  to  intervene  and 
to  prove  its  sujicriority  to  the  ordinary  Associative  laws,  by 
subordiuatin*!^  them  to  its  commands,  or  reversing  their  di- 
rection. 

Modern  psychologists,  on  the  other  hand,  refuse  to  make 
this  sharp  and  absolute  distinction  between  Will  and  the  other 
processes  of  the  mental  life.  They  lay  emphasis  upon  the 
fact  that  in  "  all  sensation,  all  Association  and  Comparison  a 
constant  cooperation  of  the  Will  also  takes  place.  "  -  "  Asso- 
ciation, "  says  Wundt,  "  is  only  the  reflex  of  that  central 
unity  of  our  consciousness  whicli  we  immediately  perceive  in 

'  Kk'ine  Schriflen,   II.,  p.  ii6. 

'Green,  Prolegouiena  to  Ethics,  Sec.  132. 


riu'  Coinrpf  <>/   //'///.  ^J 

tlif  inner  and  ontcr  activitv  of  tlu-  Will.  '"  '  'riunkin<,s  IV'f- 
ccivin.i;,  etc.,  ..ic  (lilTt-ifnt  nanu's  wliicli  si;^iiif\  {\\v  iniploN-- 
nicMil  (.f  this  activit\-  in  dilTiTiMit  splu-rrs,  and  ii].(.ii  (iili\i,.iil 
kinds  of  snl)ji-ct  niattfi'. 

\\\'  nia\  name  all  ])s\eliic-al  arlivit\,  all  intlnriux^  whiil, 
the  si-If  exerts  npon  the  eoinse  of  events,  // ///  /;/  ///,  hnuuirr 
,NV//w  of  the  lirni.  In  so  far  as  the  self  asserts  ilsrlf  a.yainst 
inner  or  onter  (.-vents,  ami  niodifa-s,  or  strives  to  niodif\-  them, 
it  ma\  l)e  said  to  will.  I'.ut.  it  nia\-  Ik-  asked,  whv  should 
the  other  psyehieal  aeti\-ities  he-  snhsnined  nnder  willinw  ? 
'i'he  answer  to  this  ([Uestion  is  to  hi-  fonnd  in  the  faet  which 
will  he  emphasized  throughout  this  c-ssav,  that  tlu-  will  pi,,, 
eess  has  really  its  root  in  ilu-  selecti\e  aetivit\-  of  attention. 
And  it  is  true  that  this  activity  finds  employment  in  lli..-  con- 
strnetiou  of  our  perceptive  world,  and  in  tlu-  formation  of  our 
concepts  and  jndunients  re;4ardinM  it,  no  K-ss  than  ineffcetinir 
chanj^cs  in  the  stream  of  thon,^ht,  or  in  hodit-s  lyin-  external 
to  ns. 

<  )nr  perce])tive  world,  the  world  with  which  we  cnic  into 
immediate  contact  in  cver\-  day  exi)erience,  is  the  result  of 
choosinj^r,  out  of  the  iulinite  variety  of  things  hv  whi<-h  we 
are  snrronndcd,  some  objects  wdiich  arc  to  us  particnlarl\-  in- 
terestin^r.  As  no  two  men's  interests  are  exactly  identical, 
the  worlds  in  wdiich  they  live  can  not  be  absolntelv  identical. 
The  painter's  world  is  more  rich  in  beautiful  forms  and 
colors  than  that  of  the  ordinary  man  ;  the  musician  detects 
ill  the  moanino;  of  the  wind  harmonies  that  arc  h^st  on  an  ear 
le.ss  sensitive.  The  scientist's  percejitive  world  is  made  np 
of  a  variet)-  of  details  wdiich  simply  do  not  exist  for  the 
ordinary  man. 

The  influence  of  the  attention  in  constitntin^r  and  de- 
terminin^r  our  world  for  ns  i.s  plainly  .seen   as  we   pa.ss  from 


U.niudzui^r^.j,  /'/lysiol.  P.ur/io/,>o-u;  ist  Aui].  y,.  726;  (Y.  also  MotTdiii^r 
On//,>u's-o/P.m/!o/c>^y,Kuir.  trans,  j  pj,.  3,4;  ■•  u  is  ,,(,1  uk.ukIi  U,  say 
that  will  i.rece.k-s  coKniti..ii  and  feeling,  for  tlu-se  latu-r,  looked  at  one  from 
one  side,  are  themselves  manifestations  of  will  in  the  wider  sense." 


lO 


The   Will. 


ri' 


childhood  to  manhood.  I  was  very  much  interested  h\*:ely  in 
walkinj^'- witli  a  little  boy  to  find  that  the  thinj^s  he  saw  were 
almost  entirely  different  from  tliose  which  made  an  impres- 
sion U])()n  me.  Talkin*^  to  him  afterwards  of  what  he  had 
seen,  I  foimd  that  the  objects  of  his  experience,  what  he  had 
actually  seen  and  remembered,  were  thini>s  which  are  prac- 
tically absent  for  the  ordinary  adidt. 

This  fact  of  the  selective  function  of  the  will  in  ])erception 
is  well  illustrated  by  Professor  James  :  "  Let  four  men  make  a 
tour  in  luiropc.  One  will  brint(  home  only  pictnres([ue  im- 
pressions of  costumes  and  colors,  jxirks  and  views  and  works 
of  architecture,  pict'ire  and  statues.  To  another  all  this  will 
be  non-existent ;  distances  and  prices,  populations  and  drain- 
aj^e  statistics  will  take  their  ])lace.  A  third  will  j^ive  a  rich 
account  of  the  theatres,  restaurants,  and  public  halls  and 
naujfht  beside;  whilst  the  fourth  will  perhaps  have  been  so 
vvra])i)ed  in  his  own  subjective  broodin.tj^s  as  to  tell  little  more 
than  a  few  names  of  places  thr()U,q;h  which  he  ])assed.  Kach 
has  selected  out  of  the  same  mass  of  presented  objects  those 
which  suited  his  private  interests,  and  has  made  his  experi- 
ence thereby."  ' 

Leaviu}^  now  this  field  of  percejition,  and  comin.i;;'  to  what 
is  usually  rej^arded  as  the  higher  mental  activities,  we  find 
that  they,  tc^o,  manifest  to  a  striking  dej^ree  the  .selective  ac- 
tivity of  the  self.  Concepts  are  formed  from  percepts  by 
abstraction,  and  attention.  That  is,  the  concept-process  con- 
sists in  i)ickinii;  out  from  a  variety  of  percepts,  those  which 
seem  to  us,  in  accordance  with  our  interests  or  practical  needs, 
to  Hc*  the  most  essential  attributes  of  the  thinj^s  presented  to 
tia  lie  elements  thus  .selected  are  bound  together  by  means 
oi  i  common  name.  While  thus  essentially  individual  in 
tb.i"  ai*-nre,  the  common  or  universal  aspect  of  concepts  is 
intelligible  from  the  fact  that  liuman  beings,  as  mendjers  of 
the  same  world,  have  to  a  large  degree   the  same  practical 


l^ritn  i pies  of  Psychology y  Vol.  I,  p.  2S6. 


TJie   Conci'pl  of  Will. 


1 1 


needs.  Reasonino,  again,  may  ])e  de.scril)e(I  as  a  selection  of 
one  ont  of  many  conceptions  each  of  which  stands  in  snbordin- 
ation  to  a  hi.i^lier,  and  of  that  parlicular  ^v/,- which  will  serve 
as  a  connectin.o;  link  between  that  higher  and  some  lower 
conce])t  or  individnal  with  which  onr  i)ractical  interests  lead 
ns  to  connect  it.     Thus  in  the  svlloLnsm. 

M  is  \\ 

S  is  .M, 

vS  is  \\ 
what  we  done  is  to  .svAvV  from  the   nnnK-rou.s  notions    which 
are  comprehended  in  \\  the  ap})ropriatc  one  J/l)\-   means   of 
which  vS  can  ])e  bron.L;-ht  into  relation  with  /V      I^nt  not  only 
this  formal  process  of  rea.soninj^-,  bnt  th.e  very  content  of  one's 
thon.^hts  is  the  result  of  selection.      .Vs  the  accouiiKuiimjut 
of  physiolooical  currents  playin.o;  throu^-h  the  brain,  there  are 
constantly  offered  to  consciousness  ideas  of  which  the  i^reater 
number  vanish  immediately  and  without  bein,t,r  reflected  ujion. 
I  choose  certain  of  these  ideas,  in  accordance  with  my  theoreti- 
cal interests  or  practical   needs,   aud   ponder  over  them   and 
their  relation  to  other  ideas.      I  deliberately  make    them   the 
subject  of  my  thou,<^ht,  direct  my  attention  to   them,   and,  at 
the  same  time,   io;nore  the  ,u:reat  rank  and   lile  of  the  actual 
mental   proces.ses,   which,  con.sequently.   take  lio  jilace  in  mv 
thought  .series.     Out  of   the  infinitude  of  ideas  in  the  stream 
of  consciousness,  I  choo.se  tho.se  about  which  I  wish  to  think, 
1  emphasi/ce  some  and  neglect  others,  and  thus  literally    make 
my  experience  what  I  will  it  .>liall  l)e. 

It  is,  perhaps,  so  obvious  as  to  scarcely  recjuire  mention 
that  our  external  actions  are  oul\-  the  outcome  of  a  series  of 
selections.  As  a  rule,  when  I  ])erform  any  bodilv  act,  contract 
this  or  that  group  of  mu.scles,  some  other  movement  isalwavs 
physically  po.ssible  ;  and  in  so  fa'-  the  act  ])erformed  may  be  re- 
garded as  cho.sen.  Hut  to  say  that  an  act  is  willed,  expres.ses 
something  more  than  that  an   e  ent   has  taken   place   which 


'i 


'  O •  JatUfs,  /'y:>n-ip/t's  of  /\v,/i,)!oo\\\  Vol.  li,  p] 


)■  ,vii  If. 


12 


The   Will. 


% 


■' 


may  be  ref^ardud  as  one  of  several  possibilities.  Because  the 
results  are  the  same  as  if  willed,  because  events  have  oc- 
curred which  from  our  point  of  view  can  be  rcij^arded  as 
selections,  wc-  have  no  ri<4]it  to  reijjard  them  as  manifestations 
of  Will,  so  lonjj;  as  we  understand  the  term  in  its  ordinarv 
sij^nification.  What  I  mean  when  I  sav  '  I  will'  is  not  onlv 
that  one  out  of  a  number  of  ]:)ossibilities  will  result,  but  that 
the  selection  is  the  outcome  of  a  conscious  acti\'it\'  which  I 
idenlif\-  with  myself.  There  can  be  no  meaniu<;  in  the  term 
'  Will  '  unless  we  underst;ind  b\-  it,  the  act  of  a  conscious 
l)ein.n-.' 

P)Ut  we  have  still  more  difncull  (juestions  before  tis.  So 
far,  we  are  on  j^round  which  toda\'  is  ■carceh'  dis|)Uted. 
vSelection  and  consciousness  are  uni\-ersall\-  admitted  to  be 
inx'olved  in  the  <ir(linar\-  concept  of  willing;-.  As  soon,  how- 
e\'er,  as  we  incjuire  into  the  dci^rcc  of  consciousness  which 
must  attend  an  act  of  Will,  we  find  the  i^rcatest  differences 
of  opinion.  Can  there  be  an  act  of  will  without  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  end  for  the  sake  of  which  the  act  is  per- 
formed ;  and  does  such  an  act  alwa\s  in  '  —  the  clear 
consciousness  of  the  sewral  jiossibillties  or  al  '  -  '\-es  open 
at  the  time?  Many  writers,  with  the  ethicai  ;.i^^r'ficaLion  of 
acts  of  will  in  view,  have  answered  both  these  questions  in 
the  affirmative.  Thus  vSi^^wart  says  the  ])rop(>sition,  •  no 
will  without  end,'  is  analytic,  just  as  '  no  effect  without  a 
cause  '  is  analytic.'  It  must  certainly  be  admitted  that  all 
action  is  for  the  sake  of  somethinj^ ;  but  this  is  not  the  same 
thin<^  as  to  say  that  this  'soniethin<^'  for  the  sake  of  which  we 
act,  is  clearly  present  to  our  ordinary  consciousness.  It  ap- 
pears to  me  that  it  is  necessar>-  to  distin,t>;uish  sharply  be- 
tween the  ordinarN-  unreflective  consciousness  which   accom- 


'  It  iiiij4;hl  perhajis  l)e  said  that  not  only  consciousness,  but  also  a  nitioual 
consciousness  is  ])rt'-su]ii)Oscd  in  a  real  act  of  will.  As  Professor  Watson 
has  lately  retnarked  :   "  Only  a  rational  l.-einj.;  can  have  a  will." 

'K/eiii''  Sc/iyi/ti)t,  //.,  /)<•>■  /i,xr([f  (/cs  Wollois. 


1; 


The  Concept  of   Will. 


'3 


panics  a  lar<,re  part  of  our  dailx-  life,  and  the  more  delibera- 
tive critical  conscionsness  which  is  evoked  when  we 
psycholoo-ize,  or  when  some  crisis  arises  which  .lemands 
closer  consideration.  In  every  day  life,  a  conscious  end  to 
which  we  refer  each  act  is  as  mnch  a  fiction  as  the  theorv  of 
separate  isolated  sensations  which  are  consciouslv  comi)ared 
and  related.  Bnt  analysis  proves  that  the  end'  is  alwavs 
present  /;/  poln/lin,  in  the  sense  that  it  has  been  a  real 
factor  in  the  choice.  Snbseqnent  reflection,  too,  niav  ])rino 
to  lio-ht  the  part  which  it  has  plaxed. 

We  may  perhaps  make  the  matter  clearer  in  another  wav. 
On  an  analysis  of  my  consciousness,  I  find  over  and  above 
the  transient  i)sychical  states,  certain  more  permanent  ele- 
ments. In  addition  to  the  jxissin,.;  sensations  of  si,<rlit,  sonnd, 
etc.,  there  arc  present  the  somewhat  fixed  mnscnlar  sensa- 
tions ;  besides  the  more  ephemeral  interests  and  ideals  which 
from  time  to  time  becomes  satisfied  and  realized,  there  are 
more  abidin-  ends  and  interests  which  are  more  intimately 
connected  with  myself.  Indeed,  it  is  these  which  I  uronp 
tocretheras  myself.  I  am  not,  however,  conscious  of  "them 
in  detail  durinu;  my  ordinary  life  ;  but  just  because  thev  are 
comparatively  permanent  they  are  ne-lected.  Their  influ- 
ence, however,  can  at  once  be  percieved  as  soon  as  an 
analysis  is  made  by  reflectino;  on  previous  action.s. 

The  other  cpiestion,  viz.,  whether  in  a  case  of  willing  there 
must  be  present  the  representation  of  at  least  two  possilde 
lines  of  action,  is  closely  allied  to  this.  As  a  j^eueral  rule,  in 
performing  the  routine  of  everv-day  life,  we  scarcelv  consider 
or  reflect  at  all  ;  we  act  as  we  have  been  accustomed  to  act 
111  like  circumstances.  In  familiar  circumstances,  we  act  in 
accordance  with  certain  practical  maxims  or  receipts,  and  the 
one  line  of  action  is  adopted  without  the  others  comin<r  i„t„ 
clear  conscicnisne.ss  at  all.  Hut  inasmuch  as  the  act  performed 
was  chosen  or  adopted,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  sa^•  that  it  was 
7cillal  The  most  of  cases  that  come  up  in  ordinarv  life  are 
at  once  adopted  or   rejected,   because  thev  are  immediatelv 


14 


The   Will. 


\h. 


!' 
■ill' ' 

1:1. 


])crccivc(l  to  ])c  consistent  or  inconsistent  with  the  ])nrpose  of 
the  life,  or  of  the  day.  It  is  only  more  rarely  that  it  is  not 
evident  which  one  of  several  actions  will  be  best  adapted  to 
our  ])ur])o,se,  and  that  we  find  ourselves  confronted  by  a  prob- 
lem which  cannot  be  settled  in  the  off-hand  way  described 
above.  When,  however,  in  conseciuence  of  a  new  combina- 
tion of  circumstances,  such  a  crisis  arises,  the  choice  caimot 
be  made  without  a  clear  representation  of  the  \arious  com- 
lietiu.i,'-  ])ossil)ilities,  nor  without  more  or  less  prolonj^ed  de- 
liberation upon  the  results  of  the  various  courses    of  action. 

It  may,  ])erhaps,  be  advanta,^;eous  to  denominate  cases  of 
willinj^-  Will  ill  the  iiarroTver  sriisi\  or  explicit  acts  of  will, 
where  the  choice  has  been  made  after  a  clear  conscious- 
ness of  different  jujssible  acts,  and  of  their  relation  to  an 
end.  We  may  then  distint^nnsh  from  this  fully  con- 
scious sta_s^e,  //'///  /;/  the  broader  sense,  or  implicit  acts 
of  will,  where  the  consciousness  of  the  other  possibilities  is 
not  so  clearly  present,  but  where  the  act  follows  the  represen- 
tation of  some  one  line  of  action  as  a  matter  of  course.  It 
must  be  kept  in  mind,  however,  that  no  hard  and  fast  line 
can  be  drawn  between  explicit  and  implicit  acts  of  will,  nor 
between  acts  which  are  implicitly  willed,  and  those  which 
are  merely  manifestations  of  unconscious  or  subconscious 
tendencies  and  instincts. 

We  shall  endeavor  to  show  in  Cha])ter  II,  that  one  species 
of  act  pas.ses  into  another  by  infinite  .(gradations.  Just  as  on 
the  spectrum  we  cannot  say  that  at  any  fixed  point  red  ends, 
and  yellow  be<;ins,  so,  I  think,  we  are  unal)leto  fix  any  divid- 
ing- line  in  the  ^gradual  development  of  Will,  as  it  passes  from 
unconscious  and  instinctive  manifestations  to  the  clear  light 
of  deliberative  choice.  The  distinction  just  made,  however, 
although  not  absolute,  will  prove  useful  in  avoiding  con- 
fusions in  our  subsequent  discussions. 

When  we  speak  of  Will,  we  denote  a  mental  occurrence 
which  has  for  its  object  either  the  production  of  something 
which  does  not  yet  exist,  or  the  holding  fast  of  something 


The   Coincp/  of    Will, 


^5 


wliich  we  already  possess,  ami  which   is  in  (lan.oir  of  heiiu'- 
displaced   by  soinethin<,r  else.      In  I.oih  cases,  there  is  a  rei)re- 
sentation   of  what  is  willed  ;  and  if  the  act  of  will    has   hcen 
exi)licit,  there  is  also  a  representation  (»f  other  possihilities. 
In  the  first  case,  when  the  will  is  directed  towards  realizin.s^r 
soniethin.<,r  that  does  not  yet  exist,  the    act  folhnvs  oftentimes 
withont  the  competition  of  other  representations.      So  sonn  as 
the  act  is  thon.<,dit  of,  it  is  ai  once  consented  to,  and  adopted. 
Ill  the  other  case,  where   the  will  is  exerted   to  maintain    the 
present   condition   of  alTairs,  it  is  more   likely  to  he  explicit. 
Very  often  we  simply  enjoy   the  present  without  willin.tr  its 
continuance.       It   is  only   when    somethino-  dse  comes   hilo 
competition  with   the  emi)loynienl  or  enjoyment  of  the  pres- 
ent that  the  will  is  called  into  exercise  at  all.      If  I  am  seated 
at  my  desk  readino-  or  writinu;,  I  do  not  recpiire  to  constantlv 
exercise   my  will    to   remain    there.      It   is  onlv   when  some 
other  alternative  presents  itself,  r.  ,;>..   that  of  takin-  a  walk, 
or  of  makin.tr  a  visit,  that  an  act  of  will   is  necessaiw  to  con- 
tinue  my    work.      If,   however,   these  competin,!,^   attractions 
present  themselves  and   I  still  decide  to  remain  where   I   am, 
it  is  because  this  has  been   willed  \n  oppositioii   to  the  other 
courses  which   have  presented  themselves  to  me. 

Further,  Will  must  be  directed  to  sometliin.L,r  which   I  be- 
lieve myself  capable  of  realizino-.      It  must  have  reference  to 
an  act  which  I  can  perform,  or  believe  that   I   can   perform. 
It  is  not  possible  that  I  should  will   that  a  raiin-  dav  should 
become  fine;  because  I  can  not  represent  this'to  mvself  as 
lying  within  my  power.     The  means  for  the  realization   of 
any  end  which  I  will  must   be  such  as  .seem   to  be  subject  to 
my  control.      To  will    the  end   implies   the  willing  of   the 
means ;  and,  further,  a  belief  that  these  means  are  such  as  lie 
within  our  reach.      It  is   true   that  sub.seciuent   deliberation 
may  teach  us  that  we  were  mistaken,   that  the  end  can  only 
be  obtained   through  the  employment  of  means  which  we  are 
unable  or  unwilling  to  adopt,  but  when  this  becomes  obvious, 
we  do  not  any  longer  will  that  the  end  shall  be  realized. 


1 6 


Thr    Will. 


%. 


K 


What  has  just  l)cen  said  enables  us  to  distinguish  between 
'  Desire '  and  '  Will  '.  The  former  implies  only  a  mere 
lookinjj^  towards  the  end,  without  any  eonsideratiou  of  means. 
The  latter  is  i)ractical,  it  sets  the  machinery  agoino;  to  ac- 
complish the  end,  and  1)e<^ins  with  the  member  of  the  series 
which  lies  nearest  to  hand.  A  wish,  then,  may  be  di- 
rected to  what  lies  wholly  beyond  one's  power  to  re- 
alize, and  it  may  be  wliolly  uni)ractical  ;  /.  <'.,  take  no 
account  whatever  of  the  means.  Thus,  for  example,  one  may 
desire  win<^s,  or  the  power  to  l)e  in  two  jilaces  at  the 
same  time.  For  the  same  reason,  it  is  quite  pd  .ible  to  desire 
certain  ends  while  the  sole  means  for  their  realization  is  not 
at  all  desired.  For  example,  I  may  desire  to  become  learned 
or  rich,  and  still  may  not  desire  to  burn  the  midnight  oil,  or 
to  practice  prudence  and  economy,  as  these  ends  demand. 

One  word  further  regarding  the  relation  of  Desire  and 
Will.  We  have  seen  that  mere  Desire  is  inoperative  and  in- 
effectual in  attaining  its  object.  Desire,  however,  passes 
into  Will  when  the  unpractical  '  would  that  it  were '  is  re- 
inforced by  the  rational  '  let  it  be,'  or  it  '  must  not  be  '  of 
the  self,  which  speaks  with  a  consciousness  of  what  the  act 
really  involves.  Desire,  we  may  say,  is  the  expression  of 
the  nature  of  a  sensitive  being,  while  Will,  in  the  sense  in 
wdiich  we  propose  to  use  the  term,  belongs  only  to  a  rational 
being  who  has  already  attained  some  capacity  for  '  looking 
before  and  after,"  and  who  is  able  to  perceive  the  essential 
unity  of  end  and  means. 

In  conclusion,  we  may  emphasize  the  fact  that  will  is  a 
mental  and  not  a  physical  phenomenon.  It  is  not  necessary, 
that  is,  that  an  act  of  will  shall  be  manifested  in  a  series  of 
muscular  movements.  We  may  will  without  moving  a 
muscle.  All  the  ])henomena  of  will  ma)-  be  present  in  con- 
sciousness though  there  is  no  perceptible  result  so  far  as  the 
external  world  is  concerned.  As  Professor  James  some- 
where says,  '  willing  is  a  relation  between  the  mind  and  its 
ideas,  not  between  the  mind  and   the  external  world.'      The 


1 

I 


-» 


I'H, 


r  ■ 


r 


1 


1 


The   Concept  of  Will.  J- 

phenoiiiena  wliich  are  to  form  the  subject  of  tliis  study,  then, 
are  psycholo,o;ical  processes,  aud  it  is  uiaiuly  with  au  ai'ialNsis 
and  description  of  these  phenomena  that  we  shall  be  con- 
cerned tlirou-hout  tlie  two  followin-  chai)ters.  When  this 
task  has  been  completed,  we  shall,  howe\-er,  proceed  to 
discuss  the  relation  of  mind  and  bod>-,  and  shall  fniallv  con- 
sider in  what  sense  it  is  possible  to  speak  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will. 


CHAPTER   II. 


Tin-;  1)i:vi;l()I'MI';nt  oi*  wii.i,. 


There  is  no  doubt  that  it  will  be  more  easily  possible  to 
analy/e  an  overt  and  clearlv  conscious  act  of  will,  than  to  de- 
termine the  nature  of  jjrocess  which  arc  lari^eh'  instinctive, 
and  which  ^o  ou  for  the  most  part  below  the  threshold  of  con- 
sciousness. In  attem])tinp  to  analyze  the  phenomena  ])resent 
in  consciousness  durin*;;-  an  act  of  volition,  we  shall  accordiuj^ly 
select  such  an  overt  act  as  the  subject  of  our  analysis.  lie- 
fore  we  bej^in  this  undcrtakin.^,  h()we\-er,  it  seems  advan- 
tay;eous  to  see  what  lij^ht  is  thrown  uj)on  the  nature  of  the 
explicit  will  processes  by  attemptin,t:[  to  trace  brielly  their 
genesis  from  earlier  and  more  simple  forms. 

In  the  fir.st  place,  we  remark  that  the  will  is  an  elementary 
and  ori^^inal  process  of  our  conscious  life.  Xo  matter  how 
far  back  we  may  ])ush  our  investi.i;ations,  we  shall  always 
find  the  will  present  as  a  reaction  of  the  .self  upon  the  con- 
scious content.  All  attempts  to  derive  will  from  st)mething 
which  is  generically  from  it,  must  necessarily  prove  fruitless. 
This  assertion  scarcely  needs  proof  at  the  present  time,  and 
we  may  perhaps  content  ourselves  by  referring  to  the  futility 
of  Herbart's  attempt — which  is  perhaps  now  almost  uni- 
versally acknowledged — to  derive  will  from  the  relation  be- 
tween representations.  While  emphasizing  the  uniquene.ss 
of  the  will  process,  however,  modern  psychology  also  points  out 
the  organic  unity  and  interrelation  of  the  whole  mental  life. 
Wliile  the  old  faculty  theory  separated  sharply  between  knowl- 
edge and  volition,  modern  psychologists  maintain  that  in  all 
sensation,  all  association  and  comparison,  will  is  also  present 
as  a  factor.  The  voluntary  control  of  thoughts  is  regarded  as 
a  process  involving  will  not  less  than  wdiat  we  usually  call  vol- 
untary acts,  and  which  produce  an  elTect  in  the  external  world. 
In  short,  we  may  say  with  Hoffding,  "  the  problem  of  will  is 


1 


Tlir   l^r:eIop))irnt  of'  Will. 


19 


coiiccriK-d  with  the  \v^\\\.  conception  and  uudcrstandini^  of 
attention."'  To  understand  the  natntc  of  will,  that  is,  we 
must  be^dn  with  will  itself.  In  other  words,  our  develoii- 
ment  must  he  (iiil,[ornrn'(\  not  thtcyoocnilicr  We  UHr-;t  .L;i\e 
up  all  attempts  to  derive  will  from  something  dilTerenl  from 
itself,  and  confine  ourselves  to  an  in\esti.L;ation  of  how  eoni- 
ple.x  deliberative  acts  are  e\()lved  from  more  simple  i»ur])ose- 
less  acts.  There  are,  sa\s  Wundt,'  two  (piestions  to  he  an- 
swered :  (I)  ''What  are  the  relations  of  the  ])rimiti\-e  inner 
activitN'of  will  to  the  other  phenomena  of  consciousness?  (2) 
How  does  the  outer  activity  of  will  arise  '"rom  tlie  inner?" 
We  shall  so  far  as  jiossihle  treat  these  (piestions  separatelv, 
althotioh  it  will  he  fon.nd,  as  we  jirocecd,  that  inner  and  outer 
manifestations  of  will  act  and  react  n])on  each  other. 

We  have  already  asserted,  that  in  every  sta.^-c  of  conscious 
develoi)meut,  there  is  always  some  acti\ity  manifested  1)\-  tlie 
individual,  which,  however,  becomes  explicit  onlv  in  volition. 
This  is  the  activity  of  apperce])ti()n  ;  and  without  this  our  ex- 
perience would  be  a  mere  series  of  .sei)arate  feelinjr.s,  entirely 
wanting-  in  an\-  unity.  But  since  it  is  in  virtue  of  the  s\nthetic 
and  dynamic  character  of  consciousness  that  our  ex])eriencc 
forms  a  whole,  we  ma\-  re}.,^ard  apperception  as  an  orijrjnal  ele- 
ment. As  we  fnul  tliis  activity  in  lower  forms  of  conscious- 
ne.ss,  however,  it  is  a  blind,  irrational  resjKjnse  to  some  ob- 
ject which  is  immediately  plea.sant  or  unpleasant.  When 
strou,i;-  or  absorbing- sen.satious  fill  consciousness,  this  activitv 
seems  crowded  out  and  to  give  no  sign  of  its  existence.  At- 
tention in  such  cases  seems  to  be  '  a  function  of  the  object ' 
rather  than  of  the  subject.  I'.ut  a  more  or  less  rapid  change 
of  content  is  a  condition  both  of  conscious  activity  and  of  con- 
sciousness itself.  When  a  change  takes  place,  when  a  new 
sensation  makes  its  appearance,  the  activity  of  the  Will  i.s  man- 


'  Vicrteljahrscli.  f.  wissfusuli.      Pliih.s.,  15(1.  Xl\'.,  Ht't.  3,  \^\^.  29. 

'  Cf.  also  Haldwiii,  Firliiiff  auii  Will,  ]>.  34-7. 

'  WuikU,  (.riduhui^c  dcr  P/iysiol.   /'s_niiolo,i;/t;  7,'"  Ann.   Hil.  II,  p.  465 


20 


Thr    Will. 


ifosUd  ill  lilt.'  iiiD'K'  of  its  ivccptiDU.  'I'lic  two  \va\-s  in  which 
this  iiivohiiUiiry  appc-riH-jitioii  iiianifcsts  itself  arc  liy  attraction 
ami  rc'|)nlsion.  If  the  new  stale  is  infirrs/im^,  i.  c'.,  if  it  in- 
troduces a  pleasant  chan!L,a-  into  iIr-  existiiij^-  stale  of  con- 
sciousness, tin-  attention  is  directed  towards  it  ;  if,  for  any 
reason,  it  is  unpleasant,  the  acti\'ity  is  employed  in  snpi)ress- 
in<^  it  so  far  as  ])ossil)le.  This  constitutes,  as  IIi'ilTdinn'  re- 
marks "an  elementary  choice,  and  determines  the  manner  in 
which  thin.i^s  shall  appear  to  us.  As  plants  turn  to  the  li.i^ht, 
so  our  percejitive  faculties  turn  to  that  which  excites  ])leasure 
and  interest,  and  away  from  that   which  excites  pain.  '"  ' 

The  selection  at  this  sta,t;e,  however,  is  altogether  hlind  and 
instinclive.  It  is  a  mere  straiuin;.^  towards  what  is  immedi- 
ately pleasant,  and  awa\-  from  what  is  immediateU'  painful. 
A  hii^her  sta^e  can  only  he  attained  throuj^h  the  de\elopnient 
of  memory  and  intellect.  This  is  reached  when  ihe  ac- 
tion is  <»-nided  \)\  the  idea  of  the  result,  as  hased  on  pre\-i- 
ous  experience,  and  represented  to  consciousness.  There  is 
thus  a  kind  of  i)rei)aration  for  the  result.  Tlie  function  of  the 
representation  thus  present  to  consciousness  is  to  determine 
to  a  threat  extent  what  shall  be  perceived.  W'e  see  and  hear 
nuiinh'  what  we  look  for  and  exi)ect.  This  preparatory 
action  of  attention,  or  of  the  will,  is  also  shown  in  the  ex- 
periments on  reaction  time.  When  attention  is  din.'cted  to 
the  movements  to  he  performed,  the  reaction  time  is  much 
les.s  than  in  the  cases  where  it  is  directed  toward  the  expected 
stimnlus.  At  this  period  of  development,  we  have  ^ot 
beyond  the  sta<;e  of  blind  instinctive  action,  and  are  at  the 
stage  of  impulse.  We  have  not  a.s  )'et  Will  in  the  narn^wer 
sense  of  a  choice  between  motives,  but  Will  which  follows  a 
single  re])resentation.  There  can,  under  these  circumstances, 
be  no  voluntary  choice  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  ;  for 
there  is  only  a  single  motive  present,  and  the  action  follows 
unhesitatinglv  in  its  direction. 


'  Ih'WTdiiitr,  ()iii/i)u-s  of  Psvcholoiiw  p.  314. 


Tlh     nt:;l,>p)>h  Ht  of  Will. 


21 


A   ival   clioicc  tirst  arises  wIkmi  diflVivnt  iinptilsrs  t-oiitlict 
witli  taoh  ollicT,  and  \vc  aiv  acrin(liii,i;!y  CMtiipL-llfd  to  \vm\sk-  and 
si'tllf  tln'  rival  clainrs  of  ))ossil)k'  coniprtiuj^  linrs  of  .irlion.     It 
is  lA-idtnt    lliat  wi'  do  not  find  >ncli  powc-r  of  dtdihcralion   to 
an\-  extent  anions^  the  lowir  animals.      In  tluir  ease,   tiien-  is 
no  hahnieini;-  ol   niotiws,  no  \vei<,diin};  of  attraetions  against 
eaeh  other.      In  the  same  wav,  tile  child's  arts  are  at  first   all 
inipiilsive   in   character.      The  object  of  the  whole  curse  of 
liis  practical  education  is  to  make  him  ///////•;  /.  r.,  to  inhihit 
impulsive  action   ])y  the  idea  of  conse.iuenees  ;  or,  at  a  later 
sta.L;e   of  devclo])nient,    hy  th.e  desire  to  l)rin,i;   all    the  acts  of 
the  individual  life  into  relation  with  somelliiii,L,r  which    he  re- 
o;ards  as  an  end  in  itself.      Sneji  a  idioice  recpiiivs  a  de.L;ree  of 
mental   deve]oi)iiient,   and   a    pov,er  of  deliberation  and  coiii- 
])arisoii,  which    is  not    found    in  youn;;   children  nor  in  most 
an:mals.      Ilowex-er  important  an  advance  is  marked  1)\-  a  de- 
liberate (dioice  between  se\eral   coni])etin,L;    nioti\-es,  \et   it   is 
exident  that   such   selections   have  developed   ,L;ra<luall\-    from 
impiulse  acts.      In   ;i   ,L;iven   case,  it   is  often    difficult   to   sav 
whetlier  the  act   has   been  determined   b\-  a  sin.^le    nioti\e,  or 
whether   other   considerations    were    also    present,    but    ha\i' 
been,  in  comparison  with  th.e  victorious  nioti\-e,  so  weak   and 
inelfectua.],  that   they   obtained    no   hold    uixm   conscicnisness. 
Accordin,;^   to   Lotze   and   some   bhi.^lish  etiiical  writers.  Will 
implies  a  deliberate  choice  betwx'cn   two   or  more  conii)etim« 
possibilities."      Hut   this  is   not  sonietliin,^'-  radically  different 
from    manifestations   of  which  we  have   been   treatin.^-  at  an 
earlier  sta.L^e,  but  is  the   highest  and  most  complete  de\eloj)- 
ment  of  Will.      ''The  selection   of   i)assive,   the  attention  of 
reactive  actions,  find  their  fruition  in  the  fiat  of  volitional  coii- 
.sciousne.ss."-     We  may  describe  these  phenomena   as  coiisti- 
tutin,<;  a  coni]dex  and   intensified  form  of  Will.      It  is  com- 


Wicrocu^vi,)^  /.,  jS6.       .MartiiR'au,   Tvpcs  of  I-llhical  Tiuorv,  \\A.  II.,  j.p. 
^Baldwin,  /•"(■(■//;/i,'.s' «;/(///■  7//,  J).  347. 


22 


Thr    Will. 


|)k'\,  for  there  arc  scwral  disiincl  slaj^a-s  or  proct'sscs,  the 
ri'])rc'st'ntatioii  of  sevt-ral  possible  decisions,  deliheralioii  upon 
the  eoiisr(pu-iiees  of  eac-h  of  these,  and,  iinallv,  the  act  of  Will 
proper,  whieli  last  in  it>rlf  set-nrs  more  conscious  than  the 
activity  of  tln'  instinctive  or  ini])nlsive  stajLje.' 

As  l)efore  remarked,  it  is  impossible  to  draw  any  sharj) 
dividing  line  between  uni-niotived  and  i)lnial-niotived  acts. 
'I'he  one  j)asses  l)\  imperceptible  sta<^es  into  the  other. 
Ncveriheless,  it  is  a  moment  of  ilu-  utmost  importance  for 
the  development  of  the  Will,  when  a  tonllict  between  differ- 
ent motives  arises,  and  the  ori^^-inal  impulse  is  resisted.  Xow 
for  the  first  time  the  action  becomes  volnntary.  The  volun- 
tar\'  act,  howewr,  is  not  something  which  suddeidy  comes 
upon  the  scene  and  supersedes  all  other  modes  of  action. 
Hut  throujj^hout  iifi-  the  ^rcat  majorit\-  of  our  acts  are  per- 
formed from  instincl  or  impulse,  and  a  deliberate  choice  is 
more  rare  than  is  j^i-'Uiralh-  inia<j[ined.  iMirther,  in  lower 
forms  of  conscious  life,  there  are  what  we  ma\-  perhaps  call 
incipient  choices.  "  I',\en  in  instinct,  a  certain  choice  takes 
place  in  so  far  as  se\'eral  simultaneous  perccjitions  awaken 
.several  different  impidses,  of  which  the  stron.ner  leads  to 
action.  iMirther,  a  sense  perception  can  call  U])  a  representa- 
tion, even  before  the  imi)ulse  has  led  to  action,  which  has  as 
a  result,  an  imi)ulse  in  direct  opposition  to  the  first.  The 
action  may  at  once  be  determined  1)\'  the  rclati\-e  strength  of 
the  inii)nlses  without  any  len,L;thened  deliberation  of  which 
corresponds  to  an  end.  Hetween  this  instinctive  choice 
(which  has  more  the  nature  of  ])assive  choice)  and  the  fully 
self-coi  cious  subordination  of  individual  motives  under  a 
maxim  or  a  law,  there  are  infinitely  numerous  intermediate 
links."'  The  distiucti\e  feature  of  voluntar)-  or  deliberative 
acts  of  will,  is  the  abstraction  from  the  immediate  soliciting 
power  of  dilTerent  impulses,  and  their  e\'aluation  according;-  to 


'Kull)f,  nil'  I.t'liir  :o)ii  U'i/lcii,  p.  72. 
'^Schneider,  Der  inciisc/ilii'fw  U'il/f,  p.  2>*x), 


Tlh'  /),:r/,)pnirnf  of   Will. 


n 


tile  iilca  of  soiiK'  piTiiiaiU'iU  mil.  W'r  can  ii<i\v  ])<.'rcc'ive 
iiKni'  clcarK'  \vh\-  \i)lnnlai\  acts  should  he  called  an  iuleti- 
sivc  form  of  Will.  Allhoii).^h  the  activilv  -if  apitcrccpliou 
can  he  i)crcci\-c(l  e\i'ii  in  insiinctixc,  and  still  more  ck-arlv  in 
inijjnlsivc  acts,  yet  it  manifests  itself  niu>i  unmisiakahK  in 
V()lnntar\'  acts.  In  lurnin.i;  the  attention  now  to  this,  now  to 
that  possihilitN',  in  deliheiatin<4-  and  relleclini^  over  llu-  coii- 
.secineiices,  and  evaluating  the  diffennt  im])nlses  in  ndation 
to  an  end,  tlu'  Will  manifests  itself  as  the  a))solute  ceiitie  of 
personality.  It  is  this  iuteusitied  form  of  Will  which  compels 
recojj^nition,  and  which  can  not  he  e.\])laini'd  as  niercK-  the  per- 
•sistenci'  in  consciousness  of  the  strongest  impression,  h'or 
my  own  j)arl,  it  seems  indisputable  that  attention  is  more 
than  *  predominance  of  an  idea  in  consciousness.' 

It  is  the  iuiniediali'  consciousness  of  our  own  acti\il\',  as 
thus  emphasized  and  intcnsitierl  in  the  act  of  choice,  \  hich 
C(»nstitutes  our  feeliui;  of  iMXedoui,  upon  which  the  sense  of 
rcs])onsil)ility  is  often  supposed  to  rest.  .\s  an  empiricallv 
given  fact,  this  exi)erience  ,L;i\'cs  no  tcstimon\-  ret^aidin.L;  the 
ultimate  (piestion  of  freedom  ;  hut  only  asserts  that  we  act 
without  compulsion,  that  we  are  forced  or  pushed  1)\-  nothinj^ 
outside  ourselves,  that  the  .self  is  the  centre  from  which  it  has 
orij^inated.  '  Without  that  feelinj^r,  iln^  uioral  judi^tncnts 
which  we  pass  u|)on  our  own  acts  would  he  unmeaning. 
With  that  feeling,  and  because  of  it,  we  recogni/.e  the  action 
to  be  our  own  and  accordingly  hold  oursel\-es  responsible.  " 
This  i.s  the  basis  of  our  practical  freedom,  while  the  more 
ultimate  and  metaph.ysical  question  can  be  answered  either 
way  without  ])rejudice  to  our  notions  oi  duty  or  responsi- 
bility. '■ 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  development  of  outer  acts  of 


•Cy.  WuiuU,  I-:tliik.  1st  ed..  ]>.  39S. 

'  HolTdiiijr,  Die  GfSt'l-indssii^kril  Jr>-  f>syiiiisLhi'u  .hliz'ilat,  V.  f.  w.  Phil. 

XV.,  pp.  373  fr. 

'Siilgwick,  'J'/tc  Methods  of  I'lthics,  \).  70  ff. 


24 


The   Will. 


Will,  as  nianifcstcd  most  iiniiicdiately  in  chanj^es  in  the  mus- 
cles of  onr  own  body.  This  de\elojMnent,  of  course,  f^oes 
alonj^r  with,  and  is  supplementary  to,  the  j^rowth  of  Will  as 
phenomena  of  consciousness.  We  have  treated  of  the  de- 
velopment of  the  latter  separately  so  far  merely  for  the  sake  of 
clearness. 

All  bodily  movements  may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  the 
jMirely  ])hysiolo<^ical,  and  the  ps\cholo<^icai.  The  ph\siolo}^i- 
cal  movements  ^6  on  mechanically,  and  are  not  attended  by 
consciousness,  or,  at  most,  it  is  only  the  result  of  the  mo\'e- 
ments  which  enters  into  consciousness.  In  i)s\ch()lo<^ncal 
movements,  on  the  contrary,  a  more  or  less  distinct  representa- 
tion of  the  movement,  or  of  its  couseciuence,  precedes  its  actual 
occurrence.  The  former  class  of  movements  may  be  either 
automatic  or  refle.x.  Automatic  or  spontaneous  movements 
ori<,nnate  within  the  organism  itself,  from  some  chan<;-e  in  the 
conditit)n  of  the  blood,  or  through  some  other  chani^e  in  the 
ort^anism.  A  reflex,  on  the  other  hand,  takes  ])lace  when  the 
nerve  current  which  has  been  carried  to  the  sensory  centre 
passes  out  by  the  motor  path  without  any  state  of  conscious- 
ness havinj^  preceded.  Automatic  movements  are  y;enerally 
random  and  purposeless,  and  continue  throu.t^h  life,  blind, 
spontaneous  discharijes  of  physioloj^ical  eneri^y.  Rellex 
mover.ients  differ  from  these  in  bein^i;  usualh-  purposive 
when  ihestimidus  is  of  medium  intensity. 

0\iQ  theoiy  of  the  de\elopnient  of  outer  acts  of  will  holds 
that  ail  acts  were  at  llrst  either  automatic  or  reflex  ;  and  that 
from  these,  voluntary  movements  were  developed.  Bain  and 
Preyer  suppose  that  at  first  all  movements  were  j^urely  phvsi- 
oloi^ical,  consciousness  in  the  meantime  beinj^  a  mere  on- 
looker and  oliserving  the  results.  In  the  coui'se  oi  time, 
however,  it  learns  to  direct  these  movements  for  its  own 
ends — to  inhibit  those  which  have  painful  results,  and  to  ])ro- 
duce  those  which  are  j)leasant.  At  first  the  influence  of  con- 
sciousness is  small  ;  but  it  gradually  gains  power  over  the 
phvsiological  movements,  and   subordinates  them  to  its   cou- 


\ 


-i 


iMi 


The  Drrelopnicnt  of  Will. 
trol.      If  now  \vc  separate,  as  tliis  thcorv  does,  conscioii 


25 


s  11  ess 


from    tile   ori<>;iual 


inovenieiits,  it    is  (lifTienlt   to   luulerstand 


how  they  are  aoaiu  to  be  eoinbined.     Just  how  tlie  Will  should 
at  a  certain  point  take  control  of  movements  which  previous- 
ly went  on  independently  of  it,  we  are  not  told.      It  is  (piite  in- 
explainable  on  this  theory,  too,  how  the  Will  should  discover 
that   certain   movements   are   subject    to   its  fiat,  and   change 
from    a    mere    onlooker    to    an    actual    a,L,aMil.      Mt)reover,  as 
Wnndt  says  :   "  What  an   absurd   conclusion    to  suppose  that 
animals  and  men  have  c(Mne  to  the  world  as  purely  theoretic 
beino;s.      Alter  they  have  experienced   many  perceptions,  and 
deliberated  much,  do  the\-  suddenly  arrive  at   the  idea.  How 
would  it  be  if  we  should  ourselves  execute  these  movements? 
Said  and  done;    and  for  the  future  a  new  and  useful  jiower  is 
o:ained.     The  only  part  of  this  account  whicli    has  an\-  rela- 
tion to  the  facts  is  the  existence    of  rellex    niovenienls.      lint 
we  neither  know  that  reflexes  must  always  precede  voluntary 
movements,  nor  that  the  will  e\er  takes    the   former   into  its 
service.     .      .      We   can    ])rove  that   in   many  case    v*!>luntary 
movements  become  mechanical  ;   for  the  o])posite  view,  on  the 
contrary,  there  is  scarcely  a  sin,^le  trustworthy  obserxation.'" 
It  .seems  to  me  that  we  must  refuse  to  se])arate   outer   and 
inner  acts  of  will  as  this  theory  does.     There  is  no  doubt  that  in 
animals  and  youn,^-  children  we  do  fnid  automatic  and    spon- 
taneous acts  ;  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  these  ever  become 
voluntary.      What  seem  to  us  like  i)h\siolooical    reflexes  are, 
however,  oftentimes  psychological  rellexes  ;   that  is,  at  least  a 
lart>;e  part  of  the  movements  even  of  yonn.i;  children  are  mani- 
festations of  Will.     In  lower  forms  of  conscious  life,  ever\-  inner 
act  of  will  manifests  itself  by  means  of  a  movement  lhrou<di 
which  the  .sen.se  oro;ans  are  involuntary  adjusted  to  the   char- 
acter of  the  stimulus.     .Mthouoh  we  acknowled.^e  the  i)resence 
of  mechanical  movements,  we  shall  still  have  to  sa_\-  that  many 


^' Wiuult,  /:\,v,n',v,   ])]..  292-9;,;   <■,/•.  •■'l^o   .Marliiifau,  .1  Study  of  k\li<^iou , 
Vol.  II,  ]!]).  202-2113. 


26 


The    Will. 


It: 


phcnonicua  which  apjjear  to  he  jnircly  physioloj^ical  are  in 
fact  psycholoj^icaL  The  outer  movement  is  o".ly  the  other 
side,  or  the  imme(Hale  result,  of  the  api)ercpption  of  the  idea  of 
the  m()\-ement.  "  ( )uler  acts  of  Will  are  only  a  product  of 
Apperce])tion  which  has  arisen  under  complex  conditions.' 
As  we  shall  see  more  clearly  in  a  later  cluipter,  the  a})perceivin.s>; 
process  of  the  idea  is  the  inner  act  of  Will  upon  which  the 
outer  manifestation  :it  once  follows.  We  are  indeed  able  in 
adult  life  to  forn'i  the  rei)resentation  of  a  mo\'ement  without 
it  actually  takinj^  place  ;  hut  this  is  because  we  inhibit  the 
nunement  b\-  thinking  at  the  same  time  of  its  not  takinjr 
])lace.  There  is  _i(()od  reascm  to  su])p()se  that  Apperception 
and  outer  acts  were  ori<;inally  inseparable,  and  that  their 
separation  rests  upon  a  later  develoj^meuL  of  consciousness." 
This  kind  of  action,  whicli  has  been  named  /V/r^;-motor,  is  the 
type  of  all  movement,  and  depends  upon  the  law  that  every 
idea  of  the  mind  tends  to  realize  itself  in  movement  unless 
held  in  check  by  the  idea  of  other  nio\emcnts. 

There  seems,  then,  stroniL^^  reasons  for  refusing-  t(j  separate 
inner  acts  of  will  and  outer  movements.  Wundt  arji^ues 
that  we  cannot  point  to  a  sinj^le  case  where  reflex  acts  have 
become  voluntary,  while  experience  constantly  shows  us  that 
the  opposite  is  the  case.  If  the  will  were  al)le  to  assert  its 
mastery  over  a  sure  workin*;-  reflex  mechanism,  all  the  more 
complicated  movements  would  be  accpiired  at  a  single  stroke. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  we  learn  such  movements  as 
walking,  dancing,  piano-playing,  by  long  practice.  It  is  only 
after  they  have  been  performed  vohnuarily  for  a  hmger  or 
shorter  time  that  they  are  handed  over  to  a  mechanism.^ 
The  order  of  development  of  outer  acts  of  will,  then,  is  from 
psychological   reflexes   or  impulsive   acts   to  voluntary,   and 


MVuihU,  (•nnidziii^r  d:s  f>/iysio/.  /'svr/io/Oi; if,  Hd.  II,  p.  470. 
■WuikU,  (in//i(/z/ii;t'  drs  fy/iysio/.    f^syc/io/oi^ir,  Hd.   II,  p.  471.    Compare 
also  JaiiRs,  Psyoholoj^y.  \'o].  II,  ]>p.  526-27. 

'WiiiuU,  Essays,  j).  294. 


'  >l 


The  nrrcIopHwnt  of  II  'ill. 


27 


il 


again  from  voluiUary  niovcmcnts  to  mecliaiiical  or  physicv 
logical  reflexes.  The  impulsive  or  instinctive  acts  are  first 
rationalized  ;  /.  <•.,  ])ronglit  into  harmony  with  some  universal 
end,  as  i)reservatiou  of  self,  or  species.  Indeed,  many  of 
these  imj)ul.ses  are  themselves  rational  from  the  l)eginning. 
It  IS  not  the  task  of  reason  to  crradicate  these  natural  im- 
pulses but  to  direct  and  control  them.  When  habits  have 
become  formed,  con.sciousne.xs,  having  done  its  \vt)rk,  ceases 
to  attend  these  ])rocesses,  and  the\-  go  on  themselves  in  a 
purely  mechanical  way.  We  sometimes  are  able  in  later 
life  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  these  old  untamed  imi)ulses  when 
a  tem})tation  .seizes  us  at  times  to  do  some  utterlv  senseless 
act  ;  and  sometimes,  too,  it  takes  all  our  will  i)ower  to  inhibit 
and  control  such  impulses. 

Of  course,  this  account  does  not  necessarily  implv  that  ;ill 
actions  go  through  this  transfornuition.  .Many  movements 
remain  throughout  life  at  the  imi)ulsive  stage.  'IMie\-  may 
even  continue  to  be  subjects  for  deliberation,  or  at  least  con- 
tinue to  be  attended  by  .some  degree  of  consciousness.  Such, 
it  .seems  t(j  me,  are  many  of  our  most  comuKiii  im])tdses,  as 
for  e\am])le,  that  for  food,  or  for  revenge.  Again,  nian\-  of 
the  acts  which  were  once  i)erformed  volunt  irilv  nia\-  not  >et 
have  entirely  pa.s.sed  over  to  the  mechanical  stage,  but  may 
still  be  attended  bv  more  or  less  distinct  consciousness.  The 
presence  -f  actions  of  this  kind  .seem,  howeser,  rath.er  to  con- 
firm our  tlieor}-  than  to  be  opposed  to  it.  I"\)r  such  move- 
ments represent  intermediate  stages  of  the  process,  they  are 
acts  which  are    on    the  way,  one  ma\-  .say,  to  become   refle.x. 


Id 


chapt1':r  III. 


AN  ANALYSIS  OV  WII,I.IN(^ 


Will  (Iocs  not  exist  as  an  isolated  clement  of  our  conscious- 
ness which  is  <i^iven  to  ns  directly  throii<(h  introspection,  hut 
it  is  rather  a  concept  which  is  formed  throuj^h  analysis  of  the 
hi,i(hly  complex  facts  which  are  _iji\-en  to  inner  ])erception.' 
Tliere  are,  no  douhc, certain  ])henomena  of  consciousness  which 
arc  usually  known  as  7')//7i()//.\\  ])ecause  in  them  will  or  acli\-- 
ity  of  consciousness  seems  to  he  the  most  distinctive  feature. 
Vet  neither  \dlitions,  nor  co^nitiou.s,  nor  feelin^^s,  form  hy 
themseh'es  actually  cxistin_t>;  states  of  mind.  As  Mr,  Ward 
sa\'s  :  "  Iirstead  of  three  coordinate  species,  coi^^uition,  emotion, 
conation,  we  have  three  distinct  and  irreducil)le  facts,  atten- 
tion, feelinj^-,  and  ohject  or  presentaticju  ccjustitutiuj^  one  con- 
crete state  of  mind  or  psychosis.  "" 

( )ur  problem  will  then  be  to  analyze  and  descril)e  the  em- 
pirically ,^iven  content  of  that  ps\-cliical  phenomenon  which 
we  name  volition.  Although  much  attention  has  been  Ije- 
stowed  upon  this  subject,  and  much  keen  introspection  has 
})een  euiplo\ed,  \et  psx'choloi^ists  b\-  no  means  a^ree  in  their 
descriptions  of  the  facts.  Howexer,  upon  one  point  all  are 
a<i^recd.  When  a  voluntary  act  of  the  clearly  conscious  sort 
is  i)erformed,  there  is  alwa\s  present  to  consciousness  a  rep- 
resentation or  prerigurin<4-  of  the  result.  If  a  movement  is 
to  be  willed,  there  is  first  a  re])resentation  in  consciousnesss  of 
how  the  UKJvement  feeis  or  looks.  It  is  of  course  necessary, 
in  order  that  these  conditions  uuiy  be  fulhlled,  that  this  move- 
ment should  ha\e  been  previously  performed.     And  so  vol- 


'  ( "/".    WuikU,  " />ir  Ia-Ihx  vkii  (kii  (i(.iiuillislH\v(.-^ung(.Mi,  "  /'////.  Studiiii, 

VI.,  p.  :vS2  IT. 

'^J:\ine<  Ward,  MiJid,   ••  rsyi-]i(il(>,i;ical  rriiici])les,"  No.  45.     See  also  the 
saiiu'  author's  arlicli,"  rsyiiiolo<4;y  "  in  \\\k.-  Knov.  Isril. 


h/   .liiaivsis  ()/'  II '////;/;'. 


29 


nntar\-  nioveinciits  presuppose  and  are  (le\-elMpeil  fruiii  iii\-(il- 
untary.  \Vc  find,  iheii,  that,  our  al)ilit\"  to  perform  an\-  e\- 
tern.al  act  at  first  depends  upon  our  a1)ilit\-  accuralel\'  to  pie- 
tnre  to  ourselves  how  the  necessary  uioeenient  feels,  /.(•.,  to 
reproduce  the  sensations  whieli  ha\e  pre\iousl\-  arisen  from 
muscle  and  joint  duriuj;-  its  performance.  These  sensations 
ha\'e  been  called  the  kinaesthetic  impressions  ;  and  the\-  are 
of  the  ti^reatest  imi)ortance  in  learnin,!;-  an\-  new  niowiuent. 
But  after  an  act  has  been,  jierformed  a  number  of  times,  the 
kinaesthetic  impressions  are  no  Ioniser  called  up,  but  more 
remote  sensations,  often  of  si^ht  or  e\'en  of  the  couse(iueuces 
of  them  are  all  that  are  necessar\-  for  the  successfiil  aceoin- 
plishment  of  the  recpiired  mowment.  As  Professor  janies  has 
pointed  out  in  his  adnnrable  chapter  on  the  Will,  '  seir^atious 
which  are  of  no  practical  importance  tend  to  pass  out  of  con- 
sciousness. When  in  learniuL;  to  row,  for  example,  I  ha\'e  h\- 
.some  chance  taken  a  stroke  in  ^ood  form,  m\-  atteiii])t  to  re- 
peat it  consists  in  strivin.i;-  to  reproduce  the  A>7  of  that  stroke, 
the  kinaestlietic  impression  of  that  mo\ement.  Later,  how(.\er, 
when  I  luue  by  practice  Ijccome  more  expert  in  the  art,  i  am 
guided  by  the  more  remote  sensations  derived  from  sight  or 
sound. 

But  besides  these  repre.sentations  of  the  more  or  less  remote 
results  of  the  action,  conceruiui;  the  i>resence  of  which  psy- 
chologists are  agreed,  is  there  aught  else  juesen??  Miinster- 
berg  agrees  with  the  ordinary  descrii)tion  of  volition  so  far  as 
to  admit  that  there  is  also  ])resent  a  feeling  of  inner  activity." 
How  he  proposes  to  explain  this  activity-feeling,  we  shall 
learn  in  a  short  time.  Let  us  now,  however,  turn  to  the 
same  author's  statement  of  the  pr(^ljleni  before  us  :  "  Modern 
Psychology  names  the  last  analysable  elements  into  which 
the  content  of  consciousness  can  be  di\'ided  sensations" 
{^I-^mpfiudiDigoi).      The  will,  then,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned 


i 


'James,    The  frimi/'ii's  of  /'\r(/i(>/i>:;v.  \'u\.  II.,  ])]).  4.S6  594. 
-  Miiii,sUTl)t.T,i,',  />/';■  U'illt-iis/iaiiJhiiii^ .  \)\>.  60-6;,, 


3" 


The   Will. 


with  it,  is  onh- a  complex  of  sensations.  "The  g:roup  of 
sensations  wliich  we  name  will,  may  by  its  complexity  and 
constanc\'  he  {listinj^niishcd  from  other  sensations,  yet  the  ele- 
ments which  result  from  the  analysis  are  coodinate  with  the 
elements  of  ideas.  Our  ])rol)lem  then  is  to  determine  what 
intensit}',  (|uality,  and  feelinj^  tone  belonfj  to  this  _q;roup  of 
sensations  which  we  call  Will."  ' 

This  statement  seems  lo  me  to  be^;-  the  (luestion  in  a  \'ery 
obvious  fashion  in  faxor  of  the  jMjsition  .Miinsterberg  is  con- 
cerned to  maintain.  The  statement  that  sensations  are  the 
last  elements  into  which  our  conscicjus  phenomena  can  be  an- 
ahsed,  is  true  only  of  those  elements  which  enter  into  com- 
pounds, or  form  parts  of  an  objective  representation.-  The 
Will,  the  primary  activity"  of  the  self,  cannot  be  known  as  an 
idea  like  other  ideas,  as  Berkeley  long  a^o  maintained.  And 
to  seek  for  a  definite  state  of  consciousness  with  a  fixed  indi- 
vidtiality  of  its  own  is  to  rest  the  problem,  it  seems  to  me, 
upon  a  fundamental  misapprehension  of  the  nature  of  con- 
scious states.  ^liinsterbcr*;-  seems  to  demand  that  there 
should  be  found  some  peculiar  i)i(iividiial  state  of  conscious- 
ness which  we  call  Will,  and  failing  to  find  this  he  seeks  no 
further.  Wundt,  in  the  article  above  referred  to,  excellently 
describes  this  tendency  to  substantialize  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness. "  I'\)r  the  adherents  of  this  the(-)ry  the  mind  is  a 
bundle  of  presentations  [I'oi-stellitugoi.)  Like  the  perma- 
nent objects  of  the  outer  world  to  which  they  refer,  the  pre- 
sentations are  supposed  to  modify  each  other  in  our  conscious- 
ness ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  to  constitute  for  us  only  t)bjects 
of  passive  ob.servation.  We  can  add  nothing  to  them,  nor 
take  anything  from  them.  Our  own  activity  is  only  a  pre- 
sentation, which,  like  all  others,  is  subject  only  to  our  obser- 
vation.    What  is  not  given  to  us  in  this  way  does  not  exist. 


i 


'  MiiiisU'rliLTt;,  the  ll'il'riisiuuuiliDi}^',  \).  62. 

'  Cf.  Wundt,  "  Zur  Lehre  von  den  Guinulhsbewtgungen,"  /'////.  Stiidii'n. 

VI,  p.  3^4. 


* 


A//  A>ialys}s  of  ll'i!/i}ii^. 


31 


Our  will,  tlicicforc,  must  be  a  presentation  which  is  analy- 
sablc  into  definite  sensations  that  can  be  traced  back  to  some 
physioloj^ical  stiniulns.'"  ' 

It  is  clear  that  this  strictly  intellectnal  account  of  con- 
sciousness is  entirely  niytholo.t,Mcal.  The  true  view  is  rather 
that  there  are  three  '  asjiects  '  in  every  conscious  state,  all  of 
which  are  essential  in  niakin.i;  it  what  it  is.  These  aides 
which  belon,L;' to  every  conscious  jirocess  are:  ( i )  kno\vled,Lre 
of  its  sii^nification  ;  (2)  its  'emotive'  or  'alTective'  as]K'ct  ; 
the  way,  that  is,  in  which  it  affects  me;  (3)  the  manner  in 
which  I  relate  myself  to  it.  This  latter  element,  it  ai)pears 
to  me,  is  known  as  directly  as  either  of  the  others.  We 
fiaiiir  the  state  accordin.t^^  to  its  signification  for  knowledge, 
and  fall  into  the  mistake  of  su]-»posino;  that  this  aspect  com- 
pletely exhausts  its  content.  Dr.  Miinsterberj.,^  contents  him- 
self with  analyzin|T^  the  content  of  consciousness  into  so  manv 
'  phenomena  '  each  havino;  a  definite  content  and  remainino- 
what  it  is,  altoj^ether  indei)endently  (,f  its  relation  to  the 
subject.  He  materializes  the  i)henomena  of  ccmsciousness 
and  makes  the  self  a  mere  onlooker.  Then,  since  it  is  found 
there  is  nt)  such  phenomena  in  the  case  of  Will  to  analyze 
and  name,  the  conclusion  is  reached  that  the  latter  can  be  at 
the  bottom  only  'a  complex  of  sensations.'  Not  sensations 
nor  reproduction  of  sen.sations  as  siic/i  constitute  the  phe- 
nomena of  Will,  but  sensations  and  their  reproductions 
which  stand  in  definite  relations  to  one  another  and  to  the 
spiritual  es.sence.'-  A  mental  state  is  not  .something- whose 
sijrnification  is  known  out  of  all  relation  to  the  self;  but  the 
attitude  of  the  self  to  the  sensation  is  an  element  in  its 
nature  which  must  not  by  any  means  be  ne<i^lected.  The 
content  of  the  mental  .state  on  its  knowinj^-  side  has  a  more 
stable  constitution  than  that  of  the  feeling-  and  willing  aspects. 


'  'I 


'WiiiuU,  "Ziir  Li'lirt-  von  den  (Tcniiilhsbewc^'unj^'cn"  /'////.    Stud..  \'I,  j). 
384-«5. 

'Lipps,  Vicr.f.  zc.  Phil.,  Rd.  XIII,  ]).  177. 


32 


Thr   Will. 


TIk-  f<tniU'i"  c-k'iiKiit  bciiiin  of  nioii'  practical  sioiii/icanci'  is 
\.\\v  un\\  one  coiniolcd  1)\-  tlif  iiaiiif  ^iveii  In  il.  This  l'Ic- 
iiu-nt  also  (.'uUts  into  ni'irc  coinjjk-x  slates  of  kiiowlods^c, 
wliilf  oiir  relation  to  it  wliieh  the  name  does  not  deseril)e, 
and  whieh  eannot  be  named,  does  not  form  an  element  of 
hi_^her  eomponrds  and  so  is  often  o\'erlooked.' 

'I'o  retnrn  to  Dr.  Miinsterher^'s  analysis  (^f  Will.  The  es- 
.sence  of  the  volitional  he  finds  as  we  have  seen  in  the 
fceliniL,^  of  inner  acti\'it\'  ;  bnt  in  aeeordanee  with  his  work- 
in,L;-  ])resn])i>ositions  this  activity  can  l)e  nothinj^-  more  than 
certain  sid)Stanti\e  states  of  mind.  Dr.  Miinsterberg  first 
examines  tlie  case  where  the  will  is  confined  to  tlie  contnjl 
of  attention  and  the  direction  of  the  proces.ses  of  thon^ht. 
In  all  cases  of  \'olnntary  chanij^e  of  content,  tliesc  in'cceded 
the  clear  consciousness  of  any  representation  another  state 
which,  in  re<^ard  its  content,  already  contained  the  former. 
In  e\-ery  case  of  in\-oluntary  chan^t^e  there  was  no  element 
preceded  the  new  state  which  contained  it.  When  I  arrive 
at  a  thront^h  l>  by  invohintary  association,  these  states  may 
have  certain  characteristics  in  common,  but  b  does  not  con- 
tain a.  When,  on  the  contrary,  I  think  of  a  and  .seek  it  in 
mv  mcmorv,  what  I  |)erceive  is  not  ii  nevertheless  it  is  sonie- 
thino-  which  aj^recs  with  it  in  content.  vSo  \o\\^^  as  a  is  not 
found,  I  ])erceive  only  an  .r  ;  but  this  .r  exists  in  a  series  of 
relations  throu^^h  whicli  it  can  be  known  only  as  a  and 
nothin«4  else." 

Let  US  now  examine  this  somewhat  detailed  statement  a 
little  more  closely,  usin<^  the  concrete  example  which 
I\Iiinsterberj4'  himself  emplo\s,  that  of  trying-  to  recall  a 
name.     "  I  try   to   think   of  a  word,    I    remember   the   place 


'SiiK'f  tlie  above  was  wriUcn  this  ])i)inl  has  bton  much  niore  clearlv  and 
fully  worked  out  by  Trofessor  Anchew  Selh.  '  Ivxidenlly  if  ])heiioiuena  or 
ob/rcls  of  Consciousness  are  alone  lo  be  acce])led  as  fads,'  says  Professor 
Selh,  '  then  all  real  activity  on  the  \YAYi  of  the  subject  is  necessarily  elim- 
inated.'    .Utiii's  P/acr  in  tlw  (^>si)ii>s,  ])p.  94,  ff. 

'  Dit'  ll'ii/ens/nunl/to/i^ ,  \^\).  67,  IT. 


.h/   .Inn/ysis  of'  Willim^. 


ii 


where  I  read  il,  I  know  exaelh-  its  iiu'aiiiii^,  hiit  //  is  i''<t 
present;  linalK-  it  eonies  to  nie.  X^w  that  word  is  fnlly 
<4i\en  as  to  its  eontent  in  tlie  ]ire\i(ius  state  of  eonseious- 
ness."  '  I'or  \\\\  own  part,  I  tail  to  nnderstand  wliat  ineaii- 
int;- is  liere  to  he  ^i\-en  to  \\\v  phrase  "as  to  its  t'oiilent." 
The  name  is  not  eontained  in  the  previons  state,  hnt  is  only 
conneeled  with  this  hy  many  Hnes  of  association.  N'or  is  it 
Irni-  that  only  tlie  name  can  resnlt  an<l  nothing  lusidts.  In 
some  eases,  all  onr  ilTorts  to  remend)er  may  prove  frnilless. 
The  X  still  remains  an  r  and  no  definite  \alne  ean  he 
assij^ned  to  il.  ( )r  the  wroni^  word  may  he  recalled  and  mis- 
taken for  the  one  of  which  we  are  in  search.  It  does  not 
seem  that  this  criterion  serx'es  adeqnatcK-  to  distin,^nish 
voluntary  thons^ht  ])rocesses  from  the  results  of  in\oIuntary 
association.  In  the  latter  case,  as  in  the  former,  any  state  of 
consciousness  nnrst  ha\-e  heen  ])receded  hy  another  or  others 
which  were  related  to  it  .'//  so)}ir  -a'liy.  Ihit  it  is  an  ui;- 
disputed  fact,  that  in  the  one  case  there  is  an  a,  a  state 
whose  content  is  not  deteiminate,  present  to  consciousness. 
This  is  of  course  not  a  representation  with  an\  definite  con- 
tent, (the  a  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  x  has  no  content),  hut  it  is 
the  mere  Jorni  of  voluntary  a'ii/iiii^.  If  some  thoui^ht  or 
word  is  .sought  for,  the  .r  is  the  consciousness  of  this  striving 
as  directed  towards  some  goal.  In  a  chain  of  reasoning,  the 
goal  to  ])e  arrived  at  is  indeed  generally  present,  and  de- 
termines the  steps  of  the  thought  process.  The  representa- 
tion of  the  end,  however,  does  not  contain  the  conclusion  ; 
for  the  latter  may  he  directly  opposed  to  it. 

It  does  not  seem  to  me  that  this  analysis  which  Miinster- 
berg  has  given  is  convincing,  or  the  immediate  evidence  of 
our  consciousness  can  be  so  lightly  set  aside.  The  belief 
that  we  are  agents,  however,  Miinsterberg  accounts  for  in 
two  ways.  First,  when  a  train  of  thinking  is  going  on 
smoothly,  we  have  no  especial  consciousness  of  the  activity 


i'l 


f>| 


'Miinsterberg,  /)!i'  ll'illt'its/ianctlitiii^,  p.  67. 


Iv      * 


34 


T//C   11'///. 


of  the  will.  Rellection,  ncvcrtlR-lcss  persuades  us  that  we 
lia\c  hctn  active  1)\'  the  use  oi  the  most  iinjxntaMi  criterion, 
that  the  rc])rescntati()n  of  the  completed  act  in  such  cases  was 
always  present  to  consciousness  in  the  i)revious  moment. 
I'or  this  reason,  then,  we  conclude  that  we  have  heen  aj^ents. 
Hut,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  "  we  can  onh  will  tr  so  lonj^-  as  it  re- 
mains in  us;  and  so  lonj,r  as  it  remains,  we  cannot,  as  em- 
pirical personalities,  set  it  aside.  Our  Will  in  this  case 
means  only  that  t7  has  remained  in  our  consciousness,  that 
the  content  of  every  moment  was  already  contained  in  the 
f()re,i;<)in<4  state."  ' 

iMirthermore,  if  we  are  conscious  of  our  own  activity  dur- 
\u'^  the  action  itself  as  we  are  sometimes  in  tliinkinj^-  and 
must  always  ])e  in  bodily  actions,  this  feelin}.;can  l)e  aualy/.cd 
into  feelinj.,fs  of  strain  in  the  or^j^ans  or  a  ti<(htcninji;  of  the 
skin  of  the  head.  Now  it  is  doubtless  true  that  inner  nuini- 
festations  of  Will  arc  invariably  accompanied  by  such  bodily 
feelings.  If  we  try  to  discover  the  phenomena  of  volition, 
the.se  are  the  only  explicit  'states  of  consciousness '  which 
can  be  named  and  described.  Vet  these  bodily  sensations  are 
not  themselves  the  feeling  of  activity,  nor  do  they  constitute 
the  essence  of  Will.  They  nia\-  often  fuse  with  this  latter 
feeling  or  be  mistaken  for  it,  but  yet  it  is  possible  by  intro- 
spection to  distinguish  the  activity  feeling  from  such  strain 
sensations.  These  bodily  sensations  which  often  remain  after 
the  feeling  of  activity  has  disappeared  ;  and,  moreover,  after 
they  have  vanished,  they  can  be  recalled.  The  feeling  of 
inner  activity,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  something  altogether 
siii  £;cnrr/s^  and  expresses  certain  relations  of  the  ego  and  its 
content,  as  opposed  to  the  passive  side  of  representations, 
which  we  objectify.  The  feeling  of  activity  is  that  which 
constitutes  chiefly  our  immediate  experience  of  the  self,  with- 
out which  bodily  sensations  would  not  be  experiences  at  all. 
"  How  can  one,"  asks  Lipps,   *'  seek  in  anything  which  be- 


'  Mihistcrbcrg,  Die  Wil/nis/uuul/im,::^,  p.  'o. 


h/  .h/ti/ys/^  oj   W'illiir^, 


35 


l()n;^N  1(1  till-  woiM,  tli;it  tVcliiij;  of  (.'iTdrt  1)\'  iirmus  <.'>{  whicli 
wliat  i.-:  and  liappriis  Ixitli  in  llif  cxlfrnal  world,  and  in  llir 
world  (if  the  l)t)(l\-,  bccoiur  tor  our  consciousness  an  filijcct  of 
(loinj;  or  suffL'rill<^^"  '  In  the  case  of  in\-oluntary  chan,m-s  of 
content,  the  new  ideas  appear  as  sonu-tliin}^  foreij^n  ti>  mir- 
selves,  sonielliin,^  Iielon.^inj^  to  the  Xon-ei^o.  In  the  case  of 
N'oluntary  alterations  of  conscious  content,  tlndiij^h  tlu' 
aj^fcncy  of  the  feelint;  of  activity,  they  are  known  as  mine; 
/.  c.y  as  helon;^-  to  nie  in  a  peculiar  sense.  IIow  then  can  this 
fceliii<;,  in  \irtne  of  which  the  world  is  first  made  rv^rv,  or  is 
opposed  to  ns,  he  attrihuted  to  an\-  element  of  the  world 
itself?  In  thns  defmin.L;  the  fcelin,L,^  as  that  which  expresses 
the  relation  of  o])position  hetween  the  self  and  the  world  of 
objectix'e  phenomena,  we  must  reniendier  that  this  definition 
is  not  identical  with  the  fact  .^ix-eii  in  immediate  ])erception. 
The  sii^nification  of  tlie  feelinti^  is  discovered  onlv  hv  reflec- 
tion ;  in  actual  experience  itself,  there  is  no  knowledj^a-  or  no 
separation  of  what  is  j^ixen  as  imier  and  outer."  It  doe>  >eem 
to  nie,  howex'er,  that  we  do  know  of  feeliujus  and  \'olitions 
innncdiately,  in  the  same  wa\'  as  coi^niitions  are  known,  and 
not  merel\-  throuj^h  results.  When  we  xolnntariK-  attend  to 
any  object,  our  attention  is  withdrawn  from  other  object. 
Instead  of  bein<i;  diffused  and  occupied  eijually  with  sexeral 
representations,  it  is  focused  upon  a  single  jioint.  This 
forms,  for  the  time,  the  centre  around  which  our  thou.^hts 
cluster;  and  the  point  into  a<^rcement  with  which  they  must 
be  brought.  Hut  this  feclinj.,^  which  attends  the  narrowin.i,^  of 
consciousness  is  not  the  reason  why  we  feel  ourselves  active, 
or,  in  other  words,  the  feelinjj^  of  activity  is  not  merely  the 
coirnizance  of  the  contraction  of  consciousness  ;  for  in  cases 
where  some  striking  event  or  object   fills  consciousness,  we 


I  Lipps,  "  B(.'niCM-kuii,t;(.'n  /ur  TlKciriL' d.  Ocfiihl,"  \'itr.  f.  w.  I'h.  lid.  XIII, 
p.  19c'. 


*  Cf.   WuiuU,  "/ur   Lelirc   vmi  (U-n   (ii'iniilhsbiwL-giuigtn,"    /'////.  Stud. 


VI. 


ii 


•"^^^^^ 


3^> 


Th,  in//. 


haw  till'  contraction  without  the  actixity  i-xpi-ricncf.  The 
iiuTc  ])rc(!oiiiiuancc  or  pcnnaiuiicc  in  conscionsucss  of  any 
idea  is  not,  then,  snlilicicnt  to  explain  this  I'ci'lin^.  As  Mr. 
Ward  >a\s:  "  It  is  ohx'ionsly  ini])ossil)U'  that  what  is  a  con- 
stitmait  in  crt'iy  psychical  c\cnt,  can  l)c  cxplicahlc  in  Icrtns 
of  psychical  events.  .\n(l  the  demand  for  such  an  explana- 
tion leads  lojuicalh-  to  a  tacit  denial  of  any  lietero,ycncit\'  in 
mind  at  all.'"  Xe\ ertheless,  Mr.  Ward  seenr>  to  hold  that 
attention  can  ne\er  he  known  prr  s<\  It  is  rather  a  neces- 
sary inference,  a  sin('  (jita  inni  of  explanation  ih.ma  i.wV  which 
can  he  known  immediately.  !!(.•  writes:  "  !t  is  aLithera  pre- 
sentation nor  a  lelalion  anioni^  presentations,  nor,  strictly 
speaking,  an  nnanalN'sahle  element  in  the  I'resentations  them- 
.sclves.  .\n  nnanalysahle  element  in  e\ery  state  of  mind,  I 
admit,  hnt  one  which  even  in  rellective  consciousness  is  ne\er 
directly  presented.  1  see  no  wr\-  serious  ohjection  to  sayinj^ 
that  all  ',»e  know  a/xuil  it  is  an  intellectual  construction,  or 
even  an  inference,  proxided  that  it  he  allowed  that  e\'ery 
proposition  in  ixsych.oloj^)-  is  completely  eviscerated  if  thi.s 
inference  is  nej^lected." - 

HolTdin<;  also  arj.;;uesa*;ainst  an  immediate  C()}.(nition  of  the 
activit)'  of  the  self.  vSuch  a  state,  he  contends,  if  immediately 
percei\'e(l,  must  he  simple  and  unconnected  like  our  sense  im- 
pressions. It  must  appear  with  a  definite  (juality  wdiich  is  as 
little  to  he  mistaken  as  the  quality  (jf  the  sensation  of  color. 
Now,  activitv  and  passivity  are  only  relati\e  notions  which 
are  indicated  hy  a  <i;reater  or  less  concentration  of  consciou.s- 
ness.  To  what  j^rade  of  concentration  does  this  feelin<;-  cor- 
respond. There  can  he  no  such  characteristic  mark  or  crite- 
rion of  Will;  for  if  there  were,  there  could  he  no  mistakes  in 
practical  life,  lint,  as  a  matter  of  fact  where  a  \olition  can- 
not at  once  he  put  into  effect,    we  can  never  he  certain  that 


'James  Ward,  JMiud,  Xo.  45,  ji.  66. 

'^  James  Ward,  Miuii,  Xo.  4S,  y.  570.     Cf.  Also  Uk'  article,  "  rs\choloj.;v," 
in  the  Hncv.  Hrit. 


///  .hill lysis  1)/  ll'/V/if/i,'. 


37 


our  rtsoluiioii  has  Kt'Cii  im.uU',  thai  it  \vi!l  in 4  he  '  siclJicd 
oVr  with  thi.' |)  lie  ca-;l  of  thnu:;hl.  '  <  Mir  miK  iMiti-rinii  is  ihe 
cxpcrifiici' ()f  otir  nwii  characli-r.  ' 

'Pht'Sf  arj^MUiuuls  seem  in  iiie  to  rest  iijmn  tht'  same  impheil 
demand  whieh  has  heeii  sn  i>t"leii  referred  to  in  this  eha]»let ;  thi- 
demand  for  sotiu-  delinitr  eoiKhtions  of  eonseioiisiiess  which 
can  l)e  elassifKil  as  jiheiiomena  of  wiU,  eaeh  ha\-in,L;a  tixed  eon- 
tent  whieh  is  as  delinite  as  a  eoh)r  tone.  Ihil  our  arminunt 
has  ^^oiie  to  «>liow  that  jn--t  heeause  the  Will  is  indi^peii'^ahle 
to  /'//  mental  life,  it  is  difrieiill  to  discowr  aii\-  special  mental 
state  to  wliieh  we  can  point  and  saw  '  lo,  it  is  here."  As  wi- 
do  not  l)a'>e  our  notion  of  t!ie  self  upon  aii\  partieular  feeling; 
or  representation,  neither  caw  we  do  so  in  the  ease  of  the 
Will.  I'lirther,  in  rejiK-  to  I  ir)ffdin,t;\s  objection,  we  ma\-  sa\' 
that  there  is  iiothim;  to  prew'H  a  decision  whic-h  has  once 
been  made  from  eoiiiin,!.',  np  a<^aiii  for  consideration.  JAery 
decision  re.t^^ardiiiL;  the  future  is  made  onl\-  h\  polh.etically  ; 
and  another  da\  ma\-  brin^'  additional  li.i;ht,  or  a  different 
frame  of  mind.  IhU  lIoiTdin.L;  urj^es,  further,  that  even  when 
we  appear  to  be  most  eiearlv  e(»nscious  of  a  resolution,  when 


It  is  so  explicit  that  we   say 


Wll 


the    real 


lecidinj4  i)oint 


does  not  He  here,  but  the  whole  mattei  was  realK' determined 
much  earlier.  The  ex])licil  M'lat  '  is  often  only  the  official 
expression  of  thai  which  has  been  already  decided. 

It  is  no  d()id)t  true  that  in  such  cases  the  decision  cousist.s 


in  refernniL,'-  the  act  under  consideration  to  some  c\\(\  i)re\i- 
onsl\-  adopted,  as  a  permanent  jirinciide  of  action.  In  this 
way,  man\-  of  our  cust<jmary  acts  are  decided  at  once  with 
reference  to  some  such  end.  Hut  if  the  act  o/  x-oliiion  is  ex- 
])Iicit,  it  marks  the  termination  of  a  conllict  between  that  end 
and  .some  other  lines  of  conduct.  A  mere  subsum])tiou  would 
take  place  quietly,  almost  unconseioush-.  The  '  I  will  '  do  this 
or  that,  .show.s  that  somethin.i;  el.se  has  entered  into  conii)etitioii 
with  it,  that  the  end  has  tottered  on  its  thrcjiie  ;  or  that  ut)  to 


'11 


'  Hoffdinj,',  Ouf/iitr''  y"  Psvr//t>/i>i;\\  i  I'.w^.  trans.  \  ]>]).  _:,.((>  IT. 


3« 


The    Will: 


this  linic  the  minor  ])rcinis(.'  of  tlu-  practical  sylloj^asin,  'this 
is  a  case  of  that  kiiiil  '  has  liccn  \\antiii]L;'.' 

W'c  now  return  to  our  anahsis  of  W'ilK  and  shall  c<insi(lcr 
two  cases  rc])rcscntin^-  rcspcctix'ch-  an  explicit  act  of  inner 
volition,  and  an  external  act  of  Will.  In  what  does  the 
essence  of  an  act  of  inner  \"olition  consist?  Suppose  that  we 
take  the  case  where  there  are  two  a.lternatives  offerini;-  them- 
selves to  us,  and  su[)pose  that  after  deliheration,  A  is  chosen 
although  I>  has  stronger  immediate  attracting  power.  IIow 
shall  we  describe  the  act  of  will  by  means  of  which  A  is 
chosen  ? 

If  we  Iea\e  out  of  account  the  \arions  j)rocesses  of  sensa- 
tional strains  which  acc(Mni)any  the  volition,  as  well  as  the 
representation  of  the  various  conscfpiences  of  the  alternatives 
under  con.sideration,  we  must  sa\'  that  the  essential  moment 
o*"  will  consists  in  fixing-  the  one  alternati\'e  before  us  by 
nil  .tis  of  the  selecti\e  attention.  Puttini^  our  analysis  in 
te  ins  of  content,  we  may  say  that  the  volition  is  the  imme- 
diate feeling  of  activitx',  ])lus  the  steadiness  and  predomi- 
iiaiice  in  consciousness  of  A.  When  we  can  atteiul  t(j  A 
soleh'  and  continnouslv,  then,  as  Professor  James  saws,  it  is 
willed.  "  We  liavi^  thus  reached  the  heart  of  our  incpiiry 
when  We  ask  by  what  process  it  is  that  the  thouj^lit  of  any- 
tliin*;  comes  to  [)revail  stably  in  the  mind.  .  .  .  We  sec  that 
attention  with  eiTort  is  all  that  any  case  of  \-olition  implies. 
The  cssoitial  ac/iicvcDiriil  of  the  will  in  sh<>rl,  lelioi  it  is 
most  voliDiiary^  is  to  attend  to  a  difficult  object,  and  hold  it 
fast  before  the  n/intl.'' -  Notwithstanding  this  excellent 
statem  Mit,  however,  the  tendency  of  James's  anahsis  is  to 
make  too  little  of  the  conscious  activity  involved  in  \-olun- 
tar\-  experience,  and  to  describe  the  volition  pr.'-cl\'  from  the 
side  of  content.  When  this  is  done,  the  alternative  chosen 
.seems  to  fill   corsciousness   becan.se  of  its  superior  attracti\-e- 


i 


'.VrisU>lk',.\'/V<);;/(\f(7/('(/;/  t://iiis.,  ]\k.  \'II. 
•Jriiuiples  of  /\\'iiiii/o,ii_\\  Vol.  II,  j).  5^1. 


.!//   .l//(i/ys/s  ,)/    U'/'/Iino. 


39 


iiess.      In    other   words,    the    subject   a])i)ears   to    he    passive 
rather  than  active.      This  is    prohal.lv  the  dauoer   in   pnttiuo 
the  description  of  ;,n  act  of  will  solelv  in   terms  of  attentio," 
Or,  perhaps,  we  shouhl   sav  tliat   it  on-ht   to   he  remenihered 
that  the  attention  is  not  nierelv  the  power  of    raisin-  certain 
mental  jn-ocesses  to  a  greater  de-rer  of   in/rusi/y-    l,nt  is  als,, 
an  intellectual  function  which  has  iIk-  powrr  of  relating   and 
incorporating  ideas  with  the  rest  of  our  experience.      It  ?s  not 
entirely   true,  then,  it   seenrs  to   nie,  to  describe  :i  case  .,f  de- 
liberate   willin-    as  a  mere  act  of   holdiu- a  representation  in 
consciousness.      The  i<Iea    which    has    been    chosen   has   been 
adopted,  not  nierelv  on  account   of  its   -reater  intensitv  as  a 
process  in  consciousness,  but   because  of  its  sionificauce  and 
its  coherence  with  the  iK'rinanent  ends  of  our  life.      This  in- 
tellectual function  of  attention  or  will  is  very  clearlv  bron-ht 
out  by  I'rofessor  IJaldwiu  in  the  following-  (piotation  :    "  The 
attention  luoyes  thron-h  the  series  of  elements,  -raspino,  re- 
lat'.n.i;-,  retaining,  selectinu,  and  when  the  iiite<,M-atioii  it  elTects 
.swells  and  hlls  consciousness,  that  is  the  '  liat.'     Just  as  s(K)n  as 
the  elements  of  the  end  cease  to  act  as  partial  iiillnences  caus- 
\n\r  the  movements  of  attention  bv  their  vividness,  and  the  at- 
tention o-ets  its  hold  upon  the  integrated  content,  the  liat  ..,,es 
forth.'"  ■'^     ' 

There  is  no  new  element  added  to  the  volition  as  a  psvcho- 
lo<>:ical  fact  when  the  act  i)ecoiiiesan  external  one,  and  effects 
•some  chauo^e  in  the  world  of  objects.  The  arirumeuts  of 
James-  and  Miinsterbcrs;- '■  seem  cpiite  convincino-  a,t;ainst  the 
existence  of  any  si)ecial  innervation  feelinos;  and  even  Wuudt 
has  modified  his  position  on  this  (luestion.  '  It  is  not  neces- 
ary  that  we  should  first  have  the  volition  as  an  internal  fact, 
and  then  add  something;  to  it  to  -et  external   volition.     The 


'Hal(hviii,  /•'(,•  Uni^s  ami  Will,  y.  ;,55. 

''■  Principles  of  /'sir/io/ooy.  Vol.  II.,  pp.  494  (f. 

•'  /h't-  U'il/rns/uunilioii;,  jip.  75  (T. 

U/nanizitoy  ifcr  P/ivsiol.   /'sir //oh trie,  3"^'  .\(if1.,  ]],\,  i,  pp.  J^,y,  fj 


40 


riic  Will. 


truth  rntlier  sct-nis  to  be  that  tlic  division  hctweeii  internal 
and  external  volition  is  itself  an  artificial  one.  Kvery  state 
of  consciousness  has  its  j)hysical  side.  A  N'olition  is  at  once 
a  psycholoi^ical  fact,  and  a  nio\in,t;  force  in  the  external 
world.  .As  James  says:  "  We  ilo  not  first  have  a  sensation  or 
a  thou<;hl,  and  then  have  to  add  soincthin<;  to  it  to  <^et  a 
nioxenien;.  Movement  is  the  natural  immediate  effect  of 
feelin*;',  iiresi^ective  of  what  the  ijUcditN'of  the  feelin,L; may 
be.  It  is  so  in  reflex  action,  it  is  so  in  emotional  expn  ssiou, 
it  is  so  in  voluntary  life.  "  ' 

Xo  anahsis  of  deliberate  acts  of  will,  however,  is  complete 
whicli  does  not  take  account  of  the  subordination  of  ])articu- 
lar  acts  under  a  permanent  end.  In  order  to  '">mplete  the 
analysis  of  such  an  act  of  volition  we  i)ass  on  to  a  brief  treat- 
ment of  this  subject. 

In  impulsive  actions,  there  is  no  reference  to  anythinjj^  be- 
yond the  act  itself.  There  !..  j^resent  in  sncli  cases  a  loss  of 
equilibrum  in  the  psychical  condition,  and  a  more  or  less  dis- 
tinct desire  of  s(jmethinj^  to  be  realized  ;  but  there  is  no  con- 
ception of  an  end  under  which  the  action  is  to  l)e  brought,  or 
to  which  it  is  referred.  ICnd  and  means  in  this  case  coincide. 
Impulsive  actions  may  be  defined  as  movements  which  follow 
immediately  the  ])erception  of  the  inciting  ol)ject.  There  is 
nothing  beyond  the  immediate  act  present  to  consciousness, 
and  so  there  can  be  no  thought  of  an  end.  The  actions  of 
children  and  of  animals  are  almost  altogether  of  this  sort. 
Mankind,  however,  does  not  remain  at  this  stage,  l)ut  in  \irtue 
of  his  reason  soon  ri.ses  above  it.  "  Human  Will  is  not  de- 
termined by  that  only  which  excites,  that  is,  immediately 
affects  the  .sen.ses  ;  but  we  possess  the  power  to  overccjine  the 
impressions  made  on  the  faculty  of  our  sensuous  desires  by 
representing  to  oun^clves  what  in  a  more  distant  way  may  be 
useful  or  hurtful.     These  considerations  of  what  is  desirable 


Primi/^lrs  of  /'syr/io/oi;  r.  \'(>1.  II.,  ]>.  527. 


Ill  .lita/ysis  of  WHlinj^. 


41 


witli  re!;;ar(l  to  ciir  whole  staU-,  that  is  of  wliat  is  j^ood  and 
useful,  aiv  l);isi(l  (.•nliiilx-  ou  reaxni.'" '  It  is  man's  al)ilitv  to 
hold  bcfoTc  hinistlf  possihililies  .is  \et  un;Utained,  whii-h  la-- 
conR'  for  him  laws,  that  makes  liim  capable  of  reaehini;  a 
hi*;lier  intellectual  and  nidial  pi, me  than  the  animals. 

I'esides  the  im])ulse  to  ]ireser\ation  01  life  and  oiT>prin}^ 
which  num  shares  with  the  lower  animals,  and  which  ni'cessi- 
tates  some  union  for  the  sake  of  protection,  there  are 
other  irresol\-alile  tendencies-'  which  we  re,L;ard.  as  pecidiarK- 
liuuuiu.  The  first  of  these  is  the  feelim;  ot  s\ni])atli\  in  the 
pleasure  or  ])ains  of  another,  in  \irtneof  which  we  are  able  to 
idcntifx'  (iursel\'C->  \s  itli  h.im,  and  for  ,  le  time'  to  make  his  en.ds 
ours.  Thus  we  speak  of  .i  man  who  is  iiicapable  of  s\  nipath\- 
as  inhum;in.  The  second  of  these  peculiarl\- human  impulses 
uia\-  be  called  the  intellectual  moti\'e.  The  animal  intellect 
is  the  ser\-ant  of  desires  and  ai)peliti.s,  ;md  is  onl\  called 
into  action  throus^h  their  deuuind.-;.  At  first,  indeed,  in  the  his- 
tor\-  both  of  the  iudi\-i(lual  and  the  race,  it  is  j)ractical  needs 
which  arouse  int(.'llectual  acti\"it\'.  The  end  at  this  sta^e  is  set 
b\-  some  practical  neces.sit\',  and  the  intellect  is  moved  to  seek 
means  for  relief.  P)Ut  while  these  pr;ictical  needs  must  alwa\s 
renuiin  end.''  for  us,  man  as  an  intellectual  beiu!:;  huds  satisfac- 
tion in  the  exercise  of  thou,i;ht  for  its  own  sake  ;  and  withont 
any  practical  end  in  view,  rellects  upon  jjlienomena  and  their 
reU 


UL'S. 


Wl 


11 


latious,  purely  for  the  pleasure  which  such  acti\'ity  brii 
The   result   of   this   reflection   is   speech.      It   has   be 
remarked  that  animals  do  iu)t  speak   because  the\'  iui\e  noth- 
ing to  say.      The\'  ne\er  exercise  their  faculties  for  the  sake 


of  d 


iscovernm 


truth 


1,  l)ut  always  witli  some  practical   end   m 


view.  Man,  on  the  othei  hand,  in  virtue  of  this  inlellectual 
impulse  is  able  to  make  truth  his  <.(oal,  and  to  disco\-er  facts 
re^ardiuo;  phenomena  and  their  relations  which  he  exi)resse.s 
in  lan<;uaj;e. 

Hut  if  these  were  the  only  additional  eciuipnient  of  a  man, 


K;iiil  Kr.  (!.  r.  V.,  !  .MiillirV  Trails.  >,  ]i.  6SS, 


42 


Tlu    Will. 


llicy  would  in\-(il\x'  him  in  hojic-lcss  rL-alisni  with  himself. 
.Sym])alh\-  and  self  low,  e.^tiism  and  altruism  come  into 
invconcilabk-  conflict.  In  the  rej^ion  of  theoretical  reason, 
too,  o])j)ositions  and  antinomies  arise.  In  o\ercominj^  these 
di.scords  and  contradictions,  man  realizes  the  hi,i;he.st  j^oal  of 
Ir's  intellecttial  and  moral  nature.  It  is  the  last  class  of 
human  imjMdses  which  leads  us  to  seek  a  harmotiN',  a  union 
in  the  play  of  different  motives,  and  a<;reement  and  (M-der  in 
the  i)henomena  ()f  our  intellectual  life.  Just  as  in  the  intel- 
lectual spliere  the  hij^hest  ])lea.sure  is  experienced  when 
"  unit\-  is  introduced  into  the  manifold,"  s<-  the  center  of 
our  soul  life  which  is  tlisturbed  and  j^ained  by  the  clash  of 
cli.sharmoniou.s  motives  conceives  the  idea  of  a  union  in  a 
supreme  end  which  will  include  in  itself  and  harmonize  all 
the  ends  of  life.  Reason,  as  Kant  tells  us,  is  a  "function  of 
unity.'"  In  its  spcculatixe  employment,  it  leads  us  to  jjostti- 
late  an  absolute  .-.ynthesi.s,  and  furnishes  the  conceptions  of 
truth  and  beauty,  the  ideals  of  vScience  and  of  Art.  When 
it  is  practical,  it  seeks  to  subordinate  conflicting;  ilesires  to  a 
hi.^her  principle.  It  seeks  beside  the  many  thiut^s  which  we 
name  <4oods,  one  vSupreme  (rood  in  which  these  other  goods 
are  taken  up,  and  throuj^^h  comjiarison  with  which  their  rela- 
ti\-e  \-aluesare  assiy;-ned.  This  impidse  after  unity  introduces 
order  and  harmony  into  the  sold,  and  so  pla\s  the  same  part 
as  Justice  in  Plato's  Republic.  Just  how  this  liij>hest  j^^ood, 
this  unconditional  end,  is  to  be  defineil  is  a  (piestion  to  which 
different  aj^es  and  peoples  have  oiven  ver\-  difterent  answers. 
Why  this  is  so  we  shall  see  later.  At  present,  we  can  say 
that  man's  potentiality  of  advancement  depends  upon  the 
presence  of  these  ends. 

To  the  lower  animals,  even  if  they  had  the  p<nver  of  set- 
tin*;  before  themselves  ends  to  be  realized,  the  pleasure  or 
pain  of  another,  or  the  intellectual  ideals  of  humanity,  would 
not  appeal.  These  are  ends  to  us  because  we  will  them,  and 
we  will  them  because  in  virtue  of  our  humanity  they  are  in- 
terestiu}.;;  to  us.     These  intellectual  and  moral  impulses  are 


.-/;/  .bid lysis  of    U'iliiiix 


43 


1 


not,  liowever,  so  strons;'  and  irresistible  as  the  ani:Mal 
appetites.  Tliese  latter  liaxe  to  pro\-iile  f<ir  llie  priiduclinn 
and  maintenance  of  life  itself,  and  eMnse([nentl\-  are  ni<>re 
ini[)erative  in  their  demands.  The  distinctly  lunnan  im- 
pulses, o\\  the  other  hand,  are  rather  i^entle  forces  whiih 
work  imperceptibly  in  the  individual  and  the  race,  and  tin- 
ends  which  they  prescribe  are  not  so  irresistible  as  to  comi)el 
man  to  embrace  them.  ( )ften  the  more  nri;ent  demands  of 
life  crowd  them  out  of  si^ht,  and  the\  fail  lo  make  their  in- 
fluence felt.  This  may  happen  in  the  moral  sphere  thron.nh 
either  the  altruistic  or  the  e,i;-oistic  impulses  (more  frecpiently 
the  latter)  assumin<;  such  projiortions  that  they  dominate  the 
whole  life;  i\o.,:\  man  may  be  so  eonsistently  selfish  that  no 
conllict  is  felt.  Ihit  where  this  lack  of  harmony  does  exist, 
it  ma\-  lead  to  a  desire  to  ox'crcome  the  disunion,  or  the  in- 
dividual ma\'  be  swa\ed  in  turn  by  selfish  and  unselfish 
motives.  When  the  latter  is  the  case,  his  life  is  made  up  of 
inconj^ruous  i)arls,  ami  does  not  form  a  consistent  whole. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  consider  the  part  which  eiuironment 
plays  in  j)rescribin<4'  ends  for  the  indi\-idnal.  We  ha\e 
hitherto  s])oken  as  if  the  ends  of  life  were  wholly  i)rescribed 
l>y  peculiarly  human  intluences.  While  it  is  no  doubt  true  that 
the  form  is  wholly  (»r  in  part  prescribed  by  natural  imoulse, 
yet  the  content  of  the  end  is  larj^ely  determined  by  external 
iullueuce.  The  intellectual  development  of  the  individual, 
the  moral  status  of  the  communit\'  to  which  he  belongs,  or  of 
the  persons  with  whom  he  is  most  intimately  associated,  pre- 
scribe to  a  larj^e  extent  the  ideals  which  ai)peal  to  him.  It 
is  a  familar  truth  that  example  is  more  forcible  than  precept, 
and  that  a  nuin  may  be  known  by  the  compaiu  he  keeps. 
Every  .society  has  certain  norms  of  conduct  which  it  ])rescribes 
for  its  members,  certain  standards  to  which  it  expects  them 
to  conform.  These  are  adopted  by  the  individual  in  a  blind 
iinconscious  way,  and  l)ec(jine  part  of  himself.  He  breathes 
them  in  with  the  air,  and,  since  they  are  tlie  common  proj)- 
erty  of  societN',  they  form  a  bond  of  union  between  the  indi- 


44 


The   Will. 


vidual  mcinljcrs.  Tlie  common  slock  of  lio])e.s  aiul  fears,  wants 
and  ])lcasnres,  constitnte  tlic  soli(larit\'  of  mankind.  These 
ideals  are  as  mncli  a  ])art  of  the  inheritance  of  the  indi\'i(hial 
as  liis  lan,t;-na,<4e. 

\\-l  these  norms  can  not  in  iwr\-  c'rcnmsta.nce  of  life  lay 
down  a  complete  code  of  cop.dnct  for  the  in(li\i<lnal.  And 
aj^ain,  these  ends  ma\'  conflict  with  his  own  natural  impulses 
or  appetites.  In  the  first  instance,  the  individual  will  strive 
to  briuL;  the  act  under  some  .i^a-neral  ])rinci])le  1)\'  which  he 
has  been  guided  in  the  past,  and  in  doin,L;  so,  will  ,^ive  it  a 
concrete  content  and  make  it  a  re,ilit\-  to  himself.  ( )r,  if  the 
cud  prescribed  ov  societN-  runs  counter  to  his  own  inclina- 
tions, a  conflict  will  ensue  wdiich  ma\'  result  either  in  liis  re- 
jectin^i  the  end,  or  in  affirming  it  for  himst/lf.  In  the  latter  case, 
he  has  I)\-  affirmini^  it  made  it  his  own,  and  identified  himself 
with  it.  If  a  hoy,  r. /,'•<  '^'i^^  been  taui^ht  the  ri^htness  of  truth 
.speaking-,  he  mav  assent  to  the  princi])le  without  reall\-  adopt- 
in*^  it  for  himself.  It  is  to  him  abstract  and  unreal,  and  with- 
out content.  I'lUt  after  luuint;-  affirmed  this  iirincijile  in  con- 
crete ca.ses,  after,  it  may  be,  iKudn.L,'-  brought  all  kinds  of  de- 
ception tinder  the  same  catei^orx  as  l\'in_t;,  this  end  t^-ains  for 
him  a  wealth  of  meaninj^,  and  a  reality  which  it  did  not  before 
po.sscss.  After  haviii<;  acted  in  accordance  with  this  jirinci- 
ple  until  it  becomes  a  custom,  it  ma\-  become  a<^ain  less  con- 
crete. To  speak  with  Hcjj;-el,  we  iuii[^ht  say  that  the  end  was 
at  first  abstract  and  universal,  then  became  concrete  and  en- 
riched with  details,  and  that  finally  these  concrete  cases  were 
taken  up  into  the  universal.  Hut  it  is  no  lonj^er  the  l)lank, 
abstract  universal  witli  wdiich  we  started,  but  a  concrete 
universal  which  includes  within  itself  the  meanings  of  the  sec- 
ond stai^e. 

Hut  it  must  be  remembered  the  end  is  not  strictly  speak- 
in<^  somethiii}^' distinct  from  the  individual.  In  truth,  the  end 
to  be  an  end  at  all  must  be  soinethinj*'  with  which  the  indi- 
vidual has  identified  liiiiKself.  It  must  form  part  of  the  per- 
manent centre  which  constitutes  for  the  time  being  himself. 


.1)/   .hia/ys/s  of  Williii-^ 


45 


The  act  by  wliicli  he  strives  to  ivali/.c  that  end  is  tlie  expres- 
sion (if  his  own  character.  Jvven  when  there  are  two  or  nioiv 
conipetino-  lines  of  eonchict  presented  to  ir->,  we  can  not  speak 
of  anv  of  them  as  ends  except  in  an  antici])at(.r\-  wa\-.  At 
hrst  thev  are  all  representations  external  to  the  self;  when 
afterwards  one  is  chosen,  it  is  taken  np  into  the  self,  and  the 
rejected  possibilities  are  to  ns  henceforth  as  nothin-. 

We  have  been  all  alon,<^  atteni])tin.L,^  to  show  the  close  con- 
n.ection     between    specnlatiw    and     ])ractical     Reason.       In 
the    f(,rnier    not    less   tlian   in   the   latter,    we   have   one    end 
which  we  strive   to  realize.      What  we   kee].  ])efore  ourselves 
m  tlnnkin,^,  as   the   .^oal    tovwirds  which   onr  efforts  are  di- 
rected, is   the   completion    of    the   ])rocess   itself;   the  nnder- 
.standin.o;  and  clear  perception  of  a  s\steni  of  relations  which 
we  tliink  of  as  alread\-  existiiiL;  in  reality,  whate\er  nieanin,L^ 
we  attach   to  realitw      In  willin^-,  the  end  son^ht  for  is  some 
new  condition    or  event    which    we    wish    to  call    into  bein.o-. 
Vet  the  two  processes  are  not  essentially  difl'erent,  and  canni)t 
be   divorced    from   each    (^ther.      While   Will    cannot  be   de- 
rived  from  thinkino-,  or  tliouj.,dit  from  Will,  \et  each  ^  rocess 
involves  the  other.      At  least  all    cases  of   conscious  volition 
involve  thou<;ht,  and  are  in   fact  only  an  ai)p]ication  of   the 
practical  .syllojrism.      In  other  words,  ''every  actioii   im])]ies 
a  .sense  of  a  creneral  principle,  and  the  applyin<r  of  that  prin- 
ciple to  a  particular  ca.se,  or  it  implies  desire  for  some  end 
coupled  with  perception  of  the  means  nece.s.sary  for  attainin,<;- 


the  end. 


And  we  liave  alreadv  liad  occasi 


on  more  tha 


n 


once  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  thought  involves  Will, 
really  a   .series  of  .selections. 


and   IS 


'Sir  A.  Grant,  T/ic  /-Jl/iics  of  Aristot/r,  Vol.  I.,  ]>.  266. 


cii.\1'Ti-:r  i\-. 

Till'.   I'SVCIIOI'IIVSICAI,  rROin.I'.M. 

.\Uh()U,t,^li  "  volition  is  a  psychic  or  moral  event  pure  and  sini- 
j)le,  and  is  absolutely  coini)leted  when  the  stable  state  of  the 
idea  is  there,"  '  yet  it  seems  to  produce  effects  in  tiie  external 
world.  The  most  immediate  result  of  such  an  outer  act  of  will 
is  a  movement,  due  U)  some  modification  of  muscular  ti.s.sue.  It 
is  not,  however,  the  fact  that  there  are  movements  which 
.seems  to  demand  e.\planati(Mi,  but  that  these  movements 
should  C(-rrespon(l  to,  and  seem  to  obey,  states  of  consciousness. 
Thou^di  there  remain  many  ^ajxs  for  physical  science  to  fill  in 
before  we  can  understand  exactly  what  takes  place  in  the  dif- 
ferent staji^es  of  the  volitif)nal  process,  yet  we  can  not  doubt  that 
asa  ])h>'siolo|L,dcal  event  it  can  be  accounted  for  mechanically. 
Xevertheless  the  direction  of  nerve  currents,  the  fact  that 
the  orji^anism  is  directed  and  controlled  according  to  the  idea 
of  certain  ends,  seems  to  indicate  a  connection  between  the 
two  series — indeed  at  first  sight  it  points  to  the  dependence 
of  physical  phenomena  upon  psychical.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  are  certain  facts  which  point  to  the  dependence  of 
mental  states  upon  physiological  processes.  In  the  first  place, 
it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  psychic  phenomena  with  which  psy- 
chology busies  itself,  do  not  form  a  continuous  series.  There 
are  gaps  which  it  seems  impossible  to  fill  up  completely  from 
the  mental  side.  Consciousness  appears  in  the  first  place  to 
derive  all  its  original  material  in  the  form  of  sensations 
through  the  media  of  the  brain  and  nervous  svstem.  These 
onrans  seem  to  hand  over  to  consciousness  '  the  raw  material ' 
of  sensation,  and  to  be  constantly  introducing  foreign  matter 
into  the  thought  series.  It  is  undeniable  at  the  same  time  that 
the  nature  of  psychic  states,  and  even  their  existence,  is  con- 


'J;iiiR'>,  I'iiiiiif>lts  of  Psvrholoffy,  Vol.  II.,     ]>.  560. 


Tlh'   l\t  lation  of'  Mi)i<i  <ni<i  lUniv 


47 


ditidiud  f(|nally  by  the  i-haractc-r  of  coiisfiousiK'Ss  itself;  but 
in  sc'usatiiiii  wr  always  slxhi  fdiri'd  to  ((.fi.T  for  an  t\i)lana- 
tiou  to  somclliinm  fr.rtlKT,  sonK-tliini;  outsidf  of  oursilws. 
And  not  onl\'  is  this  the  case  in  sensation,  bnt  also  in  I'Xplain- 
inj^  the  connections  of  the  iisychical  content,  we  are  often 
oblij^c'd  to  pnl  onracconnt  in  terms  of  brain  and  nerve  |)h\si- 
olo^y.  rr(jfcs.sor  W'nmlt  remarks:  "  Since  the  connection  of 
rcpvescntatioirs  in  onr  consciousness  refers  every  where  to  con- 
ditions wliich  lie  outside  of  consciousness,  and  therefore  can 
not  be  j^iven  to  us  in  the  form  of  mental  phenomena,  Tsy- 
chology  will  be  not  seldom  under  the  necessit\'  of  haviu»4  re- 
source to  physioloj^'ical  investi,i;ata)n.  In  cases  where  the 
causal  connection  of  inner  e\j)eriences  seems  to  be  inter- 
rupted, it  is  necessary  to  j;i\e  an  account  of  those  ]ihysical 
phenomena  which  run  parallel  to  them.  With  this  object  in 
view,  the  I'sycholoj^y  of  sensation  calls  the  I'hysioloj^y  of  the 
sense  orj^ans  to  its  assistance.  And,  in  the  same  way,  the 
explanation  of  the  cluin,L,fes  of  conscious  states  can  not  refrain 
from  referrinj^  to  the  Psycholo.s^)'  of  the  l)rain."  ' 

This  a])parcnt  reciprocal  dependence  of  mind  and  brain, 
forces  upon  us  the  question  regardin<4-  their  exact  relation. 
This  is  a  most  perplexin<^  problem  and  one  for  which  we  can- 
not perhaps  exjject  to  find  a  complete  solution.  It  may  not 
be  in  \ain,  howexer,  to  state  the  jirobleni  clearly,  and  endeavor 
to  come  face  to  face  with  the  difficidties  in\'ol\ed  in  it.  There 
are  at  least  two  (piestions  which  we  can  keep  separate  from 
each  (jther.  The  first  is  the  prol^leni  which  science,  adopt- 
in<^  as  it  does  the  connnon  .sense  standpoint,  must  raise  in  re- 
gard to  the  relation  it  is  warranted  in  predicating  between 
the  phenomena  with  which  Physiology  and  Psycholo*ry  deal. 
It  is,  one  may  sa\-,  a  methodological  (  uestiou  regarding  the 
most  profitable  way  in  which  these  sciences  sliall  carrv  on 
their  investigations.  The  other  question  is  metapliysical, 
and    is   concerned    with    the   ultimate    nature    of  body  and 


WuiuU,  /isscr.s,  ]>.  ii6. 


48 


Thr    Will. 


'Ml 

,1 
|i       -11 


mill'].  It  has  to  atU'iiipl  Im  iliscoW'v  :i  Iciia'nK'  tlicors' 
ol"  tin-  uhimalL-  uikU-iIn  in^  Miiit\  in  \irUu'  <il"  wliirli  iIk-sc 
(lift\i\'iit  clas^'.'S  (if  plK'iiiiiiR-iia  can  IimiIi  hi-ldii;.;  to  llir  saiiK' 
Wdilf!.  \\\  lia\(.'  t'»\'r\-  rrasdii  lo  .su]i|)i»>(.-  that  all  slatf>  of 
f()nsfior:siirss  ;ii(.'  acconipanicMl  l)\-  conx'spoiidinj;'  irt\'ous 
stales.  \\\-  know  tliat  an\-  considfval)!*.'  fhan,i;L-  in  tiu'  pl'.ysi- 
cal  ()r,L;anisin,  i)arlicul;ul\-  in  ilu'  brain,  is  atlciuk'd  1>\  dis- 
turbances in  the  nic-ntal  splu-rr.  W'c  al>o  bccann.-  ooiuiiu-cd,  in 
anaUsini.,^  the  pliciujnK-na  of  Will,  that  wIumi  an\-  representa- 
tion hlls  eonscionsne.ss  a  nmscnlar  nio\einent  at  onee  follows. 
iMirther,  we  nia\-  point  to  the  fact  of  the  (plant' tatixe  relation 
between  the  external  stiinnlns  and  the  resnltin.t.;  sensati(jn 
whieh  has  i)een  fornmlated  by  Weber's  law.  All  these  fact.s 
of  eorrt'Spoiidence  seem  lo  indicate  that  the  two  series  are  not 
nltimatelv  sei)arated,  but  belong;  in  some  way  to  the  same 
world.  ' 

'I'he  (piestion  which  will  fnst  concern  ns  is  that  re^ardinj.>; 
the  relation  wdiich,  from  the  scientific  standpoint,  we  are  war- 
ranted in  prcdicatini^  between  mental  and  ])hysical  phenoine- 
iia.  There  are  at  least  three  ])ossible  attitudes  toward  thi.s 
cpiestion.  The  first  of  these  conceives  it  to  be  tlie  ])iisiiie.ss  of 
.science  to  limit  itself  to  some  i)articnlar  field,  and  to  attempt 
to  find  iiuariable  connections  and  secpiences  between  the  phe- 
nomena in  that  field.  The  science  of  Psycliolo<i^y  deals  with 
"  tlie  uniformities  i)f  succession,  the  laws  whether  ultimate 
or  derivative,  accordin<>-  to  which  one  mental  state  succeeds 
another.  '\  -  The  subject  matter  of  neurology  is  the  nervous 
system  and  its  functions  and  chan<;es.  There  must  then  be 
no  confusion  of  the  resj)ective  splieres  of  these  two  sciences. 
"  iMinctions  of  the  brain  may  correspond  to,  or  may  hold 
some  other  relation  to  mind  ;  )-et  mind  and  brain  are  not  the 
same,  the  study  of  the  brain  is  not  the  study  of  the  mind, 
physioh^'jy  of  the  nervous  system  is  not  psychology.  '* 


'All   exi'ilk'iit  account  of  tliu  ])arallfls  and  analo^^ies  of  the  two  serie.^  is 
j^ivL'ii  by  Hc'ilTdin.i^,  (hif/inrs  of  Psvc/ioloi^w  i  \\n\:,.  trans.)  Chap.  II. 
-Mill,  System  of'  /.(';,'/''-  Hook  VI.,  Cha]).  IV. 
', Script mv,  "  Tho  I'rohlom  i)f  rsycholoj^y,"  }fi)id.  No.  6.v 


\ 


sc 


Tilt'  l\t  /<ilii>n  of  Mimi  anii  liihh.  Y) 

It  is  III)  <]()ul>l  oftt'ii  .'ulvaiit.'ij^cotts  and  (k-sirahlo  wlicrt'  ntu' 
scries  can  udI.  he  coniplvtctl,  where  some  i>f  its  Hnks  ate 
wanting;,  l<i  ^i\-e  the  eorrespondinj;  links  of  llu-  parallel  series. 
H()\ve\er,  where  this  done,  it  can  never  he  rei^arded  as  a  final 
explanation.  This  can  only  he  done — totpiote  aj^ain  from  I)r. 
Scriptnre's  article  referred  to  al)o\e — "  rtvV//  ///r  rtuoi^iiifion 
that  tiny  tuf  hitt  ti-iitpordiy  sn/>stitnti\sy  W'liile  thns  limit- 
ing IMiysioloj^A-  and  I'sycholo^y  to  a  partienlar  sphere,  the 
(piestion  is  still  left  open  as  to  the  u/t/»/(itt'  relation  of  the 
])he'nomena  witli  which  the\  (Kal.  "  It  is  not  to  hi'  niider- 
stood  that  hy  this  limitation  of  the  jMohlem  of  ])syc-holo!:;\- 
an\-  ojjinion  whate\'er  is  exjjressed  re^ardin,^  the  relation  he- 
tween  mental  phenomena  and  hodily  phenomena.  Let  the 
relation  he  what  it  will,  the  ipiestion  mnst  he  kept  ont  of 
ps\clu)lo,^y."  '  ( )ne  cannot  hnt  ap])ro\e  lieartiK"  of  snch  a 
clear  statement  of  the  snhjeet-matter  (jf  the  two  sciences.  It 
cannot  he  donhted  either,  that  a  protest  is  called  for  a.^ain>t 
the  tendency  discernihle  in  the  writings  of  some  psNc-liolo- 
(^ists,  to  explain  mental  phenomena  hy  fnrnishinn  a  more  or 
less  m\-thical  account  of  wliat  takes  jjlace  in  the  brain. 

There  is,  however,  another  set  of  facts  which  is  not  iii- 
clnded  in  either  of  these  sciences,  which  we  ma\-  call  the  fact 
of  the  lorrcspondt-HCi'  of  the  physi(jlo}^ical  and  the  menial 
scries.  If  we  say  that  it  is  the  province  of  jjliysioloj^ical-ps)- 
':holo<4y  to  in\'esti<4ate  the  correspondences  and  connections  of 
the  two  series,  the  (jues'.ion  inevitahU-  recnrs  concerning,'- 
the  relation  wdiich  snch  a  science  is  able  to  ])redicate  re^ard- 
in<4-  the  relation  of  the  two  kinds  of  phenomena  with  which 
it  deals.  It  ma\-  he  said  that  it  is  the  hnsiness  of  a  science, 
as  a  science,  to  discover  nniformities  of  action,  invariable  se- 
qnences  between  i)henomena.  As  a  science,  it  knows  nothin-^ 
of  any  bond  linking-  the  ])henomena  to,i;ether,  or  of  any  action 
or  interacti(jn  between  antecedent  or  consequent.  It  professes 
onh"    to  discover    seqneiices    and    nniform   modes  of  actinj^. 


'  .'^criiiture,  "  TIil'  I'roUk'tn  of  PsvcIioIo.l;)',"  M'nid,  Xo.  63. 


50 


:  .If 


Will, 


Nc'VcillR-kss,  wf  do  call  "  llial  luitt'ccdciil  which  is  imariahly 
present  wduii  the-  iihi'imiia-iia  folUiws,  ami  iii\aiial)ly  ah- 
st'iil  wluii  the  latkT  is  ahsc-iil,  other  ciicuiiistanci'S  leiiiain- 
iiij;  the  saim-,  the  cause  of  the  pheiioiiieiia  in  these  ciiciiiii- 
stauces."  Shall  we  not  use  '.he  sauu'  word  in  describing  the 
relation  helueen  the  phenomena  with  which  pin  siolo^^ical- 
psNcholoj^A'  deals  ? 

If  the  word  'cause'  denotes  only  invariable  sccpience,  there 
can,  of  conrsr,  he  no  (piestion  ahoiU  its  use  in  this  ease. 
I Iowe\cr,  it  must  not  be  forj^^otten  that,  from  its  emi)loyinent  in 
describing;  the  relations  of  ])lienomena  in  the  material  world, 
the  term  has  taken  on  some  peculiar  shade's  of  meaning 
which  are  alto<;elher  inapplicable  in  dealinj^  with  thr  plie- 
nonnna  of  consciousness.  This  ])t.'culiar  niodilication  which 
has  come  to  attach  to  the  word  '  cause  '  in  recent  times  is  the 
residt  of  the  relation  of  e(|uivalence,  which  we  alwa\s  think 
of  as  obtaininj"^  between  the  cause  and  effect  in  the  material 
world.'  I)\'  '  e(piivalence '  we  mean  that  the  series  is  con- 
ceivably re\-ersible,  Jiat  cause  and  effect  have  the  same 
]iower  of  doiuj;-  work.  This  fact  is  expressed  in  the  law  of 
the  conservation  of  eneri^ry.  This  law  has  come  to  be  an 
a.xiom  of  modern  physical  science,  and  is  a  direct  conse- 
quence of  our  postidate  that  the  anioinit  of  matter  in  the 
uni\erse  remains  constant.  Now  such  a  law  can  ha\e  no 
application  for  ps\choloj;y,  or  for  psycho-physics.  If  this  is 
clearly  recoj^nized,  it  seems  to  be  a  mere  matter  of  word.s 
whether  we  shall  or  shall  not  use  the  term  '  cause  '  to  describe 
the  relation  between  the  phenomena  with  which  these 
sciences  deal.  If  we  speak  of  causal  connections  between 
mental  states,  or  between  nervous  states  and  states  of  con- 
sciousness, we  must  do  it  with  the  express  recognition  that 
here  the  principle  of  ecpiivalence  has  no  place. 

The  second  point  of  view  is  that  held  by  the  advocates  of 
the  so-called  'automaton  theorv.'      This  view  can  not  be  re- 


'  WuncU,  Ethik,-\'rX  cd.,  p.  399. 


Till    l\i  liitioii  ii/'  Mini/  tiiii/  /!('i/v 


5» 


)4ai(U(l  as  a  www  iiiiliiali.  iii  mI'  tlu-  iMopcr  siilijii't-iiialUr  of 
physical  and  iiKi.tal  sfieiKX' ;  il  is  a  iiulaphv sical  i1k'<>i\ 
which  asserts  the  imixpssihiliiy  ol"  .in\-  cunmrtidii  \vhati.\cr 
hclwiiu  thi-  iihysical  and  the  mental  winiil.  However  t'loc 
and  in\arial)K'  is  the  eonneeliim  helween  IhmHIv  ninseiiunls 
and  stales  of  eon^iMonsness,  \et  ///  >ialil\\  il  i>  niaintaimd, 
they  };()  on  in  entire  independence  ot"  each  other.  "  I'.nl  little 
rctlcclion  is  reciuirid  to  sIkav  that  conscionsness  does  not 
make  the  mij^hly  dilYerence  whii  li  is  commoidN'  su|»]iosed. 
Conscionsness,  when  il  is  piesent,  i>  the  li,u;ht  whic-h  lightens 
the  process,  not  the  a.^xnt  in  it>  acconii>li>hnient.  W'c  are 
never  cc^nscious  of  the  thin-  nntil  the  thinj^  is.  Conscious- 
ness does  nol  j^d  before  the  e\ent,  il  onl\'  comes  into  heillj,^ 
with  its  accomiilishment."  '  I'rom  this  ]ioinl  of  \ie\\  con- 
scionsness is  a  mere  '  epiiihenonnnon,'  a  shadow  whii-h  '  on.i;ht 
not  to  exist.'  The  adxocates  of  this  lheor\-  not  onh'  recoi-. 
\\\/x-  the  onlf  which  Descartes  pointed  out  lietween  matliT 
and  mind,  hut  they  make  it  aI)>olule.  There  are  three  rea- 
.sous  ur^ed  for  thus  wrenching  the  w  -rid  apart.  I-'irst,  the 
utter  disparateness  of  the  two  kinds  of  phenomena;  secondly 
(and  partly  in  conse(|Ucnce  of  the  tir.st),  the  impos.sil)iHl\-  of 
conceivin^M)f  an_\-  action  or  reaction  between  the  two  worlds  ; 
and,  thirdly,  the  direct  con.sc(iuences  of  the  law  of  the  con- 
berx'ulion  of  eneri^w 

All  kinds  of  physical  cnerL;\',  it  is  said,  are  comparable  be- 
cause they  are  all  forms  of  motion,  and  can  be  reduced  to  a 
common  mea.sure,  so  many  foot-pound.s  of  work.  States  of 
mind,  on  the  contrary,  are  inconimensurable  with  an\-  form 
of  motion,  and  we  do  no/  /licrcforr  cxp/ain  aiiytliiiio  b\'  refer- 
ring them  to  some  physical  event.  Supi)ose  that  we  grant 
this  to  be  a  valid  ground  for  keeping  /lie  /ivo  sciences  sepa- 
rate, yet  the  objection  says  nothing  regarding  the  ultimate 
relations  of  members  of  the  two  series.     The  phenomenal  dis- 


'  IMaiidslfy  :   "  The  Cerebral  Cortex  ami  ils  Work."     J//«i/,  X\',  ]i]),  171- 


52 


The   Will. 


ii'^' 


paratencss  of  the  two  series  may  be  a  reason  for  prohibiting 
a  science  which  deals  witli  one  set  of  phenomena  from  ex- 
phiinino-  b}'  means  of  meni])ers  of  the  other  series  ;  ])nt  there 
is  so  far  no  j^ronnd  foi  l)elie\'ing  that  this  disparateness  is  the 
ultimate  fact.  The  constant  correspondences  of  the  two  series, 
and  the  fact,  upon  which  I  shall  not  dwell  here,  of  the  adapta- 
tion of  the  bodily  movements  to  the  external  environment, 
forbids  ns  to  suppose  that  such  an  assertion  as  that  of  the  au- 
tomatists  is  a  final  statement  re<^ardin_<;-  the  nature  of  the  two 
series.  There  still  remanis  the  rational  demand  that  the 
seeming-  disixu'atcness  of  these  spheres  hhall  be  harmonized. 
And  the  \-ery  fact  that  the  phenomena  of  these  two  fields  are 
manifested  in  conjunction,  not  only  strcn^rthens  our  belief  in 
their  ultimate  unity,  but  shows  that  reconciliation  is  not  im- 
possible. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  asserted  that  the  action  of  con- 
sciousness on  brain,  or  (>:  brain  on  consciousness  is  incou- 
cei\';d;k.  'The  ])assa<;e  from  tlie  i)ln'sics  of  the  brain  to  the 
facts  of  consciousness  is  unthinkable,  '  and  b\  unthinkable  is 
meant  picturable,  "  continuously  imaginable.'  "  It  seems  to 
me  that,  as  before  renuirked,  while  this  nui}-  be  an  aroument 
for  refusing-  to  entan.i^le  ps\-cholo<4\'  with  plusiolo.i^ical  ex- 
planations, it  can  sa\-  nothinj^  re,L;ardiu,^  the  tdtimate  connec- 
tion of  he  different  \  arietie.s  of  the  real.  The  word  '  incor- 
ceivable'  has,  as  Mill  pointed  out,"  three  meanings  at  least. 
Anythino-  may  l)e  termed  inconceivable  which  we  are  unable  to 
believe.  Thus  it  was  inconceivable  to  the  I'rench  jjeasant  \(\\\ 
that  the  Ciermans  could  take  Paris.  Or,  secondly,  tlie  term  may 
refer  to  something-  which  contradicts  a  fundamental  law  of  our 
thinkiui;-,  as  that  two  and  twoshonUl  amoinit  to  'i\\<:.  Thirdly, 
any  thing  or  any  event  nuiy  be  pronounced  inconcei\able 
when  we  are  unable  to  represent  it  1)\-  aw  inuige  in  our  con- 
sciousness.     It  is  nuinifesth'  in  this  last  sense  that  action   or 


'  AliinsU'rlR'rt^.    Dir  Wil/i'iis/uuiii/iim;,  y.  27. 

"  /:.\(rii/i>i(i/io)/  o/'Sir  U'i/liain  I/aiiii/loii's  /'/n7()so/)//r,  ]>.  151' 


The  Rclaiio)!  of  Mind  ami  liodw 


53 


reaction  between  brain   and  conscionsness  is  held   to    be   in- 
conceiv.d)le.      I  can  not  picture  to  myself  how  'the  idea  of  a 
beefsteak  should  bind  to<;ether  molecules  '  in  such  a  wavasin 
any  way  to  modify  niv  movements.      \\'c  mav  say  in   .ijeneral 
that  we  can  onl\-  represent  to  ourselves   wh;;t   has   been    lirst 
presented.     Since,  then,  this  act  on  the  i)art  of  consciousness 
(supposing;  it  to  take  i)lace)is  never  imir    ".ialely  known,  it  is 
plain  that  it   must  forever  remain  in   this   sense  of  the    word 
'inconceival)]e.'     We  are  ajit,  however,  to  talk   as  if  there  is 
no  difficultv  in  conceivino-  just   how  one  ])hysical    bodv  acts 
upon  another.      The  ^:re  n.clls  the  wax  before  our  eves  ;   l)ut, 
after  Hume,  we  are  conr-elled  to   admit  that   we  have  <'iven 
only   an  antecede'it  and    cou.^eipieul,   and   know    nothing    of 
anv    bond    which   uniies  tliem.      We  can  say   t^'o   that   after 
Lotze's  analysis,'  it  is  im])()ssil)le  to  ihiid<  of  any  state,   or  of 
any  action,   as   jxissin.!^-  over  from   cause   to  effect,      ^b)dern 
l)hysicists,  too,  are  abandoning-  the  concepti.>n  of  a  force  which 
detaches  itself  frou.  one  object,  and  attaches  itself  to  another, 
and  beoinnin.i;  to  admit   that    they   know   n(»thino    re.L,^ir(linjr 
the  nature  of  force  at  all — u\  racher  to  doubt  whether  or  not 
there  is  an\  thino-  which  C(  'responds  to   that   conception.      It 
.seems  then  the  reciprocal  action  of  brain  and   mind  is  incon- 
ceivable, in    the  sense   that  it   is    not  '  conti'.niously   imai^dn- 
able  '  how  ;niy  one  thin,«^  acts  upon  any  other.      We  may  per- 
haps admit  that  there   is   more  difficulty  in   conceivinj^-   how 
any  reaction  could  take  ])lace  between   mental   and    material 
phenomena,  than,  there  is  in   the  ca.se  of  phy.sical   can.sation, 
but  tliis  dirferencL-  is  not  sufficijut  support  for  a  metaphysical 
theory. 

The  third,  and  perhaps  the  stron-est  argument  for  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  two  series,  is  taken  from  the  la.w  of  the  con- 
servation of  ener«;y.  "  .Vccordino-  to  the  cairsal  principle 
everywhere  maintained  in  ])hysiolo^ical  iuvestioations,  we 
can  speak  of  a  causal  connection  between   phenomena,   only 


Lotze,  Metaphysics,  Hook  I,  Cliap.  V. 


>t 


The    Win. 


( 

«! 


•■f 


wl'.cn  the  effect  can  be  derived  frDiii  llu-  cause  accordiu.^-  to 
dcfi'iite  laws.  Such  a  derivation  is  ])()ssil)le  oul\-  when  we 
are  dealiuj^  with  lioniove'^ous  ])h.en<Mnei':a.  Tliis  deri\-ati<)u 
is  consecjuently  either  thinkal)le  or  actually  perforniahle  in 
the  vU.tire  realm  of  outer  phenomena,  since  rm  analysis  al- 
wa\s  leads  hack  to  some  form  of  motion  where  the  effect  is 
re]>resented  as  e(ini\-alent  to  the  can.se.  That  is,  under  sj)e- 
cial  conditions,  the  causal  relation  can  he  re\-ersed.  .  .  It 
is  evident  that  there  cmi  be  no  (lucstion  of  such  an  (.(juiwa- 
leu'\-  between  our  representations  and  the  j^hysiolo^ical  ]>he- 
noniena  which,  accompany  them.  As  the  effects  of  the  latter, 
nothiu!:;  but  i)liysical  phenomena  can  ever  come  into  existence. 
In  this  way  alone  is  tliat  closed  system  of  nature  ])ossil)le 
which  finds  its  most  ])erlcct  exjiression  in  the  law  of  the  con- 
servation of  eneri^y.  This  law  would  be  \-iolated  if  an\'- 
where  a  physical  cause  should  l)rin}4  about  a  mental  effect."  ' 
Thus  also  Scri])ture,  in  the  article  (juoted  above,  writes  : 
"There  is  one  fundamental  axiom  on  which  Psych  oh  JL^'-y  can 
work,  and  without  which  it  becomes  involved  in  the  mazes 
of  theory.  Mnital phoiomoia  can  not  iii//itriu'(\  or  he  in/lu- 
I'liccd  In'  Diatrrial p)u'>io)ti('}ta.  .  .  The  disco\-er\',  the  de- 
velopment, and  the  ])roof  (^f  the  law  of  the  couserxation  of 
enerj^y  by  Mayer,  Helmholt/'.,  and  Joule,  ha\e  rendered  the 
opposite  of  the  axiom  inconceivable."  '" 

There  can  be  no  objection  to  these  statements,  in 
so  far  as  they  arc  to  be  understood  mercK  as  pre- 
.scribing  the  limit  for  the  physical  sciences.  It  is  a  work- 
ing postidate  of  physiology,  that  material  phenomena  shall 
not  be  explained  by  anything-  exce])t  material  phenomena; 
and  of  jisycholo^y  that  psychical  states  shall  be  referred 
only  to  some  antecedent  psychical  states.  Vet  this  is  not 
(piite  the  same  thiui;  as  the  a.s.sertiou  which  is  so  often 
made  that  '  mental  phenomena  can  not  innncuce,  or  l)e  iuHu- 


'  WiiinU,   A'v,V(M,v,  (,\'//!r//  niiJ  SiU'!,-. 

''  Scri])tun',  "  Tlu'  I'r  I'llini  dI"  1S\  iliu!c>;^y,"   MiiiJ,  Xo.  6_v 


'flu-  Relation  of  Mi>id  ami  Ihniv. 


55 


enced  hy  pliysical  pliencniciia/     Such   a    slaU'iiicnt  sceius  to 
doo-inatise   re,u;anlin-  tin-    metaphysical   (|nestion   couccniiiijr 
the  ultimate  nature  of  hodv  and  mind.      If  it  is  trm-  that  the  as- 
sertion is  to  be  regarded  as  indicating  the  final  trntlnvoardin,<,r 
phenomenal  facts— that  in  realitv  one  set  of   i)lienomena  ])ro"^ 
ceeds  in  entire  independence  of  tlie  other— it   is   difficnlt   to 
understand   how  anv  metaphysical   tlieorv  can   overcome  the 
dualism.      ( )i-,  ])erhaps,  it  would  be  better  to  ,sav  that  the  state- 
ment is  a  metaphysical  theory.      I5ut  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
only  intended  to  indicate  the  mode  of  procedure  of  the  jdiysicil 
.sciences,  and  the  ideal  which  ]xsvcholooy  must  hold  nj)  for  it- 
self, we  must  keep  constantly  in  mind  that  this  division  isonlv 
a  methodolooical  one,   and   not  a  statement  reoardino  realitv 
itself.     This  is  all  that  the  writers  from  whom  I  have  .pioted 
mean  to  convcv  ;   yet  it  seems   to   me   that  they   have  stated 
what  is  an  axiom  of  science  reuardin^-    its  own    mode   of  -.-x- 
plainino-    facts,  as  if  it   Wvire  an  expression  of  the  ultimate 
nature  oi  these  facts  themselves. 

In  the  same  wa\-,  it  is  not  unusual  for  psychologists  to  take 
lii^di   .ground  when  dealing-  with  the  law  of  the  conservation 
of    euero-y.       It  is  not  unconnuon    to   find    it    referred    to   as 
'  proven  by  Maver,  Hehnholtz,  and  Jotde.'  or  as  '  a  fact  that  has 
now  been   fully  demonstrated.'      .\  little  consideration,  how- 
ever, shows  us  that  the  law  has  never  been    proved— nor  can 
it  ever  be — in  the  innversal  sense  claimed  for  it.      It  would  of 
course  be  forever  impossible  for  jdiysiolooists,  bv  means  of  ac- 
tual measurements,  to  demonstrate  that  the  nervous  processes 
which   are  attended   by  consciousness,  do   not   intluence  the 
latter  in  any  way,  and  are  entirely  uninfluenced   bv  it.      The 
law  has  been  verified,  with  greater  or  less  exactitude,  in  fields 
where    consciousness    can    not    be    thou.<rht    of    a?;   a    f;ictor. 
There  lias  been  no  disproof  of  the  intiuenceof  eouscio  isness  ; 
and,  from   the  very   nature  of  ilic  case,   there  can   be   none. 
But   it   is  sometimes  claimed   that  althou^di  experience  can 
never  demon.strate  to  us  this  law,   it  is  reallv  identical  with 


a    law    of   our  tii 


ouoht,  beino   another  t\)rm    of  the  law    of 


56 


The   Will. 


persistence  of  matter.'  To  make  tl-.s  law  a  necessity  of  our 
tlunii^rlit,  is  simply  an  absnrdit)-,  in  face  of  the  fact  that  the  ma- 
jority of  mankind  have  never  heard  of  it,  and  that  many  sci- 
entists do  not  understand  it  as  anythin^i^  more  than  'a  leadinj^ 
principle  of  natural  science  ;' -  or  'a  valid  and  nsefnl  workin^j 
hypothesis  nnder  which  we  may  brinj^  certain  classes  of  ])h\si- 
cal  phenomena.'  .As  Professor  I^add  says:  "  Hven  in  the 
s])here  of  ])hysical  events,  the  law  is  as  yet  demonstrably  trne 
onlv  to  a  limited  extent.  'iMie  \-arions  forms  of  physical  en- 
erjj;y  in  the  inor<»-anic  world  are  by  no  means  yet  all  redncible 
to  the  terms  of  this  law.  .  .  .  Xo  mathematical  formnla,  or 
picture  framed  b\-  the  imagination,  has  thns  far  bridged  over 
tlie  gap  between  tiu  molecnlar  enerj^^y  of  inor^^anic  and  that 
of  ()r<j^anic  strnctnres.  .  .  .  Xer\'e  force — wliat  it  is  and  what 
it  will  do  ;  what  it  is  as  jndsj^ed  l)y  w  hat  it  will  do — cannot 
at  present  be  correlated  with  any  of  the  forms  of  ener<i^y 
which  act  as  nervons  stimnli.'' '  Many  examples  mi<,dit  be 
given,  not  only  of  the  incomj^leteness,  l)nt  also  of  the  actnal 
impossibility  of  redncing  all  cansal  relations  under  the  law 
of  the  correlation  and  conservation  of  ])hysieal  energy.  The 
ideal  physical  explanation  is  thns  formulated  by  I)u  Hois 
Reymond  :  "  Before  the  differential  ecpiations  of  the  world 
formnla  can  be  formed,  all  natural  phenomena  must  be  re- 
duced to  the  movements  of  a  substratum  substantially  homo- 
geneous, and  therefore  entirely  destitute  of  cpiality,  or  of  that 
which  appears  to  us  as  heterogeneous  matter — in  other 
words  all  (piality  must  be  explained  ])y  the  arrangement  and 
motion  of  such  a  sid)stratum.'"^ 

X(»w,  howex'er  far  i)hysical  science  may  be  from  the  attain- 
ment of  such  an  ideal,  it  is  useless  to  deny  that  its  adoption 
has  led  to  enormous  advancement  in  the  work  of  understand- 


'IMiiiislrrlx-Ti;,  ^it^  W'ilh'usiuvidlnui:: ,  ]i.  9. 

■^Hoffdin,!;,  Oil  Hi  lies  of  /'svc/io/oi^w  (Vav^.  Umiis.  i,  y.  5S. 

'Ladd,  /■'/riiiriils  of  /'/i\sio/i\<^!ra/  Psyr/io/oi^v.  ]>.  657. 

*l.Ui  Hois  RcviiuiiKl,  I  'ihcr  dit'  liiTiizi'ii  lies  Xa/iiirrktiniiiis,  y.  16. 


The  Relation  of  Mind  and  /u>dv. 


57 


injT  natural  pliciioinena  and  their  modes  of  hchavior.  Mod- 
ern physio]oo;y  owes,  perhaps,  all  its  success  t(.  the  adoption  of 
iliis  j)oint  of  view,  and  its  al)andonnient  of  the  principle  of 
'  vital  force.'  In  accordance  with  this  princii)le,  everv  ehan.^^e 
in  the  or<,mnisni  has  its  'clieniical  or  physical  eqnivalent  either 
in  the  oro;anisni  or  withont  it.'  Snch  hypotheses  have  justi- 
fied their  adoption  by  jjrovin,^-  themselves  useful  ;  /.  c,  by  re- 
dncin.tr  to  unity  and  (lofinitcness  the  relations  of  what  seems 
at  first  .glance  hetero.Ljeneons  and  disparate  ])henomena.  vSo 
lono;,  then,  as  we  remember  that  we  are  dealing  with  niethod- 
olo.o;ical  hypotheses,  no  objection  can  or  should  be  raised. 
But  a  protest  must  be  nroed  a<,^'^inst  anv  attemjit  to  make 
snch  hypotheses  the  basis  for  assertions  respectin.i;-  the  ulti- 
mate constitution  of  thin.^s,  and  the  universal  order  of  nature. 
This  is  doubtless  a  danoer  to  which  sciemific  iiivestioaiors 
are  e\]M)sed,  especially  when  dealing  v/ith  lono-standiii-  h\- 
potheses.  "So  thorou.o:hly  axiomatic  have  the  doctrines  of 
the  absolutely  iu(K])endent  and  passive  existence  of  matter, 
and  of  the  constitution  of  bodies  as  a.i;<;reoates  of  absolutely 
constant  i)hysical  units,  become  in  the  minds  of  modern  physi- 
cists that  the\-  not  oulv  re.^ard  them  as  the  indispensable 
foundations  i)f  the  whole  structure  of  physical  science,  but  do 
not  hesitate  to  use  them  as  suj)ports  for  profes.sorial  chairs  of 
metaphysics."  ''' 

Hiolo.<rists  have  almost  oiven  u])  the  attempt  to  ])roduce  life 
artificially,  and  are  constanlly  obliged  to  recoj^niize  a  spon- 
taneit\-,  a  permanent  centre  of  force  which  cannot  l)e  aec-ouiil- 
ed  for  on  mechanical  principles.  Just  in  the  same  wav,  it 
seems  to  me,  neurolo,<>ists  and  ph\siolo_oists  ma\  hold  fast  llie 
law  ot  the  co.i.-.eivation  of  ener^\-  as  a  fruitful  workin,^  hy- 
pothesis, without  assertiii.L,^  do,<;iiiatically  that  life  isoiih-  a  ])lay 
of  molecules.  This  law  should  be  regarded  nierelv  as  a  didac- 
tiveor  'regulative'  principle,  not  as  a  meta.plivsical  theor\-  of 


'vSiall 
Seriis.  i 


'/■//(■   (o/Kr/y/s  ail,!    '/y/coiics  n/'  J/,, :/,■)//    J7ivsiis. 
XIII. 


Int.    Siiiir 


58 


The   Will. 


tlu-  iKiluic  of  iiltiniaU-  facts.  It  may,  ])eilia])s,  justly  (jlTcnd  tho 
sciculiric  instincts  ol  many  persons  to  sp'/ak  of  conscionsu'jss 
'  l)indin^'-  molecules  to^reih-r,'  or  of  '  the  idea  of  a  beefsteak  as 
directinn'  ner\'ons  currents"  in  one  diri.'t'tiou  rather  than  an- 
other. Stattineiits  of  thi>  kind  ai'e  thorou.^hh-  false  and  ob- 
jectionable, because  the\-  insade  the  scientist's  territorx', 
as  it  were,  and  make  use  of  the  scientist's  cate.i^ories  and 
C(>ncei>tious  to  connect  phenomena  which,  from  the  staud- 
])oint  of  the  ]);irticidar  sciences,  are  not  co  l)e  brought  to- 
j^ether.  A>.;ainst  an\-  such  a  naive  tormulation  of  the  rela- 
tion between  body  and  mind,  or  at^ainst  the  attempt  to  make 
iina,(;inable  the  connection  between  consciousness  and  brain, 
the  law  ()!"  the  conservation  of  enernA-  has  its  jn'oper  sphere  and 
]c,i;itimate  use.  At  the  same  time,  we  must  remember  that 
the  assertion  that  'mental  states  do  not  influence  or  are  not 
influenced  1)\-  material  states,'  is  ecpially  mi.'  ..hievous  when  it 
i.s  understood  as  a  metai)hysical  statement  of  '  jnirallelism  '  or 
dualism.  HofTdiuii;-,  after  enumerating;  \-ery  fully  and  clearly 
the  correspondences  between  mind  and  body,  writes  :  "We 
must  assume  that  these  parallels  have  a  real  si<.^uilicaiice  ; 
there  must  be  an  inner  connection  between  conscious  life  and 
the  brain."  ' 

Hut  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  ener}.(y  is  sometimes 
assumed  to  be  identical  with  the  causal  postulate  itself;  or,  at 
least,  the  want  of  e(piivaleuce  between  antecedent  and  con.se- 
quent  amou,^;  the  phenomena  with  which  psycho-physics 
deals,  is  ur^ed  as  a  _nround  why  we  can  never  say  that  a 
causal  relation  exists.  It  is  of  course  perfectly  plain  that  no 
qiuintative  etiuivalence  is  ever  to  be  found  I)etween  states  of 
brain  and  states  of  consciousness,  and  that  if  this  is  to  be  the 
criterion  of  causality,  we  are  forever  excluded  from  postulat- 
in.i>-  such  a  relation.  lUit  the  demand  for  explauation,  which  is 
the  source  of  the  causal  jjostulate,  does  not  seem  to  me  neces- 
sarily to  imply  the  fact  of  equivalence.     We  shoidd  still  seek 


" 


'  H()tT(lin^r_  Outlines  of  /'s\r/iol(\i^y  \  Vav^.  iraiisl.  i,  j),  59. 


Tlic   l\ilati(>n  of  Miiiii  niui    Hotix. 


50 


for  the  causes  of  natural  ])lRMioiiK'na  nnd  construot  our  scit-'iKvs, 
if  tlie  enerjfy  of  the  efl'ect  was,  say,  only  ,'',  of  ihal  of  the  oanse. 
If  there  were  (i)iy  fixed  ratio  between  tluni,  we  eo;il<l  e\'en 
(leduee  resnlts  in  the  same'  wa\-  as  wt'  do  at  jircsenl.  If,  how- 
e\er.  there  were  no  sneh  iiuantitaliw-  relations  (.xjjressihle  at 
all,  we  shonld  ^-o  on  discovering  uniformities  and  laws  in 
just  the  same  waw  W'luu  (k-aliui^  with  mental  phenom- 
ena there  is  no  ])ossil)ilit\'  of  discoserinv;  any  sneh  re- 
lations. We  are  in  a  sphere  where,  from  the  \ery  nature 
of  the  case,  mathematics  does  not  a])pl\-.  As  W'uudt 
writes:  "In  its  employment  in  nature,  the  c-ansal  con- 
ception recei\'es  a  specific  stamp  which  is  alto.^elher 
forei.s^n  to  its  loLjical  meanin,i;-.  The  couceiition  of  con- 
stanc\'  implies  certain  j)riuciples  to  which  all  causality  of 
nature  is  suhordinated,  so  that  fiualK  these  priuci])]e.s  ha\e 
come  to  be  rei^arded  as  corollaries  of  the  law  of  cansalit)'. 
Amonn'  these  are  the  law  of  conservation  of  matter  and  force, 
and  the  ])rincii)]e  of  the  e(pii\alence  of  cause  and  effect.'"  ' 
Hut  as  W'uudt  L^oes  on  to  sa\',  these  conceptions  h;i\e  no 
ineanin<j;-  when  carried  <)\er  to  the  mental  sphere.  TheN'  are 
not  then  to  be  re<^ar(le(l  as  consecpiences  of  the  causal  ])ostulatc 
in  jji'cneral  ;  but  are  necessilale<l  only  b\-  the  theories  and  con- 
cei)ts  by  means  of  which  we  inulertake  to  interpret  external 
nature.  If,  then,  in  the  mental  sjthere  the  law  of  causality 
does  not  imply  an  e(ini\alence  betweiai  cairse  and  effect, 
.such  a  lack  cainiot  be  used  as  an  arminient  a_L;ainst  predicat- 
inji;  a  like  relation  between  the  ])heuomeua  with  which  ps\- 
cho-physics  deals.  We  shall,  of  course,  ha\e  to  renuanber 
(as  we  do  in  the  relations  of  mental  phenomena')  that  the  re- 
lation is  not  the  same  as  that  which  exists  between  a  material 
can.sc  and  i.s  effect.  ''  Xo  such  i)henomenal  bond  c-an  exist 
a.s  that  which  connects  two  j)hysical  e\euts  and  we  can  only 
sa\'  that  the  cause   is   in\arial)l\-  succeeded    b\-  the  effect."  " 


'  Wundt,  l-'.tliik.  ist  I'll.,  ji.  399. 

■  S/ >■(>>/ 1^,  ••  Dr.  ;\IiinsU'rber}.;'s  Tln.'or\- of   Mind   and    I'.i  xiy  and   its  CiMi-^i.'- 


quences,"  Phil.  Rt-v.,  \'ul.  I,  Xu.  2. 


6o 


The    WilL 


Whik-  lliis  is  tnu-,  it  is  also  Inic  lliat,  e\-en  <^raiitinj>-  the 
c-(|iii\-a]inc(.-  (if  ])liysical  canst-  and  plivsical  eftVct,  wc  do 
ncil  nndtrstand  in  tlu-  kast,  f\tn  in  this  fitdd,  how  one  thin^ 
can  proiiitit'  another.  Xor  (k)cs  science  atleni])t  to  (k)  so. 
It  seeks  onl\  for  in\ariahk-  SKiUences  jind  nnifonnities. 
"The  Law  of  Catr^ation,  the  recognition  of  wliich  is  the 
nij'.in  ]iillar  of  in(hicti\i-  sc-ience,  is  hnt  the  faniihar  truth 
tliat  in\aria])ilitv  of  succession  is  found  1)\-  ol)servation  to  oh- 
tain  between  e\ery  fact  in  nature,  and  some  otlicr  fact  wliich 
has  |)rece(k-d  il,  inck-pendentlx'  of  all  c<nisi(lerati()ns  resjjcctinj^ 
the  nltiniate  mode  ^li  production  of  ])henomcna,  and  of  e\'ery 
other  (juestion  rej^^ardin.L;  the  nature  of  'thin'^s  ii  them- 
sehes '."  '  Xor  does  tlu  law  of  c'!»nser\"ation  impose  an)' 
new  task  niion  science,  no;  iiitevfere  in  an\'  wa\-  witli  the 
ho\  e  theory  of  causation.  " 'i'lu  nianifeslations  whii:h  the 
'iieor\-  re_^ards  as  modes  of  motion,  are  as  much  distir.ct  and 
separate  i)henomena  when  referred  to  a  sin^^le  forct,  as  when 
attril)uted  to, several.  .  .  The  indestructihilit)'  of  I'orc.;  no 
more  interferes  with  the  theor\'  of  causation  than  the  in- 
destructihilit)'  of  Matter,  mcanin,^  by  matter  the  element  of 
resistance  in  the  sensible  world.  //  oii/y ,  /ia/>/<'s  us  to  undcr- 
staiid  Ixttor  tliau  he/on'  the  uaturc  a)id  la'a's  of  some  of  the 
Si(fuc)ici'sy  '  Since,  then,  we  use  the  term  Causation  to  ex- 
])ress  the  relation  between  antecedent  antl  conse(pienl  both 
in  the  ph\sical  and  mental  s]iheres,  and  since  the  word  when 
used  in  jihvsical  science  does  not  imj^ly  any  conception  of 
one  \.\\\w\^  producino^  another,  but  only  denotes  an  invariable 
uniformitx',  I  see  no  reason  why  it  should  not  be  used 
without  any  metaphysical  implications  of  tlic  uniformities 
which  i)syclio-physics  discovers.  In  em])loyintr  it  in  this 
field,  we  shall,  of  course,  be  oblij^cd  to  keep  in  mind  that  we 
denote  somethini^  different  from  physical  cau.'-alit}'. 

'Phere  is  sti  1  :^nother  psN'cho-pliNsical   theory   which  is  a 


0 


'.Mil!,  System  of  /.<[■;■  !<\  Hook  III,  Cii.ip.  \',  Sect.  2. 
O-Iill,  //)/(/.  Book  HI,  Cl3aj).  V,  vSect.   ic 


Tfu'  Rilatii)>i  of    Minii  and  I^^dy 


6 1 


1)k'n(liiij^  of  llif  comnion-sensc  and  antomalon  theories,  atid 
which  wc  may  connect  with  the  name  of  Miinsleiher.i^.  Ac- 
cordin^j^  to  this  theory,  j)hy.sical  movements  of  the  ori;ani>m 
<^o  on  in  entire  independence  of  conscionsness.  Tiiey  are 
mere  mechanical  results  ;  and  Miinster])ert;  describes  in  de- 
tail how  snch  a  machine  as  tlic  ner\'on>  system,  caj)al)le  of 
transmittinj^  and  coordinating;  forces  in  snch  a  wa\-  as  to 
brin*;-  ahont  j)nr[)osive  actions,  conld  arise  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  of  evolution.  lint,  on  the  oilier  hand,  he  points  ont 
that  ijsychical  i)hen(,mena  do  not  forma  continr.ons  series  1)\- 
tliemselves,  but  depend  on,  and  are  conditioned  b\-,  physic, d 
I)henoniena.  '  In  the  same  wa\,  Huxley,  while  emphaticalh' 
denyinj^'  that  the  i)h\-sical  series  can  be  interfered  with  b\- the 
mental,  declares  that  we  have  as  much  reason  for  belie\'in^ 
that  physical  processes  are  the  cause's  nf  nieutal  j)roces'>es  as 
we  have  for  believin,i:^  that  any  one  tiling  is  the  cause  of  an- 
other. '  If  these  assertions  are  intended  onl\'  to  indicate 
scientific  nuthodoloj^ical  principles,  they  mi,i;!iL  ])erliaps  be 
allowed  to  pass  unchallenged.  Psycholo^'y  is  dependent  upon 
the  physiolo^^-y  of  the  brain  and  mr\-ous  system.  The  plie- 
uonieua  with  which  it  deals  do  api)ear  to  b<.'  discontinuous 
and  incomplete,  and  it  is  compelled,  at  least  pro\-isionaIl\-,  to 
com|>lete  its  ex[)lanation  by  attemi)tint4-  t(;<^ive  an  account  of 
the  parallel  j)hysical  seric-s.  I  ha\'e  already  noticed  the  dan- 
(^ers  to  which  this  method  of  exjdauation  is  expensed.  Hut  i 
materialistic  i)S\cholo<(y  too  (jflen  takes  the  reference  U) 
the  ner\-ous  s\-steni  as  the  final  word  on  the  subject. 
When  this  \-iew  is  jMit  forward  as  a  metaplusical  iheors 
it  seems  to  me  to  iiu'oh'e  a  double  absurdit)'.  In  tlie  lirst 
])lace,  if  states  (;f  brain  'condition'  states  of  luiud,  ali 
talk  about  the  utter  dis])arateness  of  the  series,  and  llie 
mconceivabilit)'  of  any  relation  between  them,  must  cease. 
The     })rocess    from     consciousness    to     brain,    which     Miin- 


'  ;\Iiinsteri)i'r-.  />/V  W'illrii^liaiidlHii^ ,  p.  109, 

-'JIaxlf\-,   /'.'v.vcM'  0)1  /)i\siaitis.   in  /.ay  Si'm/oiis  au'f  .  Iddivsst's. 


r.2 


The   will. 


slc'rht-r.^-  rc-jcfls  tui  llu-  ^roiiiid  thai  il  i'-  .,  w  coniiiiuouNlN  iin- 
a<4ina!)k',  is  just  as  iintliiiikahk'  wluu  \vc  altfiupt  to  trace  il  in  a 
r(.'\'cTsc  (liifi'liiiii.  I'urllRriiioii.',  this  Uk-oiv  docs  N'iolciu-c-  to 
tlic  law  of  coiiscr\alion  of  i-iicrj^'v.  I'd:"  to  assert  llial  a  ])hysical 
stale  a  has  as  its  result  auollu'r  pluNical  slate  of  exactly  the 
sauie  auiouut  of  iuer,iL;\',  /*,  j)lus  a  stale  of  cousciousness,  i\  is 
to  uiake  the  elfecl  ;;reater  than  the  eau>e.  '  Moreover,  il 
scciiis  lo  uie  that  this  |)rinci])le,  if  rcj^ardcd  as  a  slatenient  of 
fact,  is  oi)])osed  to  the  conception  of  causalitw  Acticju  is 
unthinkable  without  iuleraclion.  l'"\ery  case  of  causality 
when  ri<;htly  understood  is  seen  to  in\'ol\e  the  concej)lion  of 
reciprocity.  It  seems  to  nie,  then,  that  if  stales  of  brain  con- 
dition states  of  consciousness,  it  is  impossible  to  supptjse  that 
the  former  are  totally  unaffected  by  the  latter. 

We  must  leave  the  di.scussiou  at  this  point  without  at- 
temptin_i;-  to  answer  the  ultimate  metaphysical  question  re- 
gardiu}^  the  relation  of  body  and  mind.  W'e  have  attempted 
to  clear  up  some  of  the  confusions  which  attach  to  the  ways 
in  which  the  ]M"o1)lem  is  often  stated.  In  the  mean'Mue,  we 
must  conclude  tliat  such  a  relation  e.\ists.  The  fact  that  it 
cannot  be  embraced  in  the  somewhat  simple  formula  provided 
by  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  enert^y,  shows  us  that  this 
relation  is  more  complex  than  that  which  obtains  between 
the  phenomena  of  physics  and  chemistry,  Imt  it  throws  no 
doubt  upon  the  fact  of  relation. 


'  Cf.,  Scri])lurc,  "  The  rrolikm  of  I'syclioloj^y  ",  Mind  6j: 


CIIAI'Tl'.K   \-. 


Tin;   I'KI.I.I'oM  ol-   THI-.  WII.I. 


Wf  have  still  to  cdiisickr  iIk-  \c'.\c(I  (itRslidii  of  iIk'  \-\\u- 
(l(»iii  of  the  Will.  'I'his  has  hecii  llic'  .Sphinx  prohlciii  of 
niocleni  i)hilos(i])hy.  and  is  n.oi  nnri  lalid  to  tlR-  (iicik  tincs- 
tion,  whether  \irtne  is  innatt.'  or  ac(|uiiv(l.  'I'he  (liltienlu  of 
the  prohlcin  is  iluv  to  the  faet  that  thr  deniands  of  onv  inlel- 
lectual  ami  moral  natures  slx'Ui  to  l)i.'  antaj^ouistie.  if  expe- 
rienee  is  to  he  possible,  we  must  rej^^ard  nature  as  a  >\st(.ni  of 
necessary  laws.  "  W'e  ean  explain  nothinj^  hut  that  whieh 
we  can  reduce  to  laws  ;  whemxer  the  determination  li\ 
necessary  laws  ceases,  there  ceases  also  the  possiI)ilit\-  of  any 
explanation."  '  lint,  it  is  maintained  that  if  our  morality  is 
to  he  real,  we  must  jiostulale  a  certain  sphere  where  e\cry 
phenomenon  is  not  necessarily  determined  hy  that  which 
precedes  it,  or  a  realm  of  I'reedom.  'JMiese  postidates,  hnih 
of  which  aj)pear  absolutely  neces.sar\-,  the  one  for  knowledge, 
the  other  f(;r  our  moral  life,  seem  to  be  incfimpatible. 

Thus  arises  the  antinomy  which  it  a])pears  can  onl\-  be 
solved  by  doinj^  \iolence  to  the  denuinds  of  either  our  intel- 
lectual, or  of  our  ethical  coirseionsness.  ( )n  the  one  hand,  it 
is  pointed  out  by  Detcrminists  that  the  individual  is  moxed 
to  action  by  certain  motives  ;  that  his  actions  are  the  re- 
sultants of  certain  inlluences  playing  upon  his  character. 
Tliis  character  again  is  the  product  of  prexiousacts,  either  of 
his  own,  or  of  his  ancestors  ;  so  that  at  any  time  the  act  jjcr- 
formed  is  tlie  necessary  expression  of  the  individual  under 
the  given  circumstances.  Those  who  adopt  I)etermini>m 
point  out  further,  that  there  is  an  unbroken  line  between 
actions  which  are  governed  by  im])ulse  or  instinct,  and 
where  consequently  there  can  be  no  talk  of  freedom,  and  the 
most  complicated  and  deliberate  acts  of  choice. 


Ik' 


Kaiit,  Metaphysics  of  Morals,  Abbott's  Translation,  \).  79. 


64 


Th,'   Will. 


Oil  tlu'  iillier  side,  it  is  aij^nu-il  hy  those*  who  coiitt'tnl  for 
lMc(.'<liiin,  that  it  is  iiii|)(tssil)U-  to  considrr  man  as  a  part  of 
iiatuii',  and  snhjti't,  like  it,  to  iiuariablc  hiws.  'IMu'N  nrj^c 
in  siipixiil  of  thiir  ]>osition,  that  tht'  reason,  tin-  )>L-rsonalit\', 
cannot  he  represented  as  one  factor,  on  a  par  with  others  ; 
])nl  that  it  is  the  deti'rniinin;^  j^ronnd  in  reference  to  whicli. 
and  throni^h  wliieh,  motives  have  any  \alne  for  lis  at  all, 
iMirther  aru^nments  are  achhiced  to  pro\-e  that  it  is  onl\'  on 
the  hypothesis  of  I'reedom  that  we  can  ^ive  an\-  meaniiijL,''  to 
such  terms  as  '  Duty,'  '  Ohlii^'ation,'  '  Remorse,'  etc.,  and  that 
these  terms  express  real  experiences  of  mir  moral  life. 

If  we  are  to  attempt  a  reconciliation  of  these  views,  it  is 
well  to  try  what  admissions  can  he  made  by  each  side  to  the 
ar.i;iiments  of  the  opposite  j)arty.  To  hej^in,  then,  it  appears 
that  the  Determinist  mnst  admit  that  man  is  more  than  a  part 
of  Nature.  If  we  sjjcak  of  him  as  determined  1)\'  motives,  these 
mnst  not  betaken  to  indicate  mere  external  objects,  oroccnr- 
rences  in  time  or  s])ace.  b"or  it  is  only  when  external  event.s 
and  objects  are  taken  nj),  ex'alnatcd,  and  identified  with  the  self, 
that  the\-  ha\e  any  sij^nificance  as  moti\'es  at  all.  Just  as  in 
the  intellectnal  sphere  the  nnderst-'^'.::lin>;-  makes  Xatnre,  and 
the  nnrelated  sensation  is  *  as  t^ood  as  nothin,t;-,'  so  it  is  only 
as  adopted  by  a  self  that  '  circnmstances '  or  '  envin^nment ' 
can  ha\e  any  meanint;  for  ns.  There  can  be  no  external  de- 
termination of  our  actions  :  the  conscious  self  is  the  centre 
from  w  hich  they  ])rocee(l.  It  is  just  as  impo.ssible  to  explain 
acts  of  Will  without  reference  to  the  self,  as  it  would  be  to 
conceixc  of  our  knowle(l,L;e  as  thru.st  upon  us  from  without. 
Xor  is  tile  st;',tement  that  our  acts  are  the  resultant  of  an  ex- 
ternal and  internal  factor  an  accurate  account  of  the  facts; 
just  as  it  is  not  a  true  account  of  our  knowledj^e,  to  describe 
it  as  a  compound,  one  element  of  which  is  j^iven  from  with- 
out, the  other  contributed  by  the  nnderstandinij;-.  In  both 
cases,  the  internal  factor  is  logically  prior,  and  is  the  pre- 
sui)position  of  the  external.  There  is  alwa\s  a  translatinjt*-, 
a   coordinating',    and     evaluatin;^,    of    the    externally    j^iveu 


riif  I'yciiiom  of    tlw   Will. 


^)S 


elc-mt'iit  ;  and  it  is  oiiK  as  thus  hroiij^lit  into  relation  to  that 
pcnnaneiil  ctiiltr  of  t.  xpcricncc  which  coiislituti-s  oiirsclvfs, 
tliat  t'xlcnial  ohjt-cts  can  W  in  an\  sense  motives  for  ns. 

( )n  tlie  other  hand,  the  iniuk-rn  defenders  of  I'reedoni  ha\e 
j^M\en  11])  (at  least  in  name),  their  claim  to  a  freedom  of  in- 
dilTerence.  it  is  ([iiiti'  evident  that  sneh  a  conception  contra- 
dicts all  onr  experience.  N'o  art  of  Will  can  he  retjanled  as 
nnniotix'ed.  V.ww  when  onr  volition  is  determined  hy  mere 
whim  or  caj)rice,  tluri'  is  always  present  some  motive —  i. 
may  be  the  mere  irrational  desire  to  do  somethinj^  nnn^nal. 
The  i(U'a  of  moti\-e  or  end  i--  an  essential  part  of  an  act  of 
Will.  .\n  act  which  is  not  directed  to  some  I'ml,  were  it  pos- 
sihle,  conld  in  no  sense  he  the  ohjcct  of  ])raisr  or  hlatni-,  hnt 
wonld  he  wholly  irrational  and  irrcsjKJnsihle.  Xor  wonld  a 
Libertarian  of  today  claim  that  an  act  of  choice  has  no  refer- 
ence to  the  character  of  the  ai^ent.  lie  wonld,  ho\\e\ii, 
jnsth-  i)oint  ont  that  the  character  is  not  somethinj^  external 
to  the  individnal,  a  forei.^n  power  which  deti-rmines  his  ac- 
tions. If  there  were  no  relation  between  the  act  of  the  indi- 
vidnal and  his  character,  how  wonld  either  dej^eneralion  or 
re,<;eneration  be  i)()ssil)le?  I'nrtherniore,  whatever  view  we 
take  of  I'recdom,  we  mnst  admit  the  condiiioninjj^ effect  of  the 
environment  in  which  the  lot  of  the  individnal  is  cast,  h'.x- 
ternal  forces,  snch  as  climate,  soil,  and  ^eoiL^rajjliical  position, 
limit  within  certain  bonnds  the  directions  which  the  activity 
of  a  particular  individual  can  take.  The  social  environment 
has  an  even  more  powerful  conditioning  inllnence  than  the 
physical.  The  s^rade  of  societv  into  which  a  man  is  born,  the 
education  which  he  receives,  and  the  moral  ])recepts  which  he 
imbibes,  are  all  potent  factors  in  his  life. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  neither  ])hysical  nor  social  en\i- 
ronmeut  can  be  said  absolutely  to  determine  the  conduct  of 
an  individual,  though  both  circumscribe  its  sphere.  This 
limitation  takes  place  in  two  ways.  In  virtue  of  envi- 
ronment, certain  lines  of  conduct  may  be  closed,  and  so  can 
not  possibly  be  willed.      Hut  oftentimes  a  line  of  activit\- may 


66 


y:S'  //'///. 


also  l)c  iiiipo^sihlc  siin|)l\-  lit-caiisc  it  nr\xT  occurred  to  ns, 
I  lo»i()  1(1  III  It  1)1  potest  (Ilia  lit  II  III  Slit.  Tlic  free  man  can  choose 
only  betwee.!  ])ossil)ihlies  wliicli  lie  knows,  and  cannot 
create  his  ))nr|)oses  at  i)leasnre  out  of  nothini^.  lie  cannot 
attain  a  jierfeclion,  the  thoui^ht  of  which  has  ne\-er  come  into 
his  mind.  He  cannot  decide  for  sometliint^  whicdi  is  not  a 
possible  object  of  his  will,  since  it  exercises  no  inlluence  uj)on 
hi!n.  lie  is  onl\-  able  to  prefer  one  end  which  solicits  liim 
to  another,  to  turn  away  from  one  moti\'e  in  order  to  'follow 
another.  '  '  All  this,  it  seems  to  me,  will  ])e  readily  admitted 
b\  an  advocate  of  l-'reedom,  without  jjrejudicin^  the  cause 
which  he  isseekiu!^-  to  defend.  "  It  is  not  necessar\-  to  moral 
I'reedom  (  the  I'"reedo.n  which  tlu-  Libertarian  is  concerned 
to  maintain  ),  that  on  the  part  of  the  person  to  whom  it  be- 
]on<;s  there  should  be  an  indeterminate  ])()ssibilit\'  of  l)econi- 
iuLi^  and  doini;-  anythiu_ij  and  everxthin,^'.  "  "'  The  onl\-  I'ree- 
dom  whicli  is  recpiired  is  the  abilit}'  to  choose,  within  a  lim- 
ited sphere,  the  possibilities  which  present  themscKes  to  us 
as  ends. 

Let  us  now  seek  todisco\er  a  single  pro])osition  which  may 
jierhaps  be  admitted  by  both  i)arties  as  formin,^-  a  i)rovisional 
statement  of  the  relation  between  the  individual  and  his  ac- 
tions. 'IMie  favorite  determiuistii^  formula  is  that  'every  ac- 
tion is  the  necessary  result  of  character  and  circumstance.^.  ' 
To  this  statement  we  may  at  this  statue  bring-  the  objection 
that  it  is  not  correct  to  speak  of  the  character  a.s  a  permanent 
factor,  on  a  par  with  the  external  euvironinent ;  and,  secondly, 
to  denominate  the  act  as  necessary,  is  to  l^ej.;  the  very  point  for 
which  the  Libertarians  contend.  \Ve  shall  perhaps  avoid  the 
above  mentioned  objections,  and  find  a  propositiou  in  which 
both  parties  can  agree,  if  we  say  that  '  all  deliberate  action  is 
the  exjjression  of  a  man's  character  or  self  as  it  reacts  upon 
given  circumstances. '     It  is  true  that  a  single  act  may  not  be 


'■Tirceii,  t'r(i/(X(iiH('>/(i  to  /i/t/irs,  j).  1  ui. 


The   Frci'do))!  of  f/^r    Will. 


('1 


a  c<;inplete  or  adcjuatc  c-xprc-sion  ..f  tlu-  j.L-nnaiK-m  rliaiartri 
of  llic  iiulividual,  yet,  if  i'  is  not  made  afti-r  dclihcratio,;,  it 
must  ivpuscMit  tlic  self  of  the  nionieut. 

We  have  now  to  ask  what  is  implied  in  the  term  '  cliarao- 
ter'  wliieli  up  tu  tliis  time  we  have  u>ed  in  a  merelv  pn,- 
visional  way?  What  notions  does  tlie  word  inehide  ?  Cha.r- 
acter  is  attributed  lo  races  ..r  ehisses,  as  well  as  to  individuals. 
We  speak  of  the  national  character  of  hhi-lishmen,  I-reneh- 
men,  etc.,  and  also  ,,f  Hk-  character  which  heh.n-s  to  diilVrent 
a.L;-es  and  sexes.  It  is  scared \-  necessar\-  to  point  out  that  the 
notion  ,,f  character  has  no  nieanin-  apart  irom  the  act  in 
which  it  expresses  itsJf.  A>  an  independent  entitv  or 
realitv.it  is  an  a'vstrartion  ;  for  if  we  say  that  it  <;enotes 
''hollowe<l  out  i)aths  in  the  hrain,"  thi>  onlv  exproses  the 
fact  that  the  nerve  currents  most  often  run  in  t!;is  direction. 
"  Character  is  si;u])lv  that  of  which  individual  pieces  of  (-in- 
duct are  the  mauifestati..n  ;  it  is  ihe  force  of  which  conduct 
is  the  expression,  or  the  sul)..tance  (,f  which  conduct  i>  the 
attribute.''  ' 

Hut  if  we  define  character  simply  as  a  mode  of  res])(.n(liu,!.r 
in  a  deiinite  set  of  circumstances,  our  'previous  proposition 
will  he  true,  yet  ma  lifestly  identical.  What  is  evidmtly 
contained  in  the  notion,  is  the  thou-liL  that  there  is,  both  ii'i 
individuals  and  races,  a  somewhat  constant  mode  of  actini^- 
under  o-iven  circumstances.  The  solicilin-  power  of  diffLreu"t 
representations  retain  a  more  or  less  constant  ratio  to  each 
other.  Xo  individual  is  enpially  receptive  for  all  motives; 
but  each  proves  tlirou.t^h  his  actions  that  he  has  a  standard  of 
valuation,  in  virtue  of  which  he  chooses  one  object  ratlier 
than  another.  It  is  just  this  i)ernianent  core  of  individuality, 
as  practically  nrmifested,  which  we  name  character. 

Furthermore,  human  character  seems  to  imply  some- 
thin.t,^  more  than  a  mere  de<»:ree  of  uniformity  in  actiuJ.,^ 
Althou<;h    the    lower   animals    act    with    almost    invariable 


.VlLxaiidcr,  Moral  ()nltT  ami  Pivotrss,  p.  49. 


68 


The   Will. 


rc}>^ularit\-  in  like  circumstances,  yet  we  do  ni)t  jscrihe 
'character'  to  them  in  the  same  sense  as  we  do  to 
human  heins^s.  Tliere  is  imi)lie;l  in  the  conception  of 
human  character,  tlie  additional  idea  of  the  possession  of 
definite  ends  or  ideals,  int'»  relation  to  which  (Mir  natural 
springs  of  action,  as  mei  impulses,  have  to  be  brouj^ht. 
Thus  there  are  for  mankind  Iwo  standards  of  value  which 
mav  be  used  to  determine  the  efficiency  of  any  imj)idse. 
Kirst,  its  mere  streniL>th  or  impetuosity,  ( Hii'/iokn't)  \  an<l 
secondly,  its  conft^'mity  to,  o\  disa<^reement  with  some  ])er- 
niauent  or  deep-rooted  center  of  our  beiuii;-,  as  re])resented  by 
some  end.  In  a  rational  volition,  it  is  this  latter  circum- 
stance which  lari^ely  fixes  the  value  of  any  line  of  conduct, 
and  leads  lo  its  adoption  or  rejection.  The  more  deliberate 
and  rational  the  choice,  the  less  important  will  be  the  former 
factor,  and  the  more  permanently  will  the  litter  manifest 
itself.  It  is  this  power  of  modifyin.L;  the  immediateh-  i^nven 
impulses,  or  the  lack  of  it,  which  constitutes  a  stron;^ 
or  a  weak  character.  The  man  who  constantly  determines 
himself  by  reference  to  the  idea  of  the  end,  who  chooses, 
not  the  immediate  s^ood,  but  that  which  seems  to  be  ,L,n)otl 
'  on  the  whole,'  we  name  a  man  of  stronj;  character,  (jr  strong 
will. 

If  now  the  alternative  were  alwa\s  chosen  which  best 
at>[rces  with  the  permanent  ends  of  the  individual,  the  ipies- 
tion  of  Freedom  would  ne\-er  have  arisen.  We  would  then 
be  in  possession  of  the  only  Freedom  which  appears  to  me 
to  have  any  meaning,  the  Freedom  which  is  juescribed  by 
rational  considerations.  .\  freedom  of  indifference,  or  the 
abilitN'  to  choose  any  of  the  presenting-  possibilities  without 
reference  to  any  more  ultimate  consideration,  would  not  be 
the  mark  of  a  rational  beinir.  The  greatest  amount  of  I-'ree- 
dom  conceivable  is  the  abilit\-  to  determine  one's  self  by  the 
thought  of  the  highest  end,  ami  not  the  power  of  acting  out  of 
all  relation  to  that  end.  WhCii  we  speak  in  this  way,  how- 
ever, we  must  not  regard  the  end  as  something  objective,  with 


Tin    Fncdo))!  ,,/'  the    ll'ilL 


69 


0 


tlic  valuation  of  wliidi  wi-  liavc  notliin-  to  do.  As  wc  have 
already  had  oceasion  to  reiuark,  the  end  is  not  to  he  tliou-ht 
of  as  something  external  to  ourselves;  hut  it  is  eonstitiUed 
hy  us,  and  receives  its  value  ])artlv  from  its  iniuiediate  hold 
upon  our  frelin-s,  ])artly  from  its  relation  to  some  more  uni- 
versal end.  The  hi.t^hest  end,  that  which  is  not  sou-ht  f.,r 
the  sake  of  anything  else,  is  so  constituted  simple  on  the  ])asis 
of  its  immediacv  as  feelin-  It  is  the  hi-hest' -ood  for  us 
simple  because  of  its  intimate  connection  with  our  inm..st 
hcin.q-.  It  is  for  the  time  hein.^r  ourselves,  to  cease  to  strive 
for  its  realization  would  l)e  to  lose  our  identit\-. 

The  chief,  perhaps  the  oidy  jisn  eho!M_o;ical  argument  whicli 
IS  used  hy  Libertarians,  consists  in  an   appeal   to  the  fact   t 
which  consci(aisness  testifies  in  volition— the  sense  of  I'reedom 
which  seems  to  assert  our  ability  to  choose  between  alterna- 
tives.     "Iliold,   therefore,"  savs   Professor  Si(l<,^wick,   "that 
a-ainst  the  formidable  array  of  cumulative  evidence  olYered  for 
I)eterniinism  there  is  but  one  opposin.-  argument  (;f  real  force  ; 
the  immediate  a^^lrmati^)n  of  consciousness  in  the  moment  of 
deliberate  action.      And  certainlv  when  I  have  a  distinct  con- 
sciousness of  choosin-   belwee!)   alternatives    of  conduct,  one 
of  which  I  conceivr  as  ri-ht  or  reasonable,  I  find  it  impossible 
not  to  thi:ik  that  I  can  now  choose  to  do  what  I  so  conceive— 
supposin<;  that  there  is  no  ol)stacle  to  mv  doinn-  it  except  ab- 
.sence  of   adecpiatc   moti\e— however   stron.!L,^   mav  be   my  in- 
clination to  act  unreasonablw  and  howe\er  uniformly  I  mav 
have  vielded  to  such   inclinations  in   the  i)ast.'"      Tliere  can 
be  no  doubt  re-ardino-  the  feeliu-  of  Freedom,  theonlv  .pies- 
tion  is  as  to  what  fact  it  attests.      Xow.  it  appears  to  me  that 
the  evi.leiice  of  this  feelin-  at  the   moment  of  actin,*,^  is  that 
when    we    act    we    are  not    compelled    l)v  anything  outside 
ourselves.      Our  external   actions  maybe  constrained  b\-  for- 
ei.i^n  ])owers,  our  UKutal  life  is  free.      "  I"reedom   is  the  capa- 
bility  of   a    bein^;   to   determine   himself   throuHi    eonscious 


'  Si.1,i,rwick,   Tlh-  ^hihod$  of  /iZ/iirs,  p.  69. 


7() 


II w   ll'ilL 


in<)li\-t'.s.  .  .  It  is  not  want  of  causality',  bnt  a])sence  of 
snch  causality  as  \v(Mi1(1  wlioUy  or  partly  destroy  the  ])sy- 
cliolooical  causality.  .  .  ( )ne  cannot  appeal  to  the  con- 
scit)usuess  of  iM'eccloni  in  this  (lUestiou  ;  f'..>r  it  only  tcstities 
that  VI.'  act  without  external  compulsion,  hut  never  that  we 
act  without  cause  ;  or  that  the  reasons  which  'leterniine  us 
are  !n(lej)(>n(lent  of  (nir  orii^inal  structure  or  the  e\ents  (jf 
our  own  life.'"'  Hut  it  may  be  ar^ed  that  we  are  not  con- 
cerned to  prove  that  we  act  without  causes,  ])Ut  only  that  al- 
ternatives are  o])en  to  trs.  "  It  is  not  the  ])ossil)ilit\-  of 
merely  indeteriuinate  ch(^ice,  of  an  arl)itrar\-  freak  of  im- 
moti\-ed  willing  with  which  we  are  concerned  from  an  ethical 
point  of  view,  l)Ut  the  i)ossibilit\'  of  action  in  conformity 
with  practical  reason."'"  Does  consciousness  then  hear  wit- 
ness to  such  a  power  to  conform  to  the  rules  of  reason  or  to 
refuse  to  conform  ?  Wiiile  we  are  yet  in  a  state  of  delibera- 
tion, either  alternative  seems  to  us  eipially  i)ossible,  we  have 
the  immediate  consciousness  of  I-'reedom,  llial  llir  lifc/s/on 
lies  xvliollv  in  <utr  f^o:ct'r  ;  i.  r.,  thai  tlwrc  is  iii  force  cxtirnal 
to  US  a'liicli  prt'scrihcs  fo  lis  u^/ia/  loiirsc  7i\'  s/ia//  fo//()U\  or 
in  other  words,  l/ia/  av  arr  sr//  drtrnniiicti  and  n>/  com- 
pelled. 

I)Ut  this  t'eeliuL^  cannot  be  used  retrosp^ectiNely  as  an  evi- 
dence that  in  au\'  j^iven  case  we  coiild  ha\'e  acted  otherwise. 
It  is  often  ur^ed  that  wilhor.L  sncli  an  interpretation  '  Re- 
morse',  and  '  Sense  of  Sin ',  must  be  regarded  as  delnsi(jn,s. 
I  shall  have  to  return  to  this  point  later  on,  but  here  I  need 
only  mention  that  actions  for  which  we  afterwards  feel  re- 
morse are  not  ,i;enerall\'  attended  by  such  a  distinct  feeling  of 
Freedom.  In  cases  wdiere  we  sin  and  come  short,  the  temj)ta- 
tioii  seems  to  destro\-  the  sense  of  l'"reedoni.  'iMiere  can  be 
no  tK)u!)t  that  this  feclinj^'  is  more  prominent  in  cases  where 
the  immediate  solicitin,;-  power  of  an  impulse  or  appetite  has 


'  Wuiiilt,  I'.thik  '  i>t  cd.  ),  ]).  397. 

■  Siil}j;vvick,  The  Mctliods  of  I'.thics,  j).  67  iiioli'), 


riii-  Fm'thu)!  of  ///(■   Will. 


been  subordinated  to  some  more  |K-rma!ient  and  remote  .i^ood. 
It  is  to  eases  of  lliis  latter  elia.raeter  that  (k'feiiders  of  the  I-'ree 
Will  theory  always  point;  the  eausalitv  of  the  i^^o  as  attested 
toby  immediate  eonseiousness  is  natnralh-  then  so  stron,^  as  to 
make  it  imi)ossible  for  them  nd  to  belirve  that  tliev  eoidd 
have  acted  differently.  P.ut  if  the  theory  of  alternatives  is 
valid,  ve  ninst  face  the  other  side,  whieli  is  unfortunateK- too 
common,  where  the  action  seenrs  'to  follow  the  line  of  least 
resistance.  ' 

In  our  anahsisof  \\  lilin^  (  Chap.  III.  ),  we  found  that  the 
essence  of  volition  consists  in  holding;  fast  one  representation 
in  consciousness,  and  that  if  we  could  succeed  in  retaininj^  the 
proper  representation,  the  act  would  take  place  (  f  itself.  Xow 
the  cpicstion  of  Freedom  will  come  to  he  whether,  in  cases 
where  the  ideal  by  means  of  which  we  ou.^ht  to  determine 
ourselves,  is  crowded  out  of  consciousness  b\-  some  jjresent 
attraction,  it  is  reallv  possible  to  hold  fast  to  it,  and  res- 
oluteh-  keep  it  before  C(5nsciousness.  (  )nr  experience  in  cases 
where  we  succumb  to  the  immediate  solicitatioirs,  is  that  the 
object  is  so  interesting^  and  attractive  that  it  appears  to  take 
possession  of  us,  and  the  more  remote  ideal  is  allowed  t(j  slip 
out  of  si<4lit. 

It  may  ]U'rha])s  be  poiuted  out  here  that  a  i^eiieral  v\v\  or 
in-incij)le  of  action  is  rarely,  if  e\er,  conscioush-  abandi.ned. 
It  is  pushed  more  and  more  into  the  backnroinid  and  e\isce- 
rated  by  sin.i^le  acts.  We  excuse  oursel\-es  iu  each  case  with 
tile  thou.i^iit  that  for  this  once  it  does  not  matter,  or  that  there 
are  here  some  jiecnliar  circuurslauces  and  the  act  does  not 
really  couHict  with  the  end.  As  Aristotle  sa\s  :  "'idle  minor 
premise — this  act  is  of  a  certain  kind — is  unknown.  "'  Many 
examples  could  he  oi\-en  to  show  that  under  the  inlluence  of 
some  attractive  force,  our  intellectual  insii^ht  is  per\-"rted,  and 
we  reall\-  jjcrsuade  ourselves  to  believe  what  we  wish. 

To  return  to  the  prohlem  of  freedom.  Theipiestion  vhich 
wv  wcreconsiderim^-  was  \vlr.'thor,  in  the  case  where  the  decis- 
ion had  been  made  in  what  appears  to  be  '  the  line  of  least  re- 


72  The   Will. 

sistance,'  tlie  act  of  will  can  be  called  free.  It  apj^ears  to 
me  that  since  we  have  snpposed  the  chc^ice  to  have  been 
made  after  deliberation,  the  act  in  this  case  is  alscj  the 
expression  of  the  self,  and  therefore  free.  It  is  jnst  because 
the  individual  {possesses  such  a  definiu-  character,  that  this  line 
of  action  seemed  to  him  at  the  moment  of  deciding;,  the 
j^reater  i^ood.  What  is  to  appear  to  him  as  the  most  desirable 
line  of  conduct  cat  any  time,  is  determined  by  his  orij^dnal 
constitution,  and.  by  his  wdiole  past  hislorx-.  ( )f  c(»urse,  that 
histor\"  is  to  a  larjj^e  extent  his  own  ])roduclion  ;  but  it  is  im- 
])ossible  for  an  individual  to  wijje  (jut  the  past,  and  start  as  if 
it  h"!  nevei  existed.  Advocates  of  iM'ee  Will  differ  ;j^reatlv 
rey^ardinj.^  the  inHuence  of  character  upon  an  individual.  Pro- 
fessor Sidja^wick  sa\s  :  "  I  recoj^nii/.e  that  each  concession  to 
vicious  desire  makes  the  tlifficnltN-  of  resistini;-  it  .greater 
when  the  desire  recurs  ;  but  the  difficulty  alwavs  seems  to 
remain  se])aratc(l  bv  an  impassable  ^nlf  from  impossibility.'" 
On  the  other  hand,  Dr.  Maitineau,  an  even  more  strenuous 
defender  of  Free  Will,  writes  :  "  In  the  earlier  period  of  res- 
ponsibile  life  there  will,  no  doul)t,  be  some  waverint^  and  al- 
ternation between  defeat  and  victory  ;  but  so  rapidh'  does 
weakness  or  fo^^e  of  conscience  .set  in  and  become  habitual, 
that  everv  lapse  is  a  fearful  portent  of  another,  and  everv 
faithful  achievement  a  presumption  of  more  ;  and  the  voli- 
tions of  the  sane  mind  fast  assume  a  determinate  complexion, 
rarely  dirferiui;  much  from  the  premonitory  symptoms  of  its 
first  pn^b.'ition.  Men  certainly  differ  j^reatly  .  .  .  but 
rarely  does  a  man  \-ary  j^^reatly  from  himself,  victor  today  and 
vancpiishetl  tomorrow.  .l)i  inralciilablr  proportion  of  'a'Jiat 
arc  called  diz'crsitics  of  cJiaractcr  arc  conslilntional  rather 
than  moral  distinctions,  no  )noi  c  the  i^rou)id  of  atty  judicial 
azvardy  than  the  fact  that  when  you  xoere  tempted  I  did  not 
sin.  Were  this  class  of  differer'^^'s  removed  and  men  ar- 
ranj/ed  soleh-   In-   their  fidelit\-  or  infidelitv   in  dealiny-  with 


Siilt,'\vick,  ■/"//(■  .V.f'ih/s  of  Kt/iiLS.  \).  67, 


Tlh'  !'')■( tdnui  of  tin-   in//. 


I  o 


tht-ir  (nvn  prchlcms,  uli<.  shall  say  how  lu-ar  thcdassificalion 
would  approach  the  two-fold  distribution  of  the  cvur  viddiii^r 
and  the  L-vc-r  firm."  '  It  is  iinpossihlc  f(.r  aiiv  individual  to 
be-in  as  if  his  past  wc-iv  not.  I-lvc-n  if  wc  wciv  t..  take  the 
original  first  pair  in  the  -arden,  we  sh,,nld  have  to  sav  that 
the  for].i(hlen  fruit  was  a  temptation  to  them,  heeanse  in  vir- 
tue of  their  nature  thev  were  receptive  to  its  iullueiiee.  At 
tlic  nK.ment  of  choice,  snpposino  it  „,  i,,.  ,„,„],.  .lelii.eiatelv, 
U  must  have  appeared  to  them  as  the  ..l.ject  most  to  he  de- 
sired. 

It  will  he  necessary  once  more  to  insist,  lu.wever,  that 
lciiii)tatioii  does  not  come  fn.m  without,  l-nt  from  within. 
'  We  are  tempted  when  we  are  led  awa>  l.y  our  .,wn  lusts  .nid 
enticed.'  Tlie  witches  cmild  u<.t  have  tempted  Macheth  had 
not  his  own  s.-ul  resp<.uded  to  their  su-uestions.  I^aiupio  is 
'armed  so  strono  in  houestv  '  that  their  word>  have  no  effect 
"l'"!>  liini.  Xo  solicitation  fn.m  without  can  take  possession 
<'•  =1  niau  a-du.t  his  will.  '  Mv  p  .vertv,  hut  not  uiv  will 
consents,'  says  the  apothecarv  tr.  Hamlet  ;  hut  at  the  luo.neut 
ot  theexchan-e,  the  m.Muv  he  received  for  the  pois.m  was 
more  important  in  his  e\es  than  a   human  life.- 

It  appears,  then,  that  the  cousHousiiess  of  freedom  cannot 
be  appealed  to  after  the  act  lias  heen  i)erfornied,  as  an  evi- 
dence tliat  we  miuht  have  done  otherwise.  Such  an  idea, 
when  referred  to  a  i)ast  action,  must  he  regarded  "  parth  as 
tlie  coufusion  of  a  luetaphvsical  notion  with  i-svcholooical 
experi^r.ce,  partly  as  an  illusi<.n,  which  is  verv  natural  when 
the  individual,  with  his  n,  w  conviction,  and  with  the  strono 
desire  to  have  acted  otherwise,  vividly  conceives  himself  a't 
the  moment  of  action,  without,  however,  hein.<r  able  to  sur\ey 
and  reali/e  all  the  inner  and  outer  conditions  in  actual  opera- 


Ihc  Moral   I'lnl-M-plur  and  x\x^  M<,ial  I.ilc-,"  /;//.  /our.  o,' /■//>!,<    \nl     I 
••  IlR-.leci.fsl  .l.lltTeiux.  praclically  in  Hr.  ,„„ral  lilf  .,1  .nan"  i.  ihe  .lillVn 
lietwitn  ihf  tasy  K'-in^  and  ih^  ^tn-nnons  niw(,d.  ■' 

■Cf.  Pn.k-.ssor  C.rson's  lutroducHoii  /o  S/i„/:,-sp,;iir,   ],]..  22;  If. 


ticc 


74 


The  Win. 


tion  at  llu-  time.'"  '  After  the  individual  has  willed  the  act, 
and  has  repented  of  it,  Ju-  i)r()iect.s  himself  into  the  past,  and 
ima,t,dnes  th  it  the  act  mii^dit  have  taken  place  at  tliat  fiiiir, 
as  he  >ii>7i'  wishes  that  it  had.  Ajjjain,  the  eonditioii  of  the 
self  lookiniL,'^  l)ack  upon  the  act  with  remorse,  is  wideK'  differ- 
ent from  that  in  which  it  made  the  decision,  yet  we  ascribe 
to  the  ])ast  self  '  oth  the  mental  .status  which  led  to  the  \-oli- 
tion,  and  that  which  at  the  i)resent  moment  leads  to  its  con- 
demnation.     I'^nither,  anv  state  of  del-')eratio    is   i  state  of  in- 


hibition.    Tl;     v-olition  is  the  rerio"'i''.;'  of 


'  ..ikcs  w'.iich 


ha\e  pre\ente<l  action,  and  l)nn<4s  ni'l)  \\  a  ]s"cniiar  feelin.^; 
of  nnrestrictedness  which  dri\-es  into  i':''  oa^V  yronnd  the 
thought  that  this  state  has  been  cansed.  \\"\..,  ej^ard  to 
the  fntnre,  every  act  api)ears  to  be  nndetermined,  becan.se  we 
cannot  form  any  clear  pictnre  of  it  withont  images  of  other 
possibilities  comin,^-  in.'- 

.\  <;reat  deal  of  controvers\-  has  taken  ])lace  as  to  whether 
human  actions  are  continja^ent  or  necessary.  W'e  shall  ha\-e 
later  to  examine  the  moral  ar^nments  and  t(j  determine, 
whethc'  or  not  contin<^en.c\-  is  a  postnlate  of  morality.  Here 
we  mnst  first  trv  to  nnderstand  what  meaning  we  can  j^^ive 
to  tlK'  terms.  Continj.;;enc\'  and  neces^it\'  then,  it  seems  to 
me,  are  catci^ori^'S  that  express,  as  Kant  sa\s,  no  determina- 
tion of  the  objects  themselves,  bnt  only  a  relation  to  onr 
mode  of  coiL;nizin,(>  them.  If  we  call  a  fntnre  act  contin- 
j^cnt,  we  mean  by  ihe  word,  that  any  one  of  se\-eral  pos- 
sibilities may  occnr  ;  or  better,  that  onr  knowleds^e  does  not 
enable  ns  to  make  any  prediction.  ( )n  the  other  hand, 
'  necc.ssit\'  onl\'  expresses  onr  expectation  fonnded  npon  mii- 
forniit\'  of  ex])erience,  or  npon  com])lete  knowledi^e  of  all 
the  conditions  at  work.  "  .\  tiling  can  in  no  res])ect  be 
called  contini^ent  excei)t  in  relation  to  the  imperfection  of 
onr  knowledt^e,  and  our  ij.;;norance  of  its  causes.      It   is   only 


'  llolTdiiiii,  ()/i//ii/i-s  of  /'svc/ioloi^w  \i.  ,^4S. 

'■'('/'.    II(")rfilin.iL;,      "Die    (ii'S(.'l/ni;LSsi.uk<.'it     (Kr    psychi^clR'ii     .Vi'tivital,' 
I'icrtcljahrsih .  f.  i.'issi'iisc/'iaftl.  /'/iHosof^/iit',  X\'.,  4. 


Thi    I'ticiimn  of  !/ir    Will. 


75 


called  ii<(rss(n  V  wlu-n  our  stilf  'u  knowk'dL;^  is  sncli  lli.it 
wi  i)c-rcci\-c' that  it  will  (Vv/^c/;//)' liap])!.'!!.  "  '  It  is(|uil<.'  usii:'.! 
to  coiH  ivc  of  things  as  suhslaiiccs  with  cxTtaiii  lii^lits  and 
prcro;.,  NX'S  of  tin  ir  own  apart  fmui  liu- ordi'i"  of  llic  world 
to  wliicii  they  l)(.'loti<4  ;  or  pfrliaps  i  nion  coniiiion  niixk'  of 
tlu)U<,f!  *  regards  a  law  as  an  aI)solult'  |  nus  o\'er  and  above 
the  thi  .i^s  and  events  in  which  't  is  nianifcstc(l.  Uoth  of 
tliese  views  cvidenth-  d-  .end  nj)on  a  false  abstraction  of  our 
thought.  As  Loize  says,  "  The  fact  which  we  have  to  recog- 
nize is  the  p'-'^'^.'ss  of  hecouiing  itself,  an<l  as  gi\en  along 
with  it  we  have  ;  Is(j  to  recognize  the  ifiitd/oii  wdiich  this 
progress  takes."  - 

It  is  only  wilh  reference,  then,  /o  Diir  ixptctirtinii  of  what 
is  ahoul  to  haj)])'  n,  that  necessit\-  and  contingency  haw  .in\- 
meaning.  The  past  is  neither  contingent  nor  necessary,  nor 
can  these  predicates  be  applied  to  things  in  thenisehes. 
Xevertlieless,  in  the  plnsical  world  it  nia\  l)e,  perhaps,  allow- 
able to  speak  of  an  e\ent  as  the  result  of  certain  conditions 
True,  we  imply  nothing  b\-  means  of  the  word  except  our 
own  con\'iction  that  the  occurrence  will  take  ]ilace.  Ihit  in 
virtue  of  the  conceptions  of  the  permanence  of  matter,  and 
the  conservation  of  energy  which  we  call  lo  our  aid  in  inter- 
preting external  nature,  we  arc  able  in  a  great  man\  si)heres 
to  predict  with  mathematical  acianacx-  the  character  of  future 
events.  It  is,  then,  just  this  jxiwer  of  ])ri.(liction  v>hich  we 
mean  to  denote  when  we  call  any  e\eut  necessary.  Ihit  in 
the  ca.-iC  of  a  conscious  indixidual,  we  use  no  concejtlious 
analogous  to  those  of  the  couser\ation  of  matter  and  eneri^y. 
These  material  n.otions,  as  we  luue  already  >een  (j).  50),  lose 
their  meaning  when  applied  to  the  acti\ilies  of  know  ing  and 
willing.  In  the  sj)iritual  sphere,  there  is  an  increase  of  nun- 
tal  force  in  the  development  of  each  individual.  "  As  an  im- 
mediate  consequence  <jf  this  it  follows,  that  in  the  psychical 


'Spinoza,  l-'.tliics,  I'arl  I,  I'm]).  33.      (N'oti'i. 
M,ol/e,  .^ftiap/iysiis.  1  I-iii^.  u•aIl^.  1,  \'m1.  I,  ],.  197. 


76 


Tlir   Will. 


world  ;i  sufTiciciit  causal  explanation  is  possible  onl\-  in  a 
backward  direc-tion.  W'c  are  able  beforehand,  at  most,  niere- 
1\-  to  iudiealelhe  "^eniial  eliaraeltr  of  llic  result,  but  ne\er  to 
foritrll  till'  exact  form  wliieli  it  will  lake.  There  is  a  sjjirit- 
ual  hisi<)r\-  of  thf  past  ])nt  none  of  tlie  fnlnre.  Laplace's 
'world  formida  '  c.innot  be  referred  to  meni.al  e\'ents,  not 
onl\  I)reanse  of  tin.-  inlinilc  complications  in  thai  rt'alm,  but 
also  bc'canse  it  is  in  itsrlf  in  fundamental  opposition  to  the 
laws  of  spiritual  ])lienomina.  "  '. 

I'lUt,  after  all.  1  nia\-  be  accused  by  both  ])arties  of  evadinj.j' 
the  real  ([uestion  at  issue.  The  old  interroj^falion  aia\'  ai^ain 
be  nrL;;e(l,  '  whether  at  the  moment  of  action  the  other  alterna- 
tive mi.^ht  not  ha\-e  been  chosen  '.  I  cannot  but  think  that 
this  puzzle  is  (.•nlireh-  futile,  and  of  a  piece  with  the  (pieslion, 
'  wlu-lhcr  or  not  the  world  as  a  whole  nii^ht  not  ha\e  been 
otherwise'.  JU-fore  the  choice  was  made,  durin<4  the  time  of 
deliberation,  ni'ither  alternatixe  is  possible.  lint  when  the 
ex'idence  is  all  in,  one-  act  onl\-  is  the  ])roper  expression  of  the 
indi\iduars  character.  P.ut  those  who  contend  for  'contin- 
^enc\' ",  howe\er,  mav  still  insist  that  the  self  can  step  in  at 
the  moiueut  of  action  and  determine  the  event  this  wa\'  or 
that,  without  any  reference  to  the  character  or  motix'cs.  This 
is  to  relajise  into  the  old  position  of  lihriiim  arbitrii.  It  is  to 
sejjarate  the  act  from  the  sum  of  its  conditions,  to  make  it 
irrational,  and  entirely  incapcd)le  of  any  explanation. 

Hut  there  are  some  adx'ocates  of  freedom  who  put  the  mat- 
ter in  a  much  more  intelli,'L;ible  form.  The  freedom  which 
the\-  demand  is  the  power  to  deternnne  oneself  accordin<;  to 
the  concei)tion  of  an  end.  The\'  admit  that  e\-er\-  hinnan  act 
is  necessary,  in  this  staise,  that  wlien  the  entire  series  of 
its  conditions  are  present,  it  cannot  fail  to  appear;  and  that 
it  could  not  ha\'e  ha])i)ened  otherwise,  since  this  woidd  have 
demanded  other  conditions.  Hut  anu)nj4  these  conditions  the 
most  important  is  this  :   that   the  e,^o  itself  had   decided   for 


'  Wund'i,  /;'////<•,    I  i>t.  cd.  ',  ]■..  4(Ki 


I'll,-  I'lt'iiiom  of  thr   Will. 


one  alteriiati\c'  rathor  iIkui  the  oIIrt, 


rn'siik's  th'  etTiot- 


of  which  I  am  tlic  acciunulatinn,  I  t-Iaiiu  also  a />r/  w^y/rr/ i-aii>- 
ality  which  is  still  left  oxer,  when  my  phcimmiiia  Iiaw  l(»l(l 
mc  the  talc  of  what  thc\- arc  and  dn."  '  Thtisc  wlit)  tijihtild 
this  theory  maintain  thai  il  i>  t-oncciwiMc  that  \.\\v  si-lf 
shonld  ori.i;inalc  ahsolnlcly  r.cw  hcj^inninj^s  in  the  c  )nise 
of  thinj^r.s.  IC\'ery  snch  a  new  l)c;4innin«4  ninst,  just  be- 
cause il  is  a  l)c^;inninj4,  he  ine\|ilicahle  as  re<,^'lrds  the 
\va\'  in  which  it  couio  lo  pas-,;  for  to  explain  means 
nothing;  nioic  than  lo  show  thai  a  dctinile  e\enl  is  ihe  le- 
sult  of  ils  anlecedenls  in  accordance  with  j^eneial  rules.  If 
it  is  claimed  that  such  a  hej^inniiiu;  is  nnlhinkahle,  lhc\  rej>l\- 
that  the  iiicomi)rehensil)le  character  is  im  .ir^mneiit  a,^ainsl 
the  as.sumplion  of  it,  hut,  indeed,  is  a  residl  of  that  wry  as- 
sumption. "  A  necessit>-  of  hai)j)enin;^^  for  human  ihouj^ht  and 
an  antecedent  real  necessity  are  two  i'nlirel\'  different  thin<.;s."  ■ 

The  real  truth  which  .qi\es  plansiliilils-  lo  ihis  ]»o.sition  is 
found  in  the  fact  thai  ihe  self  is  more  ihan  ihe  .sum  of  its  con- 
ditions. W'e  can  ne\'er  full\'  explain  an  ai'l  of  aii  individual 
by  i^ivin^  .in  acconnl  of  the  conditions  under  which  he  li\ed. 
The  individual  is  somelhin<4  o\er  and  abo\e  this  .sum  ,•  he  is 
the  sv)ithcsis  of  the  conditioirs  ;  \et  apart  from  the  coudiliou> 
he  is  nolhin.t;.  The  Iranscendent  self  is  a  mere  cttpitt  iiioi  lu- 
U))i.  To  make  the  result  depend  upon  the  action  of  such  a 
self  would  be  to  contradict  all  experience.  It  would  be  to 
call  in  ihe  aid  of  a  dens  rx  nKuii/na  lo  exjjlaiu  what  we  are 
as  yet  unable  to  reduce  to  kuv.  True,  the  self  is  the  center 
into  relation  with  wdiich  all  external  a<;encies  are  brou^^ht 
and  from  which  the\'  all  receive  their  value.  This  is  the 
freedom  of  self-determination,  which  must,  as  the  action  of  a 
rational  beini^,  take  place  accordin.n  lo  laws. 

The  point  of  view  of  those  who  contend   for  contingency, 


'  Marliiuau,    Types  of  l\tlui\il  T/horv.  \u\.  II,  \<.  ;,9, 

■■' RiiiiKliii,    /\'i\li-ii  iti/,/.l/if's<i/zi',  I  'rluT  rliiii^'i'  f>syi/io/<\<iisc/ir  I'l'itiiissti: 
iiiiiiiii  t/<:\  Stiii/'it'i/its. 


•s 


Ihr    WilL 


% 


secins  WW  iiincli  akin  in  that  i>f  iliosc-  who  l).i>r  iliiir  faith 
(Ml  ihc  niiiac-iil( 'iiN  in  uaUiii-.  'I'lir  iii<iii\  r  in  h.ilh  cases  is  ihc 
srinir,  In  \intlit'alf  \.\\v  >iii)r(.-niai-y  <-t'  th(.-  si)iriltial  i)rinc-ij)k' 
as^aitisi  a  material  rom-rpliMn  ot"  tli'-  unix'crsi-.  The  nlil  <U'- 
isin  suii|i()Sim1  thai  ( i"(l  is  a  l)c-in,iL(  onisidi-  of  llic  wniM,  who 
occasionall\'  inaniu-sud  his  piX'siMKx-  1)\- a  niirai-K'.  I-Ax-nlsat 
certain  poiiiis  of  lime,  liie  en-ation,  the  ilood,  etc.,  wiTe  a]^ 
peahtl  I'l  a-.  ]ii(>Mt's  of  the  (li\-ine  existence.  ju>l  in  the  same 
\va\',  it  ha-^  lieen  lo-i  .ifu-ii  the  cnstoni  to  write  ami  sjirak  as 
if  in  tile  greater  part  of  the  mental  life,  the  self  wiTe  a  mere  on. 
looker.  I'.nl  \-el  in  order  to  (lenionstraU'  llu'  existence  of  the 
self,  who>i-  fniK-lion  tluy  ha\e  almost  taken  awa\  ,  the  -^ame 
writers  claim  that  at  certain  points  in  the  history  of  theimli- 
vidnal,  ihis  jjiwer  steps  in  and  ori.^nnates  new  l)e,i,dnnin;^s. 
lioth  these  truths  rest  on  a  snrer  l)asis  than  sneh  defenders 
have  found  for  them.  Wv-  ha\'e  not  in  psycholo<.;y  to  vindi- 
cate and  exhihit  the  ac-tion  of  self  at  this  point  or  that.  <  )n  the 
coMtrarv,  we  ha\c  foiuwl  reason  for  maintainin,|  that  the  whole 
])s\  tdiical  lifi'  is  a  manifestation  of  the  self.  \'o  part  of  our  expe- 
rience can  he  re.i^ai'ded  as  i^oin,;;'  on  antom.itically,  or  as  handc<l 
o\'erlo  nsrea<l\-  madehy  means  nf  nerxous  processes.  \\\' not 
unfri.(piently  find  the  process  of  external  asso';iation  re,<4ar(led 
as  a  mental  event  that  is  sufficiently  explained  1)\'  the  con- 
nection hetween  the  brain  .L;au:;lia.  Thai  hein^' assumed,  the 
next  sii-p  is  to  endea\'or  to  show,  as  .MiinsterherL;-  has  done,  ' 
that  the  so-called  'inner  association'  is  reducible  to  outer. 
.\}.;ainst  this  point  of  \-iew,  it  is  necessary  to  raise  the  previous 
(piestiou.  We  must  endeavor  to  show  that  external  associa- 
tion is  not  in  itself  intellii^ible  without  postulatin,^-  an  aclivi- 
\\  of  the  self.-' 


■I* 


W'e  ha\e  now  to  in\-esti<j;atc  the  nmrcd   arj^nnients  for  the 
freedom  of  the  will.       It   has  been  ur!.;ed  that  indeterminism 


'  Si-f  MiiiisUihiri,',  Ilri tiiii^i-  zur  t\vf>rr.  /\vilioloi^'it\  \\u\\  I. 

•'  lM)r   ;i    full    and   cuiiviiiciiij^  tlfiiiDiistratioii   of  this  i)oiiU,  rj.   II6ff(^inJ,^ 

t'))t.T  WieiUTfrkfTiiu-n,  .Issociatioti,  i-tc,"  \'.  f.  \v.  I'hil.,  1SS9-90. 


I  Ik    /'i;  ,i/>i»t  i>/    f/ir    Will.  79 

is  iiii|iliitl  Ix'tli  ill  llu'  n-w.mls  uiu!  iiuni.sliiiKiit>  lli;ii  .m- 
(li'all  oiil  I)y  llic  >t;iU'  In  its  (.'iti/iiis,  and  also  in  tli<-  iiitii.il 
jud^'iiKMils  wliii-li  Wf  i)a>s  ii|>.iii  niii  (iwii  (.'Dtiiltirl  or  thai  of 
ollui^.  !l  is  j^rmrally  adniitli'd  that  il  i>  iiiip(»sil)K'  to  (.'x- 
plaiu  or  justify  iiKk-U-niiinisiii  t'loin  ,i  iliroirlical  slaudpoint, 
bill  yc-l  il  is  claiiiui!  as  a  iKi'c's-ars  jxtslulaU'  lioih  of  i-riiuiiial 
law,  and  of  tlu-  fai-ls  of  om  nioial  lifr.  \\\-  shall  li.ivt-  lo 
exaniinf  llusr  cases  scparalt-U . 

In  tlir  liisi  ])iac'c,  il  is  niaintaiiK'd  that  ri'siionsil>ilit\-  hi- 
forc-  llif  law  implies  c-oiilin.m.-iic\ ,  or  a  power  of  aeliiij;  ollur- 
wisc.  A  ,)ud,ii;c  is  iiol  jiisiilk-d  in  condrinninu;  a  i)risonfi  to 
loss  of  lihrrty  or  l<»  ollur  pniii^hiiunl,  il  i->  said,  iinli>s  \w  is 
convinced  thai  llic  man  (.■■uiM  haw  ackd  dilTcrcnlly.  All 
due  j)lacc  for  ihe  fiinclion  of  iiniiishnunl  as  a  rcforniin,!^  and 
(IcUrriiiL;  iiitliiciicc  hcin^;  coiu'cded,  il  i>  (.-lainu'd  thai  lliesc 
tdcmcnls  1)\  no  means  e\han>l  its  nature,  and  ihal  there  is 
soniethinj;-  still  necessary  to  explain  its  nalnic  and  jiislifs  its 
txisleiice.  This  additional  eleiiienl  is  coiilaiiieil  in  llie 
thon^hl  ihal  justice  demand>  llial  the  oiTeiider  >h:dl  he 
pnni>lied.  'I'liis  is  alone  what  iii>li;ie>  pniii>linieiil,  or  al 
Icasl  whal  jiislilics  ns  in  aw  irdin.^  se'.'ae  pniiisliiiKiil  for 
great  crimes,  and  in  inini>liin,:^  with  le--^  se\irilv  for  smaller 
offences.'  "What  i>  reilK-  irne  for  the  ordinar\-  conscious- 
ness, whal  il  eliiii;--  to  and  will  not  let  .^o  ...  is  the  neces- 
sary coniieelioii  lielween  re>ponsil)ilit\-  and  lial)ilily  lo  pnn- 
ishnienl,  helweeii  piinislimeiil  and  deserl  or  the  findini;  of 
gnilliness  before  the  law  or  moral  tribunal."  "'  In  oilier  word>, 
the  idea  of  jnslice  demands  ihal  llie  offender  shall  suffer  and 
make  reparalion  for  his  crime.  This  view  is  slroiij^ly  em- 
phasized by  Kanl  in  the  k'l  dtfsli  ln(.-  "judicial  pnnishnieiil 
{poena  fnrcnsis),  which  is  dislin.miishable  from  tlu-  natural 
punishment   (poi  iia  naf'' '(jlis)  which    overtakes    wickedness 


'Kiiiiulin,    h'nttii   /I  .  Iit/'sii/::i\   '  '1  hir(iiiii;tf>xyiii.   !'iir(iiissi/-:ittn;<>/  c/is 
Sti\ifii(/its. 

-'Bradley,  lithiial  Studies,  y.  5. 


I 


If*- 


Ho 


Th,-   Will. 


Vr- 


and  i>f  wliicli  the  la\v-<^ivcr  lakes  no  account,  can  never  l)e 
rej^anled  as  a  mere  means  to  the  i^ood  of  cither  the  indi- 
vidual liimself,  or  of  societN'.  Hut  it  must  always  he  directed 
aj^ainst  the  transj^ressor  hecause  he  has  hroken  the  law.  .  .  . 
The  individual  must  he  found  worth v  (jf  punishment  hefore 
there  can  he  any  thought  of  makiu!:;-  this  punishment  of  ser- 
vice to  him  or  to  his  felhiw  citizens.  The  law  of  punish- 
ment is  a  cate,!L,n)rical  i)unishmeiit,  and  woe  to  him  who 
follows  the  serpentine  windings  of  a  utilitarian  theorx-  in 
order  to  discover  what  advantaji;-e  ihere  is  to  be  derived  from 
punishment,  according;  to  the  pharisaical  maxim,  'it  is  better 
for  one  man  to  die  ratiier  than  all  the  i)eoj)le  i)erish.''  For  if 
rii^hteousness  should  cease  to  exist,  human  life  would  no 
longer  ha\e  any  value.  .  .  .  ( )iil\-  the  ri.s^ht  of  retribution 
{jus  tali(>nis)  as  exercised,  of  course  b\'  a  jud}.;c,  not  b\'  a 
])ri\ate  iiidi\idu;d,  is  a  real  and  accurate  description  of  the 
(pialit\'  am';  (luantils  (.'!'  punishment  ;  all  other  descriptions 
are  wavering;  and  evasive,  and  have  no  resemblance  to  the 
dictates  of  justice  in  its  slren^•lh  and  purity."  ' 

The  same,  or   almost   the    same    view    of  the   funclion   of 
punishmenl  is  taken  by  Ile^el,   who   re<;ards   punishment   as 
the    inevitable    ne<^atin,i>^    of    the  crime."      vSeveral     modern 
writers  also  insist  upon  'the  idea  of  rejjaration  or  retribution,' 
as  a  necessary  element  of  the  idea  of  i)unishment.' 

In  spite  of  such  hi^h  authoriiies,  however,  I  cannot  ad- 
mit that  criminal  law  presupi)oses  the  power  of  alternative 
on  the  part   of  the   law-breaker.      It   is  only    if  we   insist   in 


> 


% 


M'C.iul,   \\'t-tki\  IM.  XII.]!]!.   11'),  I  S"  i  n.irti.'iisti'iir>  I'll.  ). 

•  U^i'ii'i'.  liil.  \'II1,  p.  i,iS-  -Siiu'f  this  r>sa\-  was  wriUi'ii  >^i'V(.'ral  arlick-s 
(Ualiiin  willi  IKj^i'l's  lludiy  oi"  iiunisliiiunl  \inw  a])]HMn.il  in  ])liil()S()|il-.ical 
journals.  ('/'.  J.  I'",.  .'Mf'ra.um'rl,  /i/i.  Jonni.  of  /■'l/iits.  X'ol,  \'I,  ]>]>.  479  tT.  ; 
ami  S.  W".  Dydi',  "I  tempi's 'riu-Kiy  of  CritiU' and  I'unishiiuiit,"  /'////.  A'l'riVw, 
VII,  ii]).  6.>  IT. 

■W/'.  J.  Si'th,  "Tlic  Tluory  of  ruuislinii'ia."'  l)il.  Jouru.  0/ /Ctiiics,  Vol. 
II.  No.  2. 


\.' 


The   /-'nri/oii/  of  (Ih-    Will. 


8i 


findin,^;  in  puiiisliiiK'nt  a  rdrihutorx'  (.k'HUiit,  an  altcinpl  oil 
llic  pari  of  the  stale  to  ohlaiii  a  (juid  fiio  (/no,  thai  we  leiiuirc 
t(.)  allrihtile  anv  such  unacc'mntahlc  jxjwit  to  the  in<li\iihial. 
All  a  ju(l.i;;e  is  conccnu'd  to  know  is  that  tlu'  in<li\i<lual  has 
acted  with  full  self-cousciou 'Uls>.  TIk-  instinct  to  take  \en- 
<,H-au(-e,  howe\er  useful  it  uia\-  have  heiu  in  a  militant  stale 
of  society,  does  not  !iud  a  place  in  the  eivili/atiou  of  the 
present  time. 

The  prevalent  \iew  of  the  present  a^^e  is  thai  p'nni.-.hment  is 
not  retribution  f^r  pasi  crime;  l)Ul  thai  its  purpose  is  to  prt.'- 
vent  future  wron^doiu^.  What  is  aimed  at.  and  w  ha!  i>  felt  to 
!)(.•  tlu-  ouK  jusiification  of  punishment,  is  the  refMinialinn  of 
tile  criminal,  and  the  proieclinu  of  sucieU-.  This  laUr  end 
is  aceom]:)lislied  in  two  wa\s  ;  uamelw  1)\- freeirn^^  M>ci(.'l\' from 
those  w  ho  \-iolale  its  laws,  and  1)\-  deterring  others  fr^  n\\  follow- 
ing^ their  examjtle.  The  second  dul\'  which  the  >lale  owes  lo 
its  eili/ens,  that  of  education,  is  !)ecominL;  more-  and  more 
pr<jminenl  in  dealiuL;  with  the  criminal  cla>s.  Thoc  aie 
rci^arded  a-  a  class  who  retpiire  souu-  s])ecial  a.ltentiou  ou  the 
pail  of  the  stale,  not  as  wilful  and  deliherale  offi-uders  upon 
wdlo'.U  the  state  is  called  to  lake  \-eU!4ea!lce. 

There  are  two  conditions  under  whicdi  it  is  possible  to  sa\' 
that  if  the  individual  cannot  he'];  doinu;  the  acl,  he  should 
not  he  imuished.  iMrsth',  if  the  act  is  not  the  expression  of 
the  character  of  the  indi\idual,  if  it  has  heeii  extorlid  from 
hiin  1)\'  an  external  a,L;ency,  he  is  not  juslK-  considered  dan- 
t;erous  and  separated  from  the  rest  of  societ\-.  Xor  has  he 
shown  that  he  re{|uires  that  S])ecial  treatment  which  the  state 
deals  out  to  those  who  do  not  realize  themseh'es  in  confor- 
mity with  the  recpiired  norm.  vSecoudl\',  if  his  character  were 
fixed  and  unalterable,  all  efforts  toward  reform  would  be  in 
vair.,  and  it  mi^ht  be  a  (pieslioii  as  to  how  far  the  slate  is 
justiiied  in  usin^  him  as  a  '  means  '  to  (h.-ter  others.  I!ut  pun- 
ishnient  obtains  its  tinal  justilication  from  the  fact  that  the 
ofleiuler  can  be  induced  to  act  differently.  That  is,  ihrouj^h 
the  help  of  tlie  means   provided  by  the  state,  he   can  become 


82 


The   Will. 


anolliL'T  man,  accjuirt.'  new  ends,  and  take  up  a  diHerent  atti- 
tude toward  the  world. 

Tile  reformation  of  the  criminal,  and  the  protection  of 
societv,  ap])ear  to  me,  then,  the  only  ends  which  are,  or 
should  be,  aimed  at  in  punishment.  Hut  in  a  certain  sense 
we  may  say  that  all  punishment  is  retributive.  Punishment  is 
the  denial  or  negation  of  the  wrong  by  the  reaffirmation  of  the 
right ;  and  the  wrong  exists  in  the  will  or  self  of  the  crim- 
inal, therefore  by  i)unishing  him  we  seem  to  destroy  the  evil 
which  we  may  regard  as  perscjuified  in  him.  This  is  in  effect 
what  really  does  take  place,  and  what  the  ])oj)ular  C(/nscious- 
ness  demands.  The  state,  then,  as  the  su])i)ressor  of  crime 
and  promoter  of  good,  may  be  regarded  as  a  moral  or  spiritual 
agent ; '  yet,  although  legal  punishment  is  retributive  in  its 
nature,  it  is  not  retribution  which  is  consciously  aimed  at. 
Such  a  theory  would  offend  our  moral  natures.  Its  truth, 
however,  has  been  well  expressed  by  Mr.  Alexander  as  fol- 
lows :  "The  value  of  the  theory  lies  in  its  placing  human 
punishment  in  a  line  with  the  process  of  self  assertion  by 
which  species  maintain  their  life.  The  human  institution  of 
punishmeiit  is  comprised  under  the  wider  law  of  nature,  of 
the  reaction  of  an  organism  against  anything  which  impedes 
its  vitality.  From  this  comprehensive  point  of  view,  punish- 
ment, therefore,  is  retributive.  Men  do  like  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Jiut  though  it  is  true  to  say  that  i)unisliment  avenges 
the  evil  deed,  if  we  go  on  to  say,  that  we  punish  for  the  sake  of 
vengeance,  or  that  punishment  is  its  own  end,  we  are  not 
only  stating  something  repulsi\'e  in  itself,  but  are  guilty  of 
positive  confusion."" 

( )ur  conception  of  ])unishment,  then,   seems   to  square  as 


'  Cf.,  Rashilall,  fii/.  Join  ii.  of'  Hlliiis,    "  Tlu'Tln'ory  df  PunislniKiit,"  Vol. 

II,   ])]).    2()  fT. 

■■.-Vk'xandcr,  J/oni/  ih-i/cr  and  f^iOi^irss,  p.  t,2^,     Cf.     Also  Ht'fj;el,   Wcrke 

VIII,  n.  I '^o.     "/>>/(■   That  ik's  Vtrhrecheiis  isl  iiiclil  dii  Krsles,   I'osilives 
.  .  .  » 

zii  wolchei.i  (lie  StialY-  als  NL.L,'ation  kiiiiie  ;  soiiduni  eiu  Negatives,  so   dass 

die  Strafe  luir  Negation  der  Negation  ist." 


The  Frcedotfi  (^f  thr   Will. 


83 


well  with  (Icterniini.sin  as  with  freedom.  Indeed,  we  may 
claim,  that  onh-  uj)()n  the  supp().siti(;n  that  a  man's  acts  repre- 
sent his  character,  and  take  place  accordin.i^  to  fixed  laws, 
does  there  apjiear  to  be  an\-  hoj^e  of  intlnencinj^  him  in  anv- 
way.  We  ma\-,  j)crhaps,  then  assert,  that  if  the  retril)ntory 
theory  of  jmnishment  postnlales  freedom  of  alternati\es,  the 
reformatory  conception  demands  as  a  j)resnp])osition,  deter- 
minism. It  is  jiist  hecan.se  a  man  aviih'/  lirlp  acting  as  he 
does,  that  he  recpiires  to  he  sej)arale(l  from  society,  and  snh. 
jected  to  a  special  kind  of  treatment. 

The  distinctiveh'  moral  ari^niment  is  based  on  the  feel  in  j^  of 
ol)li<.(ation,  and  the  retrospective  jnd.<.i;ments  we  jiass  on  onr 
own  condnct.  It  is  contained  in  Kant's  famons  statement, 
"  the  onii^ht  imi)lies  tiie  can."  Xow  it  is  nr^ed  with  jj^reat 
force  by  some  modern  writers,  that  althony^h,  from  the  jjoint 
of  view  of  psychi)lo^;v,  we  cannot  escape  deterministic  con- 
clnsions,  vet  tlie  fact  of  morality  compels  ns  to  postnlate  in- 
determinism.  In  either  words,  the  reco<.jnition  of  an  act  as 
one  which  I  om'ht  to  perform,  implies  abilit\'  on  m\-  part  to 
perform  it.  The  feeling  of  remorse,  which  is  the  consecpu-nce 
of  the  net^lect  of  some  dnty,  W(Mdd  be  ntterly  vain  and  nn- 
nieaninij,  it  is  said,  if  I  am  so  con^titnted  as  to  be  incapable 
of  actinj^  otherwise.  "  hjti.vr  free  will  is  a  fail,  <ii  moral  jnd<.(- 
nient  adelnsion.  "  '  "  Whatever  may  be  the  case  with  the  in- 
tellectual problem,  the  facts  which  we  call  moral,  thesnpreme 
facts  of  human  existence,  do,  as  Kant  insisted,  d<'nuind  such 
reference  to  a  freely  aetinj^  jjer.sonality.  "  • 

If  determinism  really  destnjys  our  moral  conceptions,  we 
mnst  admit  that  this  is  a  stronj>;  arj^-nnient  aj^ainst  it.  h'or  it 
is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  facts  f)f  our  moral  consciousness 
are  as  real  and  authoritative  as  any  other  facts  of  our  life.  I 
venture  to  think,  however,  that  moral  conceptions  and  facts 
will  not  be  found   incompatible  with  determinism.      We  may 


'  Martint-au,  Type^  of  Ethical  Theory,  Vol.  II.,  p.  141. 
'J.  Sc'lli,  h'>cedo)n  <is  I'.thiial  Postultttc.  \>.  24. 


t'' 


i 


«i 


Tin    Will. 


indeed  have  to  modify  to  some  extent  our  traditional  notitMis 
of  nioralit\-;  but  I  l)t'lie\-e  that  wlien  thus  nKxlified,  they  will  be 
mole  in  accordanee  witli  our  e\er\-da\' exj-erience,  and  with 
till-  laws  of  psycIiolnL^y.  iMrsl,  then,  it  seems  e\ideiit  that 
the  im])ortanee  of  freedom  as  an  ethical  pDStnlate  has  i^rown 
onl  of  ihi.-  eonc-eplion  of  nioralitx'  as  moral  law.  "  It  is 
lhn)UL;h  ihe  jural  conception  of  ethics  that  tlie  contniVL-rsy  of 
f'ee  will  chielly  becomes  imi)orlant.  A  plain  man  (V^k:<~  nut 
n.ituralK-  luonire  whelher  lie  is  free  or  not  to  seek  his  own 
!l;oo<1,  proviiled  tniK'  that  he  knows  what  it  is,  and  that  it  is 
atlr.inable  by  voluniar\'  aclion.  i'.ut  when  his  conduct  is 
compared  with  a  v^A^^  to  the  violaPMiiof  which  punishments 
are  attached,  the  «|Uesli<ia  whether  lie  realK'  could  ob^y  the 
rule  by  which  he  is  jnd.n'.d  is  o!)\-ion,s  and  iiUA'itaole  ;  since  if 
he  could  not,  it  seems  contrary  to  our  seu.seuf  iu>ti(  .  to  -pun- 
ish him."  '  liut  in  modern  tinu>  we  seem  to  ha\e  reverted 
to  Aristotle's  coiiee])tion  of  nioralit}'  as  action  according;  to 
an  end.  it  Sfeins  (piite  possible,  tlK'U,  tliat  mor;dit_\-  will  re- 
main just  what  it  is,  whether  we  are  free  or  determined. 
hUhics,  like  lo,u;ic,  is  a  norinati\'e  science.  Just  as  io^ic  pre- 
scribes certain  laws  or  standards  for  llionoht,  so  L'thicN  at- 
teiii])ts  to  ili.scover  the  norms  K^{  ri^ht  conduct.  'iMiese 
norms  may  be-  prescribed  by  scjciety,  >'et  the  indi\-idual 
in  virtue  of  his  moral  nature,  must  ado])t  them  as  his  own. 
The  feeling;  of  oblii^ation  is  simpU  tlR-  imiiK-diate  con- 
sciousness of  the  individual  that  these  ends  have  a  ri.^ht  Vo 
him.  'rhe\-  carry  with  them,  as  Kant  remarked,  a  certain 
di^nitv'  and  majestx'  before-  \\hi(di  our  moral  nature  bows 
down.  A  feelini;  of  oblioaiiou  is  simply  the  reeoi^nition  of 
the  anthorit)'  and  universalitv  of  certain  norms  of  couduci. 
What  then  is  the  truth  in  the  ar.^nnu'Ut  that  the  "t)U,L;ht'  im- 
plies tiie  '  can  '  ?     Xot    that    we  could    ha\-e  acted   otherwise 


'  SiilK^vick,  llisloiv  '  /'./liiis,  \\.  lo.  (.%im])aix'  P.-uilsin's  iKscriiitiiiu  of 
till-  ])i()l>k:ii  as  Dili-  "  V.  lui 'i  ii(>u-  'iiiUt  eurlaiii  ooiidilions  ami  has  disa])- 
])t.'ar(.'(l  with  ilu'  (lisai)])t.'arain'.'  m"  ihcs  uiiditions,  a  prnhlfiii  wliich  exists 
only  lor  a  llicolo^ic  il  or  schoia  i:c  iihiloso])liy."     I'ltliik.  p.  357. 


I'hr   l-i(',tioni  i<J  tlir    Will. 


thar.  we  did  in  cases  wliciv  \vc  li;  vc  faik-d  ;  hwv  thai  \vc  are 
cap(xhlr  of'  ht'(0)iiiu^  sniiicthiii,L(  hcUcr  than  we  are  at  present. 
The  'on<4-ht'  does  not  in.ply  that  we  can  here  and  now  real- 
ize  an\'  ideal  whieli  we  reeo^ni/e  as  hindin,^  npon  ns  ;  hnt  it 
implies  'canhood,'  llu-  i)otentialil\-  of  attaining  a  position 
lii;4hcr  than  we  have  \el  reaehed.  The  recoj^nilion  ot'  ><)nie- 
thin,^-  as  that  which  ou.^dit  to  he  realized  is  the  sole  condition 
of  fntnre  progress.  The  I'eelin-  of  ohlioaiion,  so  to  speak, 
contains  in  it  'the  promise  and  jxilency'  of  all  moral  im- 
provement. .And  it  is  hecan^e  we  reco,<^ni/e  these  moral  ends 
as  attainable  that  they  have  an\-  l.indin.i^  force  for  ns.  if 
onr  characters  were  not  snhject  to  chan.^e,  fatalism  wonld  he 
the  logical  ontconie  of  Determinism.  If  1  were  persuaded 
that  an\-  external  force  ])re\ented  nie  from  hecoiniiii^  other 
than  1  am,  no  ideals  of  a  better  life  wonid  bi-  reco.^nized  as 
obliuaiovy.  TIk'  fatalist  sav^ ;  'If  m\  act  is  the  resnllanl 
oi  m\-  character  and  environment,  m\  fntnre  condnci  is  ab- 
solnleK-  nece.ssar\-.  My  character  is  .-i\ en  .md  niv  circnm- 
stances  as  well,  therefore  the  resnll  is  something-  over  which 
I  can  ha\e  no  control.'  If  such  were  tlu  .ainal  facts  of  the 
case,  moral  oblijj;alion  woidd  be  <.nlirel\  meaninj^less.  The 
leelin,i,f  of  responsibility  which  has  as  its  basis  'the  imme.li- 
ale  conscionsness  of  iMeedoni  "  is  a  wilio  ai;^ument  against 
an\-  snch  position. 

We  have  next  to  consider  in  v.'hat  way  a  Determinist  can 
interpret  the  feelin;j^  of  remorse,  and  the  coirscionsness  of  sin. 
It  is  nr.i^ed  with  j^reat  force  by  the  advocates  of  I"ree  Will, 
that  if  we  do  not  admit  the  po.ssibilit\-  ofdoinj^  otherwise,  at 
least  in  crncial  ca.so,  these  term.s  represent  mere  illnsions.  We 
ina\-  err,  it  is  said,  bnt  we  cannot  sin,  nor  can  we  have  any 
reason  for  remorse.  I  venture,  iiowever,  to  think  that  a  real 
meanin,^  and  a  sufficient  ju.stiCicalion  can  be  i^isen  to  thcst 
t\>elin-r.s  without  recoj^nizin^r  anv  such  i)o.stidate.  If  the  in- 
dividual admits  that  tlie  action  in  (pie.stion  has  been  con- 
sciouslv  willed  in-  him,  and  that  uothinj^-  but  his  own  char- 
acter  led  to  its  adoption,  and  if  now  he  has  come  to  a  belter 


86 


The   Will. 


iniiul  and  recognizes  that  it  is  not  in  c(3nf()rniity  with  some 
ideal  wliicli  is  rc<^arded  as  hij^lier,  and  hence  as  oblij^atory, 
he  has  ever\-  possiljle  motive  for  reproachin^"^  liimsclf.  The 
feelinj^r  (jf  remorse  is  the  immediate  resnlt  of  the  i)ercej)tion 
of  the  discrepancy  existinj^  between  the  ideal  and  the  actnal. 
Tile  Determinist,  i-ej^rardin*^'-  his  act  as  the  expression  of  liis 
character,  and  not  of  some  mnnotived  freak  of  willinj^,  has 
the  stnjnj^est  ])ossible  reasons  for  feelin<4-  remorse.  It  is  when 
Tie  fnlly  realizes  that  the  act  i-  his  own — that  he  is  a  man  of 
sncli  a  character — that  his  feelin<;  of  remor^^e  becomes  most 
poij^nant,  and  he  i.'.  ready  to  abhor  himself  and  exclaim, 
'  wretched  man  that  i  am  ;  who  shall  deliver  me !'  He 
jndj^es  and  condemns  not  merely  the  act,  bnt  his  own  char- 
acter, which  the  action  has  shown  to  fall  so  far  short  of 
what  it  oujj^ht  to  be,  and  of  the  standard  v/hich  his  (jwn  moral 
natnre  demands.  K'emorsc  when  apjilied  by  an  individnal 
to  his  (3wn  character  in  tliis  sense,  has  a  real  regenerating  in- 
fluence. If,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  indulged  in  as  vain  regrets 
regarding  the  jiast,  it  is  debasing  antl  lunnaid}-.  The  j)ain 
which  I  feel  today  when  some  act  has  shown  me  that  I  am 
mean  or  cowardh-,  1)ccomes  a  force,  a  motive,  to  lead  me  to  a 
better  life,  b'thical  jndgments,  whciher  passed  upon  our- 
selves or  others,  are  justifiable  onl\  if  they  are  used  as  ethical 
forces  in  or^Ier  that  a  different  course  of  action  may  be 
followed.  "  When  we  i)rouounce  ethical  judgment  up<in 
CLliers,  the  question  is  not  whether  or  i  )t  they  could  have 
acted  otherwise  ;  but  we  l)lame  an  act  in  order  that  the  will 
of  the  individual  may  act  differently  in  futup  .  We  have  no 
right  t(j  pro  1  ounce  ethical  judgments  upon  others  except 
from  ethical  motives.  Every  one  who  expresses  an  ethica' 
judgment  uses  forces  which  are  among  the  strongest  and 
deepest  in  the  world,  and  imposes  upon  himself,  therefore, 
an  ethical  responsibility."  ' 


'HoffdiiiK,  "  Die  Gesetzma.ssigke;;  der  psych.  .Vctiviliit,' 
XV,  4. 


V.   f,   w.,  rhil. 


